

CONTROL BLOCK:

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1	G	A	E	I	H	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
R	9	LICENSEE CODE				14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	37	CAT	58

REPORT SOURCE 1 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 6 2 8 7 9 8 0 7 0 6 7 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

2 At 1220 CDT, MSIV Fast Closure Startup test for Unit 2 was initiated. Reactor
3 scrammed as a result of MSIV closure. During the resulting transient, RCIC and HPCI
4 both isolated on steam line high differential pressure. Technical specs 3/4.7.3.b
5 and 3/4.5.1 Action A were met for both RCIC and HPCI respectively. The ADS system
6 was operable and capable of performing its intended function. Both the RCIC and HPCI
7 systems were successfully started manually. At time of occurrence Unit 1 was in cold
8 shutdown condition for maintenance, hanger modifications, and refueling. (continued)

SYSTEM CODE S F 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE CODE E 13		COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14				COMP. SUBCODE S 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16			
EVENT YEAR 7 9		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 9		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1		REPORT TYPE T		REVISION NO. 0							
ACTION TAKEN E 18		FUTURE ACTION X 19		EFFECT ON PLANT A 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD C 21		HOURS 0 1 9 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 24		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 0 8 0 25	

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS (30)		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)		
1	5	B	28	0	0	0	29	N/A	B	31	Operator observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6 Z (33) Z (34) N/A N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			
NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
17	000	37 Z 78	N/A

7907180551

790718055

346 037

NRC USE ONLY

Georgia Power Company
Plant E. I. Hatch
Baxley, Georgia 31513

Event Description and Probable Consequences (continued)

There have not been any simultaneous system isolations previously on the subject RCIC and HPCI systems on either Unit 1 or Unit 2. There were no personnel injuries, overexposures, or any release of radioactive materials to the environment as a result of this occurrence.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

Cause of RCIC isolation is not known at this time and is under investigation by both utility and NSSS supplier. Switch 2E41-N005 setpoint was within acceptable range; however, switch 4004 was out of calibration. HPCI switch 2E41-N004 was re-calibrated and returned to service. Opinion is that switch calibration may not be sole cause of HPCI isolation and is also under investigation. All switches involved are ITT Barton Model 288. Results of investigations and any followup testing will be reported in an updated LER.

Narrative Report
for
LER 50-366/1979-59, Rev. 0

On June 27, 1979, at 1220 CDT, the MSIV Fast Closure startup test was initiated for Hatch Unit 2. Initial reactor power was 97% (2365 MWt). Reactor scram resulted due to MSIV closures. RCIC and HPCI systems isolated on steam line high differential pressure after the reactor scram. Both systems were manually started by plant operators. RCIC system, after manual start, ran throughout the duration of the MSIV closure test. HPCI was started at 1238 CDT to raise water level and was shut down at 1239 CDT by plant operator.

Immediate corrective actions initiated by plant operations personnel were to manually start both RCIC and HPCI systems. Systems were successfully started manually. Redundant systems were available and capable of performing their intended functions. Test shop personnel were notified of the systems isolation and were instructed to check calibration of steam line high differential pressure switches 2E51-N017 and N018 (RCIC) and 2E41-N004 and N005 (HPCI).

Test shop personnel found the calibration of the RCIC switches to be within an acceptable range per procedure requirements. Cause of the RCIC system isolation on high dP is unknown at this time and is under investigation by both utility and the NSSS supplier.

Per the recommendation of the NSSS supplier, instrument piping for RCIC switches 2E51-N017 and N018 is being modified to correct piping geometry which could be a factor in the isolation of the system. The NRC resident inspector was informed on 7-4-79, at 1010 CDT of the instrument piping modification.

HPCI high steam line differential pressure switches N004 and N005 were checked for calibration. Switch 2E41-N005 was found to be acceptable; however, switch N004 was out of calibration. Switch 2E41-N004 was recalibrated and returned to service. Incorrect HPCI switch setpoint may not have been the sole cause of system isolation and will also be investigated. Upon completion of investigation of HPCI and RCIC isolation problem by utility and NSSS supplier, supplemental corrective actions will be taken and reported in an update to this LER.

At the time of the occurrence, Unit 1 was in a cold shutdown condition for maintenance, hanger modifications, and refueling. Results of the Unit 2 investigation and corrective actions will be considered for application to Unit 1 systems. Previous failures of HPCI and RCIC systems on Unit 1 and 2 will be re-evaluated.