

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 N Y J A F 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 7 0 9 2 6 7 9 8 1 1 1 2 0 7 9 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 SEE ATTACHMENT
0 3
0 4
0 5
0 6
0 7
0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
S F 11 B 12 C 13 E L E C T R I C 14 Z 15 Z 16
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
7 8 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
X 18 F 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 N 24 A 25 S 4 2 0 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 SEE ATTACHMENT
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
E 28 0 5 2 29 NA D 31 ARCHITECT-ENGINEER 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
Z 33 Z 34 NA NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 40 NA 41
7 8 9 11 12 80
1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
Z 42 NA 43
7 8 9 10 80
2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION
N 44 NA 45
7 8 9 10 80

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7911270 445

NRC USE ONLY

9-92-16 C.D.

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-056/01X-1

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During normal operation, the plant staff was informed by the Architect-Engineer that certain cabling associated with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System inboard steam supply isolation valve and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) did not meet the separation criteria required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This discovery was made as a result of the Fire Hazard Analyses being conducted by the Architect-Engineer.

The six (6) cables in question which could affect the control of the inboard isolation valve for the HPCI System steam supply (23-MOV-15) are located in the same cable tray as some ADS cables. Discovery of this condition is considered a reportable event under the circumstances described in Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 6.9.A.4.1.

The only manner in which improper operation or an undesired situation could result is an event which could cause simultaneous failure of both ADS and HPCI cables to the extent that both systems would be inoperable.

Initial corrective action (taken on September 26, 1979) to preclude spurious closure of 23-MOV-15, de-energized the valve by racking out of the breaker. In addition, to satisfy the requirements of primary containment isolation, the outside isolation valve for the HPCI system (23-MOV-16) was maintained in its normal closed position and checked daily as required by Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 3.7.1.

In addition, the Architect-Engineer informed the plant that other (third party) cables could affect the operation of 23-MOV-15 due to their proximity to both HPCI and ADS cables. There are two alternate solutions to correct both of the problems set forth above. One solution is to re-route the cables while the second solution is to install a redundant ADS control system. As a result of a detailed review of the alternatives, the cable re-routing option was selected and a preliminary design modification to re-route the cables of concern was completed during the week of November 12, 1979. Further, the plant staff has also re-evaluated the initial corrective action taken. This re-evaluation indicated the preferred method of assuring operability of the systems ECCS and primary containment isolation functions would be to provide augmented protection against a fire which might involve cables of both the systems. Accordingly, the FitzPatrick Plant Staff initiated, on November 16, 1979, an hourly patrolling fire watch in those areas in which cabling for the HPCI and ADS are in proximity to each other and restored 23-MOV-15 to a fully operable condition. This action of establishing an hourly patrolling fire watch parallels that required by Technical Specifications, Appendix A, Paragraph 3.12.E.1.b. when early warning protection against a potential fire must be taken due to inadequate or inoperable fixed detection systems.

With respect to the proposed design modification which will re-route certain cables associated with the HPCI system to provide diverse physical separation, the FitzPatrick Plant anticipates that implementation of the modifications will be completed as originally stated, during the forthcoming refueling outage. In view of the actions noted above, the event does not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

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