



LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD • WADING RIVER, N.Y. 11792

November 21, 1979

SNRC-450

Mr. Denwood Ross, Director
Bulletins and Orders
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Ross:

Enclosed herewith are six (6) sets of Shoreham-specific system information in response to those Bulletins and Orders Task Force long-term questions of July 13, 1979. These responses will be incorporated in a pending supplement to the generic data presented in NEDO-24708, "Additional Information Required for NRC Staff Generic Report on Boiling Water Reactors."

Very truly yours,

J. P. Novarro,
Project Manager
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station

JPM/cc

Enclosures

cc: J. N. Wilson
J. Higgins
W. Kane

1391 195

6006

7911260 340

A

3
111

PLANT SHOREHAM UNIT(S) 1

A
BYPASS CAPACITY

Plant Steam Bypass Capacity, % Rated 25%

1391 196

PLANT SHOREHAM

B

SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS SHARED BETWEEN UNITS

PAGE _____ CONTINUED PAGE _____

Single-unit plant check here ☒ and do not complete

System or Component

Shared Between
Units Numbers

1391 197

PLANT SHOREHAM UNIT(S) 1

PLANT-SPECIFIC SYSTEM INFORMATION

POOR ORIGINAL

System	General		Water Sources		Instrumentation and Control		Frequency of System and Component Tests
	Safety Classification	Seismic Category	Safety Classification	Seismic Category	Safety Classif.	Seismic Category	
1. RCIC	2 ⁽⁵⁾	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
2. Isolation Condenser	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾
3. HPCS	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾	— ⁽³⁾
4. HPCI	2 ⁽⁵⁾	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
5. X CS	2 ⁽⁵⁾	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
6. LPCI	2 ⁽⁵⁾	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
7. ADS	1	1	1	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
8. SRV	1	1	1	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
9. RHR (including shutdown cooling, steam condensing, suppression pool cooling, containment spray modes)	2 ⁽⁵⁾	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
	2	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
	2	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
	2	1	2	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
10. X SW	3	1	3	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
11. ECCN RBCLCW	3	1	3	1	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
12. CRD X	2 ⁽⁷⁾	1	2	1	NON-IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
13. CST	NA ⁽¹⁾	NA ⁽¹⁾	NA ⁽¹⁾	NA ⁽¹⁾	IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
14. Main Feedwater	NA ⁽²⁾	NA ⁽²⁾	NA ⁽²⁾	NA ⁽²⁾	NON-IE ⁽⁴⁾	1	(6)
15. Recirculation							
— Pump/Motor Cooling ⁽⁸⁾	3	1	3	1	IE	1	(6)

Notes: See attached sheet

1391 198

PLANT-SPECIFIC SYSTEM INFORMATION

NOTES

- (1) CST suction piping to HPCI/RCIC is safety Class 2, seismic Category I. The bottom portion of the CST containing the volume (100,000 gallon) dedicated to HPCI/RCIC is encased in a seismic Category I outer concrete wall.
- (2) All feedwater piping inside the reactor building is seismic Category I. Feedwater piping downstream of valves F032A & B is safety Class 1.
- (3) System not applicable for SNPS-1.
- (4) All safety systems will have some non-essential instrumentation which are used for non-safety functions (i.e. annunciators).
- (5) Portions of the system which constitute reactor coolant pressure boundary as defined by 10CFR50.2 (2) are safety Class 1.
- (6) Frequency of tests will be identified when the Technical Specifications are developed.
- (7) Insert and withdraw lines as well as scram discharge components.
- (8) Same system as item 11.
- (9) Scram functions are IE.
- (10) Containment isolation functions are IE.

1391 199

[illegible]

