

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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P. O. Box 529100  
Miami, Florida 33152



June 18, 1979  
L-79-018

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO  
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251  
IE Bulletin 79-06 A

The attached information is submitted as a follow-up to our earlier responses to the subject bulletin. We understand that only bulletin items 2 and 10 remain open following this submittal.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Uhrig  
Vice President  
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU:GDW:cf

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire

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## UPDATED RESPONSES TO IE BULLETIN 79-06A

### Response 5

As indicated in our April 24, 1979 response, "normal practice and established procedures dictate that an operator (as a primary and essential function) monitor and maintain steam generator level(s) during transients or accidents." The operator assigned to maintain steam generator level(s) does not have any other concurrent duties during an accident or transient until after the steam generator level(s) are stabilized.

### Response 7

(b, c) In our response of June 4, 1979 we stated that "the actual procedure changes will be made after resolution of the differences between the NSSS vendor recommendation, and the bulletin (NRC) requirements (regarding operation of HPSI and RCP pumps)." The final procedure changes will be based on the final resolution achieved by the NRC and NSSS vendor with regard to the bulletin requirements concerning HPSI and RCP pump operation.

### Response 8

We normally perform a field verification of the correct positions of all safety-related valves necessary to ensure proper operation of engineered safety features prior to a start-up following a refueling outage. This field verification will be performed prior to the start-up of Turkey Point Unit 4.

Our procedures require a re-verification by a field inspection of the correct position of all valves on the locked valve list, monthly.

Our procedures require a verification by a field inspection of the correct position of each safety related valve which has been subject to maintenance or test (including periodic surveillance tests) prior to returning the system or component to service.

We have verified that our position requirements in our procedures for safety-related valves necessary to ensure proper operation of engineered safety features are correct by reviewing the appropriate procedures against the applicable flow diagrams.

Response 9

Prior to the start-up of Turkey Point Unit 4, a special interim instruction will be implemented to require:

- 1) That controllers for the sump pump discharge valves and the main steam isolation valves will be placed in the shut position prior to resetting phase A containment isolation, and
- 2) That the controllers for the containment purge and instrument airbleed isolation valves will be placed in the shut position prior to resetting containment ventilation isolation.

This instruction will remain in effect until the control logic of these valves can be revised in accordance with our earlier letters.

Response 10

The removal of safety-related equipment from service for maintenance or test is required by procedure to be reviewed and approved by the on duty nuclear watch supervisor or nuclear watch engineer, in addition to a licensed senior reactor operator. A log of equipment clearance orders is required by procedure to be maintained in the control room. In addition any safety-related component that is removed from service must be logged in the equipment out of service log book which is also maintained in the control room.

Our procedures require that the equipment clearance order log book be reviewed periodically by the nuclear watch supervisor and the nuclear watch engineer; and that the equipment out of service log book be reviewed by the oncoming nuclear watch supervisor and the nuclear watch engineer each shift.

Response 11

In our June 4, 1979 submittal, we stated that use of the NRC proposed direct open communications network, when installed, would address this issue. Now that the new direct open communication network (radio phone) is operational, we will use the network to make the initial

report and to maintain an open communication channel with the NRC control center in Washington, D. C. within one hour when the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation. We understand that use of this communication channel satisfies the open communication channel requirements of the bulletin and that no other verbal notification of any other NRC personnel is required. Plant instructions will be revised to implement these reporting requirements prior to the start-up of Turkey Point Unit 4.