

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	5	7	0	6	2	2	7	9	8	0	7	1	3	7	9	9
60	61									68	69						74	75						80
DOCKET NUMBER											EVENT DATE						REPORT DATE							

0 2 While performing the Unit Two Diesel Generator monthly preventive maintenance

0 3 inspection, a nut was inadvertently dropped into the diesel generator winding when

0 4 replacing the brush rigging cover. The retrieval of the dropped nut extended the

0 5 diesel generator outage time 20 minutes beyond the 1-1/2 hour time limit set by

0 6 T.S.3.9.E.1. The 1/2 diesel generator had been tested prior to taking the Unit Two

0 7 diesel generator out of service. The nut was found prior to starting surveillance

0 8 required by T.S.3.9.E.1.

7 8 9

09		SYSTEM CODE		E E 11		CAUSE CODE		A 12		CAUSE SUBCODE		C 13		COMPONENT CODE				G E N F R A 14		COMP. SUBCODE		D 15		VALVE SUBCODE		Z 16														
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		7 9		—		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		0 1 2		—		OCCURRENCE CODE		0 3		REPORT TYPE		L		—		REVISION NO.		0												
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																								
X 18		Z 19		Z 20		Z 21		0 0 0 0 22		N 23		N 24		N 25		G 0 8 0 26																								

1 0 The dropping of the nut was due to human factors. The nut was found and the Unit Two

1 1 diesel generator operability surveillance was performed.

1 2

1 3

1 4

1. FACILITY STATUS (28) C 2. % POWER (29) 0 0 4 3. OTHER STATUS (30) NA 4. METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A 5. DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operational Event 6. ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) Z 7. AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (34) NA 8. LOCATION OF RELEASE (35) NA 9. PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (36) 0 0 0 10. TYPE (37) Z 11. DESCRIPTION (38) NA 12. PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (39) 0 0 0 13. DESCRIPTION (40) NA 14. LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (41) Z 15. DESCRIPTION (42) NA 16. PUBLICITY ISSUED (43) N 17. DESCRIPTION (44) NA 18. NRC USE ONLY 19. 398 267 20. 7807250283

NAME OF PREPARER J. Vahrenwald

PHONE 309-654-2241 Ext. 195



**Wisconsin Electric** POWER COMPANY  
231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

July 3, 1979

Mr. James Keppler, Regional Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region III  
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301  
MODIFICATION OF THE RESET CIRCUITS  
IN THE SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION CIRCUITS  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 79-010/01T-0  
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 79-010/01T-0, which, together with this letter, provides a 14 day followup report to our 24 hour written notification of June 20, 1979. The results of our review of the safeguards actuation circuitry of Point Beach Nuclear Plant indicate a finding that may be reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.9, "Performance of structures, systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than that assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition."

As you know, Mr. A. Schwencer's letter dated November 28, 1978, identified a deficiency in the reset circuitry of the Containment Ventilation Isolation circuits at two other plants. The letter requested that we investigate the reset circuitry used at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in the Containment Ventilation Isolation and other safeguards circuits.

In our letter to Mr. Denton dated January 16, 1979, we indicated that the safeguards reset circuits at Point Beach had the characteristics mentioned in the November 28 letter and that we would analyze the circuits in detail and modify them where necessary. Further, because of the mechanical characteristics of the containment ventilation valves, we committed in LER 79-04 to keep the valves closed during power and hot standby operation. A meeting was held at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant with Mr. J. T. Beard of your Staff on June 5, 1979, at which time circuit configurations, requirements, and modifications were further discussed.

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July 3, 1979

We have completed a detailed review of the safeguards actuation circuits at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The results of this review indicate that some changes to the circuitry are desirable. Modification requests to effect these changes have been written and are in the review and approval process.

There are four safeguards circuits for which we believe modifications are desirable. These are Safety Injection, Containment Isolation, Containment Ventilation Isolation, and Containment Spray. The modifications we propose will provide the following circuit characteristics:

1. MANUAL INPUTS

Manual actuation of a safeguards circuit will not be affected by the reset circuitry. Safety Injection has always had this feature. The other three circuits will be modified.

2. AUTOMATIC INPUTS

The Containment Ventilation Isolation circuit will be modified so the reset function will not block an additional automatic signal from activating the circuit. The Safety Injection circuit is designed to sequence a group of protective actions after receipt of an automatic or manual initiation signal. The Safety Injection circuit must be reset after initiation in order to operate equipment which was secured or stripped by the safety injection sequence. Should an additional automatic signal be generated after reset it is not desirable to resequence the protective actions which have already occurred and change the post accident equipment lineup. For this reason the Safety Injection circuit will not be modified in this regard. Containment Spray and Containment Isolation do not have multiple automatic inputs and therefore no modifications are necessary.

3. SEPARATE RESETS FOR EACH TRAIN

Separate reset switches will be provided for each train for each circuit.

4. PHYSICAL ACCESS

The reset switches will be fitted with clear plastic covers. This will prevent inadvertent or accidental operation and will require deliberate operator action to reset the safeguards circuits.

5. ANNUNCIATION


For Containment Isolation, Containment Ventilation Isolation and Containment Spray, status lights and annunciation will be provided for each circuit in which the reset hold-in feature is retained. The reset hold-in feature may be deleted, eliminating the need for additional lights and annunciation. Safety Injection circuits will be provided with status lights and annunciation for each train.

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July 3, 1979

It is estimated that these modifications will be completed approximately two weeks after final approval of the modification requests and installation procedures. Approvals are expected to require approximately three weeks.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "C. W. Fay", is written over the typed name.

C. W. Fay, Director  
Nuclear Power Department

Enclosure

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