POOR ORIGINAL

Isolation Valves

Penetration Number	Line Size, In.	System	Is System an Engineering Safety Function	Figure	Process Fluid	Valve Number	Isolation Signal Code(s)	Location	Type	Actuator	Primary Actuation Mode	Secondary Actuation Mode	Full Closure Time, sec.	Power Source	Position Indication in Control Rm.	Positions			Comments		
X-10-B	16	RHR (TEST TO PASS)	Y	B	W	F024	F024, RM	0	GB	M0	A	RM	79	AC	D	C	Normal	Shutdown	Post Accident	Power Failure	(1) OPEN FOR SUPP. PUMP CHECK
	16	Y	Y	B	W	F020	Y	0	GT	M0	A	RM	71	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN FOR SUPP. PUMP CHECK
	2	RCIC (MIN FLOW)	Y	B	W	F019	RM	0	GB	M0	RM	M	5	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	4	NPCL (MIN FLOW)	Y	B	W	F012	Y	0	GB	M0	RM	M	10	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	4	RHR (STEAM COLD DISCH)	N	B	W	F011	F011, RM	0	GT	M0	A	RM	20	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	4	RHR (MIN FLOW)	Y	B	W	F007	RM	0	GT	M0	RM	M	20	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	10	SCHE SPRAY (TEST)	N	B	W	F015	F015, RM	0	GB	M0	A	RM	67	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	3	SCHE SPRAY (MIN FLOW)	Y	B	W	F031	RM	0	GT	M0	RM	M	16	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	2	RHR (RCIC SECTION RD)	N	B	W	F047	N/A	0	RV	—	OP	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	C	C	C	N/A	N/A	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
X-11	4	RHR (HEAD SPRAY)	N	A	W	F022	F022, RM	0	GB	M0	A	RM	13	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN FOR HEAD SPRAY CHECK
	4	Y	N	A	W	F023	Y	0	GB	M0	A	RM	11	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN FOR HEAD SPRAY CHECK
X-12	10	NPCL	Y	A	S	F002	F002, RM	0	GT	M0	RM	—	18	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	1	Y	Y	A	S	F047	Y	0	GB	M0	RM	—	20	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	10	Y	Y	A	S	F003	Y	0	GT	M0	RM	M	12	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	1	Y	Y	A	S	F080	Y	0	GB	M0	RM	M	102	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
X-13	18	Y	Y	B	S	F021	RM	0	GT	M0	RM	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	C	C	C	N/A	N/A	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	18	Y	Y	B	S	—	N/A	0	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	C	C	C	N/A	N/A	(1) OPEN WHEN FLOW DECREASES
	2	Y	Y	B	A	F042	N, RM	0	GT	M0	RM	M	71	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
X-15	16	Y	Y	B	W	F007	Y	0	GT	M0	RM	—	16	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
X-16	3	RCIC	Y	A	S	F083	Y	0	CR	M0	RM	—	12	AC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
	1	Y	Y	A	S	F008	Y	0	GT	M0	RM	M	16	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
	3	Y	Y	A	S	F085	Y	0	GT	M0	RM	M	12	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
X-17	1	Y	Y	A	S	F001	RM	0	GB	M0	RM	M	38	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
	2	Y	Y	B	S	—	Y	0	GT	M0	RM	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	C	C	C	—	—	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
	1 1/2	Y	Y	B	S	—	Y	0	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	C	C	C	—	—	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
X-18	2	Y	Y	B	A	F002	RM	0	CK	M0	RF	—	13	DC	D	C	C	C	AI	AI	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL
	2	Y	Y	B	A	—	Y	0	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	C	C	C	—	—	(1) OPEN ON LOW GAT LEVEL

POOR ORIGINAL

Isolation Valves

Penetration Number	Line Size, In.	System	Is System an engineered safety function	Figure	Process Fluid	Valve Number	Isolation Signal Code(s)	Location	Type	Actuator	Primary Actuation Mode	Secondary Actuation Mode	Full Closure Time, sec.	Power Source	Position Indication in Control Rm.	Positions	Comments	
X-19	6	RCIC	Y	B	W	F031	RM	0	GT	M0	RM	M	31	DC	D	Normal	AI	When power piping from S.P. Rm.
X-20A	10	CURE SPRAY	Y	A	W	F006	-	I	VIC	A0	RZ	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-21A	2		Y	A	W	F006	RM	I	GB	M0	RM	-	18	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-22A	1/4		Y	A	W	F005	-	0	GT	M0	RM	M	20	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-23A	1/4		Y	B	W	F001	-	Q	GT	M0	RM	M	26	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-24A	4	RBCLCW	N	C	W	M0-035	-	Q	GT	M0	RM	M	23	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-25A	4		N	C	W	M0-034	V	0	GT	M0	RM	M	23	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-26A	3		N	B	W	-	FG2, RM	0	GT	M0	A	RM	16	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-27A	3		N	B	W	-	-	I	CK	-	RF	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-28A	7		N	B	W	M0-037	FG2, RM	I	GT	M0	A	RM	20	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-29A	7		N	B	W	M0-036	V	0	GT	M0	A	RM	20	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-30A	7	CONTAINMENT PURGE	N	B	A	M0-035A	L, RM	I	B	A0	RM	M	5	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-31A	18		N	B	A	M0-035B	-	Q	B	A0	RM	M	5	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-32A	18		N	B	A	M0-035A	-	I	B	A0	RM	M	5	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-33A	18		N	B	A	M0-035A	-	0	B	A0	RM	M	5	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-34A	18		N	B	A	M0-035A	-	0	B	A0	RM	M	5	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-35A	18		N	B	A	M0-035A	J	0	B	A0	RM	M	5	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-36A	3/4	REACTOR RECIRC SAMPLE	N	A	W	F019	FG2, RM	I	GB	M0	A	RM	15	AC	D	Shut down	C	
X-37A	3/4		N	A	W	F020	V	Q	GB	M0	A	RM	15	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-38A	3	RADWASTE	N	B	W	M0-038	FG2, RM	Q	GT	M0	A	RM	16	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-39A	4		N	B	W	M0-037	V	0	GT	M0	A	RM	16	AC	D	Shut down	AI	
X-40A	1 1/2		Y	A	B	-	-	I	CK	-	RF	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-41A	1 1/2		Y	A	B	-	-	0	CK	-	RF	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-42A	3/4	N: LAIR PURGE FOR TIP	N	C	A	-	-	0	XV	XC	RF	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-43A	3/4	TIP DRIVE TUBES	N	C	A	-	-	0	CK	-	RF	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-44A	3/4		N	C	A	-	-	0	BL	XC	RM	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	
X-45A	3/4		N	C	A	-	-	0	XV	XC	RM	-	N/A	-	I	Shut down	-	

