



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III  
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210  
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

August 28, 2019

Mr. Joel P. Gebbie  
Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer  
Indiana Michigan Power Company  
Nuclear Generation Group  
One Cook Place  
Bridgman, MI 49106

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2—BIENNIAL PROBLEM  
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT  
05000315/2019010 AND 05000316/2019010

Dear Mr. Gebbie:

On August 1, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Petro, Managing Director of Engineering, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at D.C. Cook.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Eric R. Duncan, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316  
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

Enclosure:  
As stated

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Letter to Joel Gebbie from Eric Duncan dated August 28, 2019

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2—BIENNIAL PROBLEM  
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT  
05000315/2019010 AND 05000316/2019010

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
**Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000315 and 05000316

License Numbers: DPR-58 and DPR-74

Report Numbers: 05000315/2019010 and 05000316/2019010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0046

Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Company

Facility: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Bridgman, MI

Inspection Dates: July 15, 2019 to August 01, 2019

Inspectors: G. Hausman, Senior Reactor Inspector  
J. Mancuso, Resident Inspector  
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector  
J. Winslow, Resident Inspector

Approved By: Eric R. Duncan, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### List of Findings and Violations

Unit 1 Steam Dump Valves Inadvertently Failed Open			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green FIN 05000315/2019010-01 Open/Closed	[H.14] - Conservative Bias	71152B
A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that all design specifications for the Unit 1 Alarm Log Computer (ALPC) associated with a reactor controls and instrumentation (RCI) system engineering change were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure a design specification that the "engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions" was met when an engineer opened an ALPC human machine interface display screen on the system's Unit 1 engineering workstation and the steam dump valves re-positioned to 75 percent open.			

### Additional Tracking Items

None.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

### 71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

#### Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensee's corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
  - Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the corrective action program (CAP) in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems.
  - Operating Experience, Self-Assessments, and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's processes for the use of operating experience, audits, and self-assessments.
  - Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs used to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment.

## INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment	71152B
<p>Corrective Action Program: Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee's performance in the areas of problem identification and the implementation of the process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems adequately supported nuclear safety.</p> <p>The inspectors performed reviews of the essential service water system and the auxiliary feedwater system. Additionally, the inspectors performed an expanded 5 year review of the emergency diesel generator system. As part of these reviews, the inspectors conducted system walkdowns and evaluated condition reports, engineering changes, and work orders. Interviews with licensee staff were also conducted as part of the reviews.</p> <p>The inspectors identified a weakness in the effectiveness of corrective actions taken to resolve an issue documented in the CAP. A minor violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,</p>	

Criterion V was identified when the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and effectiveness reviews for AR 2018-1045 associated with a root cause evaluation in the Security Department. This minor violation is documented in this inspection report.

Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits: Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee was generally effective in the use of operating experience in the CAP. When performing causal analyses and determining corrective actions, the inspectors determined that operating experience was routinely utilized and reviews were completed in accordance with licensee procedures. In addition, the team sampled operating experience from the NRC, industry, vendors, and third party groups and determined that for the samples selected that appropriate assessments for applicability to the licensee were performed.

The inspectors also reviewed licensee self-assessments and audits. The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately performing self-assessments and audits in accordance with licensee procedures and implementing corrective actions as needed.

Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the licensee's safety conscious work environment (SCWE).

The licensee's employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of several means available. The inspectors observed various station meetings, including those in which new CAP items were reviewed, and interviewed a representative cross-section of station personnel.

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the overall health of the Employee Concerns Program. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed the Employee Concerns Program Manager, reviewed recent case logs and case files, and considered statements received during interviews with station personnel.

Unit 1 Steam Dump Valves Inadvertently Failed Open			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green FIN 05000315/2019010-01 Open/Closed	[H.14] - Conservative Bias	71152B
A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that all design specifications for the Unit 1 Alarm Log Computer (ALPC) associated with a reactor controls and instrumentation (RCI) system engineering change were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure a design specification that the "engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions" was met when an engineer opened an ALPC human machine interface display screen on the system's Unit 1 engineering workstation and the steam dump valves re-positioned to 75 percent open.			

Description:

On May 7, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 3, and during RCI troubleshooting activities at the engineering workstation for the RCI system, the Unit 1 Group 1 steam dump valves unexpectedly re-positioned to 75 percent open as indicated on the Reactor Operator ALPC.

