

RO TELEGRAM FORMAT

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SUBJECT: HATCH UNIT 2, DOCKET NO. 50-366, NOTIFICATION OF REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
NO. 50-366/1979-59, Rev. 0

NOTIFIED: Ross F. Rogers

DATE: 6-28-79

DATE: 6-27-79
TIME: 2:00 PM (circa)

DESCRIPTION OF REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

Initial Conditions:

Prior to performance of Unit 2 startup test for MSIV closure, reactor power was 97 percent (2365 MWt). At 1220 CDT, MSIV closure test was started. Reactor scram followed as a result of MSIV closure. RCIC and HPCI systems isolated on steam line high differential pressure. The requirements of technical specification 3/4.7.3.b and 3/4.5.1 Action A were met for both RCIC and HPCI respectively.

Nature of Occurrence:

RCIC and HPCI systems isolated on steam line high differential pressure. Systems were manually started and RCIC system ran throughout the duration of the MSIV closure test. HPCI was started at 1238 CDT to raise water level and shut down at 1239 CDT.

Immediate Corrective Actions:

As systems isolated, they were manually started and later secured after test completion. Test shop personnel were notified of isolation and were instructed to check calibration of steam line high differential pressure switches 2E51-M017 and M018 and 2E41-M004 and M005.

Cause:

Calibration of RCIC switches 2E51-M017 and M018 were found to be acceptable per procedural requirements. Cause of RCIC system isolation has not been determined at this time and is under investigation by both utility and HSSS supplier. HPCI high steam line differential pressure switches 2E41-M004 and M005 were checked. Switch 2E41-M005 was found to be acceptable however M004 was out of calibration. Switch 2E41-M004 was recalibrated and returned to service.

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Supplemental Corrective Action:

Following completion of investigation, supplemental corrective actions will be taken.

Status of Rack Up or Redundant System:


The ADS system was operable and capable of performing its required function in its intended manner. Both the HPCI and RCIC systems were successfully started manually.

Impact to Other Unit:

Unit 1 was in cold shutdown for hanger modifications and refueling. The results of problem identification and corrective actions will be considered for application to Unit 1 systems. Previous failures of both systems (HPCI and RCIC) on both Units 1 and 2 will be re-evaluated.

Justification for Continued Operation:

Continued operation cannot be justified until the cause of the HPCI and RCIC isolation can be identified and corrected.


M. Marry
Plant Manager

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