

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

LER 79-31/3L

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 5 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

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0 9 7 8 SYSTEM CODE W A 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE C 13 COMPONENT CODE S U P P O R T 14 COMP. SUBCODE B 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9 21 22 EVENT YEAR 7 9 23 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 24 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 1 26 27 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29 REPORT TYPE L 30 31 REVISION NO. 0 32
ACTION TAKEN D 18 33 FUTURE ACTION H 19 34 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 36 HOURS 0 0 0 0 37 40 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER I 2 0 7 26 44 47
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1 5 7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS E 28 10 11 % POWER 0 9 7 29 12 13 OTHER STATUS NA 30 44 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 45 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Review of Records 32 46
1 6 7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 10 11 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 12 13 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 44 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36 45
1 7 7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 0 0 0 37 10 11 TYPE Z 38 12 13 DESCRIPTION NA 39 44
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7912170 329
NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. F. Conway

PHONE: 802-257-7711

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During the continuing effort to determine and insure the adequacy of the Seismic Class I hangers, as described in the NRC Bulletin 79-02, hangers SW-H-76, RCIC-H-82, and HPCI-HD-67B were removed from service during the post Fall Refueling/Maintenance Outage. Prior to the scheduled plant startup, all outstanding items were reviewed for their affect on system operability. These three hangers went unnoticed during the review. Tech. Spec. Section 3.6.I.1 requires that all seismic hangers be operable during power operation (based on interpretation associated with RO 79-15). As allowed by Tech. Spec. Section 3.6.I.2, all hangers were repaired within the 72 hour time period. There have been no similar occurrences reported to the Commission.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of this occurrence is the failure to recognize that a seismic restraint was not returned to service prior to plant startup. The affected hangers were returned to service within the required 72 hours following the discovery. Appropriate personnel were reinstructed on the requirements for hanger operability and the necessity to perform more careful reviews of the documentation.

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