A licensee cause evaluation subsequently determined that during the troubleshooting activities that were in progress at the time of the event, an ALPC human machine interface display screen on the RCI system's engineering workstation that was opened as part of the troubleshooting activities caused an inadvertent demand signal to be sent to the Unit 1 steam dump valves, which caused the valves to re-position to 75 percent open. The licensee determined that software files stored on the engineering work station to support testing for a recently installed RCI system change were not removed and, as a result, the steam dump valves re-positioned when the engineering workstation was opened. This was contrary to the design specifications for the RCI engineering change, which stated that the "engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions."

Corrective Actions: As a part of their immediate corrective actions, operators placed the steam dump control selector switches to off and ensured that the Unit 1 Group 1 steam dump valves re-positioned closed. Additionally, the licensee deleted the ALPC software files that resulted in the unexpected demand signal from the Unit 1 engineering workstation and performed an extent of condition review on Unit 2.

Corrective Action References: AR 2019-4970, Unit 1 Steam Dumps Failed Open

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to ensure that all design specifications for the ALPC associated with an RCI system modification were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to comply with a design specification that the "engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions," which was identified during troubleshooting by an engineer using the RCI system's engineering workstation when the steam dumps unexpectedly re-positioned to 75 percent open.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the inadvertent opening of the steam dump valves in Mode 3 caused a Reactor Coolant System pressure and temperature transient. However, if left uncorrected, when operating in Mode 1 the inadvertent opening of the steam dump valves could cause a significant power transient which would affect the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors answered 'No' to all the "Transient Initiators" questions in Exhibit 1, "Initiating Events Screening Questions." Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (i.e., Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, in

this instance, the licensee did not ensure that factory acceptance testing and post modification testing for the engineering workstation associated with the RCI system engineering change positively validated the design specification that the engineering workstation not include the capability for control functions. As a result, the licensee was unaware that the RCI system's engineering workstation could perform direct control functions due to the ALPC software files being located on the engineering workstation.

Enforcement:

The inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Minor Violation

71152B

Minor Violation: The inspectors reviewed AR 2018-1045 associated with a root cause evaluation in the Security Department. During the review, the inspectors identified that one of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) associated with the supervisory review of electronic logs was not being performed as written. Specifically, the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) approved CAPR 2018-1045-28 to, "Establish a requirement for Security supervision to perform a shiftly review of new electronic logs." The inspectors, however, identified that Security supervision was only reviewing a portion of the new electronic logs shiftly, and not performing a full review of electronic logs shiftly as directed by the CAPR. Licensee procedure PMP-7030-CAP-002, "Condition Action and Closure," Step 3.3, states, in part, that CARB concurrence is required for the following:...CAPR approvals; CAPR modifications; and making any changes to an open CAPR assignment that has been previously reviewed and concurred with by CARB." However, CAPR 2018-1045-28, which was a CAPR assignment that had been previously reviewed and concurred with by CARB, was modified by Security supervision to only review a portion of the new electronic log shiftly without CARB approval. The inspectors identified this as a minor violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." This issue was documented in the licensee's CAP as AR 2019-7109.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was not a finding of more than minor significance based on answering 'No' to all of the more-than-minor screening questions. The inspectors also reviewed the examples of minor issues in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," and determined that this issue was most closely related to Example 4.a in that that this was a procedural error that had no safety impact.

Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V constituted a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

## EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On August 1, 2019, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. J. Petro, Managing Director of Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Calculations	SD-180731-001	Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Heat Exchanger (HE-15E/W) Tube Flaw Structural Evaluation	0
	Corrective Action Documents	AR 00863160	Inadequate Evaluation on NSAL-00-009	01/07/2010
		AR 2010-3656	1-ABD-B-3D Breaker Tripped Open When Pump Auto Started	10/14/2010
		AR 2013-1347	Fuel Injector Pump Spraying Fuel Oil on Diesel Surveillance	07/18/2014
		AR 2013-6194	Reserve Feed Tripped Due to a Fault	06/19/2014
		AR 2014-15099	Identified Pin Hole Leak in 2-HV-AFP-EAC Essential Service Water Piping	12/02/2014
		AR 2014-9231	AutoPIPE – Time History Error	08/06/2014
		AR 2014-9877	Foreign Material Exclusion Cover Installed on AB Diesel Generator Vent Caused Indicator Problems	02/19/2016
		AR 2015-14015	Bentley Software STAAD.Pro Has Critical Errors	10/28/2015
		AR 2015-14961	Inability of Component Cooling Water System to Supply Make Up	11/17/2015
		AR 2015-6917	Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Tripped During Post Maintenance Testing Run	02/24/2017
		AR 2015-8935	PAA 15-05-01 Interface Between Design Engineering and Procurement Engineering	07/10/2015
		AR 2015-8935-46	Evaluate Change Management Plan Effectiveness	06/01/2017
		AR 2015-8935-47	Final Effectiveness Review Based Upon Revised Change Management Plan	06/12/2017
		AR 2016-13049	Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel Generator Essential Service Water Supply Line Pipe Degradation	11/10/2016
		AR 2016-14625-30	Interim Effectiveness Review - Emergency Diesel Generator Delivery Valve Holder	11/03/2017
		AR 2016-14625-31	Perform Final Effectiveness Review - Emergency Diesel Generator Delivery Valve Holder	12/13/2017
		AR 2016-8003	Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator Seized Fuel Injection Pump Failure Analysis	05/24/2017
		AR 2017-13059	U1 TDAFP Failed Surveillance, Failed to Reach Rated Speed	12/21/2017

