CENTRAL FILES

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Delta, Pennsylvania
17314

June 27, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE - PROMPT NOTIFICATION

Confirming R. S. Fleischmann's conversation with Mr. E. C. Greenman, Region I, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on 6/26/79.

References: Docket No. 50-277
Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3
Technical Specification Reference: 6.9.2.a(9)

Report No. 2-79-32/1P
Occurrence Date: June 26, 1979

Identification of Occurrence:

In response to the analysis required by IE Bulletin 79-02 Revision 1, 1217 of 1243 seismic Class 1 supports have been analyzed (the remaining 26 are being analyzed but the analysis is not yet complete). As a result of this analysis, 92 supports have safety factors less than 5 during the design basis earthquake. Of these, 8 have safety factors less than 1; i.e., may fail during the design basis earthquake. The 8 supports are distributed as follows:

1 on the Unit 2 HPCI System
1 on the Unit 3 HPCI System
1 on the Unit 2 RHR System
1 on the Unit 3 RHR System
2 on the Unit 2 Emergency Service Water System
1 on the Unit 3 Emergency Service Water System
1 on the Unit 3 Drywell Inerting System

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Inadequate Design.

(1 of 2)

Please deliver to Mr. Grossman

Analysis of Occurrence:

These seismic supports are either single supports in a piping system or are widely separated as in the case of the Unit 2 emergency service water supports. The single HPCI support in each unit is for piping associated with the test flow path which is isolated from the injection flow path except during testing and is automatically isolated if initiation occurrs during testing. One of two emergency service water system supports on Unit 2 and the one on Unit 3 are located on the service water side of a normally closed and locked manual valve connecting the emergency service water discharge and service water discharge. Failure in this location would not interfer with emergency service water delivery. The other Unit 2 emergency service water support is associated with one of the two redundant supply loops which could be isolated if necessary. The single RHR support on each unit is associated with a single subsystem and is not on piping common to the two subsystems. The single drywell inerting system support is on piping at a significant distance and several rigid supports outboard of the outer isolation valve which along with the inner isolation valves is normally closed. These deficiencies constitute less than one percent of the total supports analyzed. The calculational method used is conservative in that all stress and loads are combined to obtain the total load during the DBE. Calculations indicate that these supports will withstand an operating basis earthquake. The Operations and Safety Review Committee has reviewed this data and concludes that safe operation can continue until modifications can be completed. Design of these modifications has begun and modifications will be complete within two weeks. In light of the conservative nature of the calculation and the very low probability of a seismic event occurring during the short repair period, the OSSR Committee has concluded that these deficiencies have a minimal safety significance and that the plant can continue operation.

Corrective Action:

The inadequate supports will be corrected expeditiously but in no case more than two weeks.

Previous Failures:

Report No. 3-79-19/1P.

Very truly yours,

W. T. Ulrich
Station Superintendent