

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

T.S. 6.9.1.8.1.		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE							
0	9	S	F	11	B	12	A	13	C	K	T	B	R	K	14	B	15	Z	16		
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.											
17	7	9	21	22	1	3	8	24	26	0	1	28	29	T	30	0	32				
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					
X	18	G	19	20	Z	21	0	0	0	22	Y	23	N	24	N	25	W	1	2	0	26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7 8 9 80

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 34 NA

7 8 9 10 11 44

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

45 80

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	2	(38)	Na	(39)
7	8	9	11	12	13				
80									

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION
1	8	NA

1398 083

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12	
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7 8 9 10
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
NA (44)
NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. Cartwright PHONE: 703-894-5151

NRC USE ONLY

PHONE: 703-894-5151

Description of Event

On November 8, 1979, Westinghouse informed Vepco that an undetectable failure in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System had been identified. Because present testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) does not check the operation of the Reactor Trip Breaker auxiliary contacts for the P-4 permissive, a potential failure of the P-4 contacts would not be detected and the automatic initiation of safety injection could be prevented.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The P-4 permissive provides an interlock in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to enable or defeat, depending on the status of the Reactor Trip Breakers, the capability to manually reset and block safety injection. If the P-4 contacts fail to close when the reactor trip breakers open, the normal mode of resetting and blocking SI could be prevented. If the contacts fail to open when the breakers are closed, the consequences are such that following a previous initiation of SI and manual reset and block, the block of SI would remain following the reset of the reactor trip breakers, when the plant would return to power. An annunciator is available in the control room to check the correct function of the P-4 permissive; however, illuminated control board windows are not permitted by IEEE Standards as an acceptable means of detection because the components are not safety grade. The health and safety of the general public were not affected by this event. Unit 2 has the same design and is similarly affected.

Cause of Occurrence

This undetectable failure is apparently the result of a design error by Westinghouse.

Immediate Corrective Action

Westinghouse has provided procedures for testing the P-4 contacts with the unit shutdown and with the unit at power. Both test schemes are presently being evaluated.

Scheduled Corrective Action

Appropriate procedures will be changed to incorporate the testing of the P-4 contacts on a periodic basis.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.

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