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		AR 2017-1330	AREOR 2015 Contained Documentation Errors	02/02/2017
		AR 2017-2597	Primary Water Does Not Meet Operating Basis Earthquake Design Requirements	03/06/2017
		AR 2017-3227	Commercial Grade Part Installed on Safety Related Component	03/24/2017
		AR 2017-3711	Declining Performance Trend of CAP Quality	04/10/2017
		AR 2017-4629	Part 21 Relay Found in 1-CD Emergency Diesel Generator OME-150-CD Inverter	06/13/2017
		AR 2017-5836	Unit 2 Containment Spray Additive Tank Percent Sodium Hydroxide Below Administration Limit	06/12/2017
		AR 2017-6217	Compensatory Action Will Not Supply Adequate Flow for CCW Makeup	06/22/2017
		AR 2017-6571	U1 EMDAFP Outboard Bearing Housing Cap Missing Gasket	07/06/2017
		AR 2017-7002	NCV 2017-007-01: EDC Procedure Provides Incorrect Guidance	07/21/2017
		AR 2017-7015	NCV 2017-007-01: Operability Evaluation Performed for AR 00863160	07/21/2017
		AR 2017-7192	Worker Entered Radiologically Controlled Area Without Radiation Work Permit or Self-Reading Dosimeter	07/25/2017
		AR 2017-7211	NCV 2017-007-01: Timely Resolution of Potentially Non-Conforming/Degraded Issues	07/27/2017
		AR 2017-8605	Material Grade Change Not Captured in Impact Review for Engineering Changes	09/08/2017
		AR 2017-8607	Seismic and Piping Calculations Do Not Match Installation Engineering Change	09/08/2017
		AR 2017-8921	1-MDFPX2B Relay Failed Testing	09/16/2017
		AR 2017-9683	Insufficient Maintenance of Safety Related Components	09/29/2017
		AR 2018-0634	Unit 1 Letdown Safety Lifted While Removing Letdown Orifice	05/23/2018
		AR 2018-10405	Discrepancy between Design and UFSAR Damping Values	11/14/2018
		AR 2018-10443	Commercial Grade Dedication Deficiency	11/15/2018
		AR 2018-1045	Root Cause Evaluation in Security Department	01/31/2018

