

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	1	L	C	A	D	1	2	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5	
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE						14	LICENSE NUMBER										25	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE 01 6 01 50 00 02 54 7 0 17 11 77 9 8 07 30 79 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While performing reactor high pressure automatic blowdown functional
0 3 test, QIS 40, the high pressure switch in the Target Rock safety/relief
0 4 valve controller was found inoperable (T.S. 3.5.D.1). The auto-blowdown,
0 5 manual, and safety functions of the valve were still operable. The four
0 6 remaining relief valves were functionally tested satisfactorily.
0 7
0 8

0	9	SYSTEM CODE		C	2	11	CAUSE CODE		A	12	CAUSE SUBCODE		C	13	COMPONENT CODE				I	N	S	T	R	U	14	COMP. SUBCODE		S	15	VALVE SUBCODE		Z	16
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		0	2	3	OCCURRENCE CODE		0	3	REPORT TYPE		L	REVISION NO.		0					
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																			
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32																		
E	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z																		
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48																		

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The lead wire from the switch to the terminal had come loose. The
1 1 leadwire had not been securely tightened to the terminal when the switch
1 2 had been replaced and tested during the last surveillance. The connector
1 3 was tightened sufficiently to prevent the lead from coming loose again.
1 4

FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 E 29 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
 % POWER 0 9 8 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
 OTHER STATUS (30) NA 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) B 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Routine Test 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
 ACTIVITY CONTENT (33) 1 6 Z 33 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
 RELEASED OF RELEASE (34) Z 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE		DESCRIPTION				
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	2	0	0	0	NA

8		9		11		12		80	
TYPE		DESCRIPTION		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY					
1	9	Z	(42)	NA		(43)		7908140 690 J	

7 8 9 10 80
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 650 002 NRC USE ONLY
2 0 N (44) NA
7 8 9 10 80

NAME OF PREPARER D. Clark

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- I. LER NUMBER 79-23/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION
- III. FACILITY NAME UNIT ONE
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER 050-254
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On July 7, 1979, the instrument maintenance department performed the reactor high pressure automatic blowdown functional test, QIS 40. While performing the test, the mechanic found the high pressure switch in the Target Rock safety/relief valve controller was inoperable. This condition made the high pressure relief function of the 1-203-3A relief valve inoperable, which is contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.D.1. The auto-blowdown, manual, and safety valve functions of the valve were still operable. The four remaining relief valves were functional tested satisfactorily. An immediate investigation was begun to determine the problem.

The only problems previously encountered with the controller pressure switches is setpoint drift; the most recent of which is documented in LER/RO 78-21/03L-0.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

One function of the Target Rock safety/relief valve is to protect the reactor vessel from overpressurization. The valve utilizes a pressure sensing switch which operates an air-operated pilot valve. The open pilot valve will cause the main disc to open and relieve the reactor pressure. When the high pressure switch is inoperable, the relief protection provided by this valve is lost. However, since the safety mode was operable and is set at the same actuation pressure as the relief high pressure switch, overpressure protection was still in effect. The automatic blowdown and manual modes of the valve were still operable and would have performed as designed under a ECCS initiation. The four remaining electromagnetic relief valves and all nine reactor vessel safety valves were capable of keeping the reactor coolant boundary intact. The high pressure coolant injection system was also operable throughout the duration of the occurrence. Since the remainder of the system was operable and capable of controlling any abnormal transient; the primary coolant boundary integrity was not jeopardized as a result of this occurrence.

VII. CAUSE

The cause of this occurrence has been attributed to personnel performance. The pressure switch had been replaced and tested during the last surveillance. Since that time, the lead wire from the switch to the terminal came loose, rendering the high pressure switch inoperable. The lead wire had not been securely tightened to the terminal when the switch was replaced.

The pressure switch is an integral part of the Consolidated Electromatic Relief Valve Controller type 1539 VX.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The loose lead wire was found and reconnected to the proper terminal. The connector was tightened sufficiently to prevent the lead from coming loose again. The high pressure switch was then retested satisfactorily. A discussion was held with the personnel involved in replacing the switch about the importance of checking over his work before finishing a job and performing work in a professional manner.