



July 13, 1979

L79-600

FILE: RR 2 (NP-33-79-33)

Docket No. 50-346  
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Director, Region III  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Enclosed are three copies of the supplemental information for Licensee Event Report 79-030 (NP-33-79-33) which has been revised. The revision to the report is indicated by a "1" in the left margin. There has been no change to the Licensee Event Report itself.

Please replace your previous copies of the supplemental information for Licensee Event Report 79-030 with the attached, revised copies.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray  
Station Superintendent  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/SNB/ljk

Attachments

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director  
Office of Management Information  
and Program Control  
Encl: 3 copies

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-33

DATE OF EVENT: February 20, 1979

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System valve torque switch failed

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2422, and Load (Gross MWE) = 818.

Description of Occurrence: On February 20, 1979 at 1300 hours while performing Surveillance Test ST 5071.01, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Monthly Test", AFW System Valve AF3869 could not be closed by the motor operator, but could be opened by the motor operator. This rendered AFW System 1-1 inoperable and placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, which requires two independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and flowpaths be operable. The Action Statement requires the inoperable system be returned to operable status within 72 hours or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence was due to a faulty torque switch in the motor operator for AFW Valve AF3869. The closing torque switch would actuate and prevent the valve from closing with the motor operator. The valve could be operated manually.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. In the event of an occurrence which required the AFW System, AFW System 1-2 would have fed the affected steam generator.

Corrective Action: A new torque switch was installed under Maintenance Work Order 79-1558. This torque switch supplied on the vendor's same part number, is of a heavier duty design. At 1915 hours on February 20, 1979, Surveillance Test ST 5071.01 was performed and AFW System 1-1 was declared operable, removing the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.

On June 7 and 8, 1979, the torque switches on the other Auxiliary Feed Pump discharge Valves AF3870, AF3871, and AF3872 were changed to the heavy duty switches, and ST 5071.01 performed successfully under Maintenance Work Order 79-2042.

Failure Data: One previously reported failure of AFW System motor operator torque switches had been reported under Licensee Event Report NP-33-77-83.