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		AR 2018-3506	Radiation Protection Did Not Verify Dose Rates for Unit 1 CLV Work	03/27/2018
		AR 2018-6917	Potential Commonality in Recent Repeat Events	07/05/2018
		AR 2018-7570	Component Cooling Water to Essential Service Water Leak Identified on Unit 1 East Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger	07/27/2018
		AR 2018-8046	Unsupported 1" Safety Injection Line at 1-GSI-R509	08/13/2018
		AR 2018-9481	High Steam Generator Sodium Concentration in Unit 2	10/09/2018
		AR 2019-1165	Staff Did Not Fully Correct Identified Condition	02/05/2019
		AR 2019-1409	Issue with Effectiveness Review Performed in 2016-2026-18	02/13/2019
		AR 2019-1677	Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Assessment Finding	02/21/2019
		AR 2019-1680	Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Assessment Finding	02/21/2019
		AR 2019-1681	Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Assessment Finding	02/21/2019
		AR 2019-3227	Degraded Concrete Pier in Unit 1 Forebay	03/28/2019
		AR 2019-3285	Potential Issue Identified with Corrective Actions	03/29/2019
		AR 2019-3770	Water Leaking from 1-HV-AFP-T2AC, TDAFP Room Cooler	04/12/2019
		AR 2019-4188	1-HV-AFP-T2AC Piping Leak	04/21/2019
		AR 2019-4968	Steam Dump Controller Failed	05/07/2019
		AR 2019-4970	Unit 1 Steam Dumps Failed Open	05/07/2019
		AR 2019-5396	N-44 Was Declared Inoperable	07/13/2019
		AR 2019-5469	1-WRV-772 and 1-WRV-762 Failed Full Stroke on Backup Air	05/22/2019
		AR 2019-6920	1AB Emergency Diesel Generator Assumed Load After Divorcing from T11A Bus	07/16/2019
		GT 2017-9541	RA- NRC Bulletin Gap Analysis	09/27/2017
		GT 2018-0355	Evaluate EN 53151 Defect in Thermostatic Valve Assemblies	01/11/2018
		GT 2018-10826	High Pressure Coolant Injection Inboard Steam Valve Failure	12/03/2018
		GT 2018-4488	Enhancements to 12-EHP-4030-056-218	10/17/2018
		GT 2019-5044	Refuel Platform Hoist Failure During Fuel Movement	05/09/2019
	Corrective Action	AR 2019-6942	Logs were Not Completed or Identified	07/17/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2019-7109	Procedure Step Was Not Implemented as Intended	07/22/2019
		AR 2019-7471	Deficiencies in AR 2015-14015 - STAAD.Pro Critical Errors	08/01/2019
	Engineering Changes	EC 52453	Unit 1 - Reactor Controls Instrumentation System Upgrade	1
		EC 55754	Install Mechanical Jumper	06/25/2018
	Miscellaneous		Management Screening Committee Agenda	Various
			Daily Screened Actions	Various
			Operating Experience Screening Committee Agenda	07/18/2019
			Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Summary	05/19/2017
			Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)	Various
		50.59 Evaluation 2015-0479-01	12-TM-15-49-R2: Compensatory Action in Support of Component Cooling Water Passive Failure	11/25/2015
		50.59 Screen 2015-0479-01	12-TM-15-49-R2: Compensatory Action in Support of Component Cooling Water Passive Failure	11/24/2015
		50.59 Screen 2017-0331-00	EC 55754: Compensatory Action in Support of Component Cooling Water Failure	10/27/2017
		FCR 55461-006	Field Change Request: Modification and Addition of Supports Located on 3 Inch Primary Water Piping (EC 55461 HC Revision 0)	0
		LER 315/2010-001-00	1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Inoperable	06/18/2010
		LER 315/2013-002-00	System Actuation of the Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator	06/24/2013
		LER 315/2014-002-00	Non-Compliance with LCO 3.8.1 During Surveillance Preparations	10/20/2014
		LER 315/2015-001-00	Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications	07/29/2015
		LER 316/2005-001-00	Reactor Trip from RCP Bus Under-Voltage Signal Complicated by Diesel Generator Output Breaker Failure	01/09/2006
		LER 316/2016-002-00	Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue	02/09/2017
		LER 316/2018-001-00	Valid Actuation of the Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing	06/04/2018
		NEI 16-07	Technical Report - Improving the Effectiveness of Issue	0

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Resolution to Enhance Safety and Efficiency	
		NEI Efficiency Bulletin: 17-14	Improving the Effectiveness of Issue Resolution to Enhance Safety and Reliability	1
		ODMI 1-18-001	Component Cooling Water Leakage Trending	05/01/2019
	Operability Evaluations	AR 2018-3803-1	Increasing Trend in Vibrations and Noise on 1-PP-7E Essential Service Water	04/08/2018
		AR 2018-7570-1	Component Cooling Water to Essential Service Water Leak Identified on Unit 1 East Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger	08/02/2018
	Procedures	1-OHP-4021-003-001	Letdown, Charging and Seal Water Operation	77
		1-OHP-4024-122	Annunciator #122 Response: Plant Service	34
		1-OHP-4024-130	Annunciator #130 Response: Makeup Water System	8
		12-EHP-5043-CGD-001	Commercial Grade Dedication	18
		12-EHP-5043-EDC-001	Evaluation of Degraded/Non-Conforming Conditions	26
		12-EHP-5043-ERP-001	Engineering Review of Procurement Documents	32
		12-OHP-5030-016-001	Supplying Essential Service Water to Component Cooling Water for Makeup Using a Temporary Modification	5
		12-THP-6010-RPP-006	Radiation Permit (RWP) Processing	40
		12-THP-6010-RPP-104	Personnel Dosimetry Use in Varying Radiation Fields	21
		12-THP-6010-RPP-401	Performance of Radiation and Contamination Surveys	42
		12-THP-6010-RPP-407	Special Radiological Evolutions	36
		12-THP-6020-CHM-309	Make-Up Plant	19
		2-OHP-4024-222	Annunciator #222 Response: Plant Service	25
		DTG-EQR-003	System Health Report	8
		DTG-NCAP-001	Processing Non-Corrective Action Program Actions	2

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		ECP Desktop Guideline	Employee Concerns Program	2
		PMI-2015	Policy for Maintaining A Safety Conscious Work Environment	4
		PMI-7030	Corrective Action Program	46
		PMI-7034	Self-Assessment and Bench-Marking Programs	11
		PMP-7030-CAP-002	Condition Action and Closure	38
		PMP-7030-CAP-004	Conduct of Effectiveness Reviews	9
		PMP-7030-CAP-005	Conduct of Causal Evaluations	14
		PMP-7030-MOP-001	Corrective Action Program Management Oversight Process	30
		PMP-7034-SAP-001	Conduct of Self Assessments	32
		SPP-2060-SFI-106	Security Conduct of Operations	39
	Self-Assessments		System Health Report: Essential Service Water – Unit 1	Q2 - 2018
			System Health Report: Essential Service Water – Unit 1	Q4 - 2018
			System Health Report: Essential Service Water – Unit 2	Q2 - 2018
			System Health Report: Essential Service Water – Unit 2	Q4 - 2018
		GT 2017-0614	Measuring & Test Equipment Quick Hit Self-Assessment	11/14/2017
		GT 2017-0651	Equipment Status Control Quick Hit Self Assessment	11/20/2017
		GT 2018-0493	Chemistry Primary Water System Quick Hit Self-Assessment	11/13/2018
		GT 2018-0497	Conduct of Chemistry Quick Hit Self-Assessment	03/05/2019
		GT 2018-0500	Management of Non-Conforming Conditions Quick Hit Self-Assessment	04/24/2019
		GT 2018-0947	Measuring & Test Equipment Quick Hit Self-Assessment	01/14/2019
		GT 2018-0966	Operations Decision Making Quick Hit Self Assessment	11/13/2018
		GT 2018-10453	NRC Inspection Full Self Assessment - PI&R	11/15/2018
		GT 2018-11397	Behaviors Excellence Plan Effectiveness	05/01/2019
		GT 2018-1678	Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls, In-Plant Radioactivity Control and Mitigation, and Occupational	04/02/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Dose Assessment Full Self-Assessment	
		GT 2018-2898	Exam Administration and Evaluation Methods Quick Hit Self Assessment (RheW)	12/20/2018
		GT 2018-4227	Standard Design Process - Expectations for Effective Design Changes Quick Hit Self-Assessment	12/20/2018
		NOS-17-06	Nuclear Oversight Audit: Corrective Action Program	07/13/2017
		NOS-17-10	Nuclear Oversight Audit: Engineering, Design Control, and Inservice Inspection/Inservice Testing	11/16/2017
		NOS-18-01	Nuclear Oversight Audit: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)/Process Control Program	02/15/2018
		NOS-19-01	Nuclear Oversight Audit: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program/Off-site Dose Calculation Manual	03/18/2019
		NOS-19-05	Nuclear Oversight Audit: Corrective Action Program	07/30/2019
	Work Orders	WO 55405314	Perform Ultrasonic Test on Piping Downstream of 2-WHO-718 Heat Exchanger	10/13/2016
		WO 55481604	MTM, 1-HE-15E, Inspect for Tube Leaks, Install Tube Plugs	05/30/2019
		WO 55492331	Perform License Renewal Activity: System Engineer Walkdown – Unit 2 Essential Service Water System	03/12/2018
		WO 55502751	1-WPX-731-V1, EC-55711, Replace Valve & Upstream Piping	09/22/2017
		WO 55502754	1-WPX-735-V1, EC-55711, Replace Valve & Upstream Piping	09/20/2017
		WO 55503076	2-WPX-736-V1, Replace Valve EC-55895	04/18/2018
		WO 55503077	2-WPX-732-V1, Replace with 2" Valve/Piping EC-55895	04/05/2018
		WO 55503450	Install Pipe Supports 12-APW-R4002, R4003, R4004	12/05/2019
		WO 55506808	Unit 1 CCW Cross Tie Valve Seat Leak Test	11/04/2017
		WO 55506809	Unit 2 CCW Cross Tie Valve Seat Leak Test	04/12/2018
		WO 55510794	Perform License Renewal Activity: System Engineer Walkdown – Unit 1 Essential Service Water System	03/22/2019