POOR ORIGINAL

Isolation Valves

Penetration	Line Size, In.	System	Is System an engineered safety function	Figure	Process Fluid	Valve Number	Isolation Signal (s)	Location	Type	Actuator	Primary Actuation Mode	Secondary Actuation Mode	Full Closure Time, sec.	Power Source	Position Indication in Control Room	Positions	Comments
X394B	1	INSTRUMENT AIR TO SEC	N	B	A	MOV 31A	—	0	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	AC	—	Normal	Power failure
X41	1	↓	N	B	A	MOV 31B	FX, RM	0	CB	MO	A	RM	5	AC	D	0	Post accident
X42	2	HPCI	Y	B	A	MOV 31C	FX, RM	0	CK	—	BF	—	N/A	DC	—	0	—
X42	1 1/2	RCIC	Y	B	A	MOV 31D	FX, RM	0	CB	MO	A	RM	16	DC	D	0	—
X43	2	↓	Y	B	A	MOV 31E	—	0	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	AC	—	0	—
X43	1	RHR (HX VENT)	N	B	A	MOV 31F	RM	0	CB	MO	RM	M	10	AC	D	0	—
X44	1	↓	N	B	W	MOV 31G	—	0	RV	—	OP	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X44	1	RHR	N	B	S	MOV 31H	—	0	RV	—	OP	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X44	1	RHR (HPCI STEAM DRN)	N	B	S	MOV 31I	—	0	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X44	6	PRI. CONT. ATMOS. CONT.	Y	B	A	MOV 31J	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	31	AC	D	0	—
X45	4	↓	Y	B	A	MOV 31K	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	20	AC	D	0	—
X45	1 1/2	DOWNCOMER SEAL PRESSURIZATION	Y	C	A	MOV 31L	RM	0	CB	MO	RM	M	6	AC	D	0	—
X45	6	PRI. CONT. ATMOS. CONT.	Y	B	A	MOV 31M	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	31	AC	D	0	—
X46	4	↓	Y	B	A	MOV 31N	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	20	AC	D	0	—
X46	1 1/2	DOWNCOMER SEAL PRESSURIZATION	Y	C	A	MOV 31O	RM	0	CB	MO	RM	M	6	AC	D	0	—
X47	6	PRI. CONT. ATMOS. CONT.	Y	B	A	MOV 31P	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	31	AC	D	0	—
X47	6	↓	Y	B	A	MOV 31Q	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	16	AC	D	0	—
X47	6	↓	Y	B	A	MOV 31R	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	31	AC	D	0	—
X48	3/4	CRD	Y	C	W	—	—	0	CB	—	M	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X48	1	↓	Y	C	W	—	—	0	CB	—	M	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X48	1	RHR	←	C	W	—	—	0	CB	—	M	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X49	10	DOWNCOMER SEAL CLEANUP	N	B	W	MOV 31S	VALVES	AS	CB	X-Y 3 ABOVE	—	—	—	—	—	0	—
X49	6	PRI. CONT. ATMOS. CONT.	Y	B	A	MOV 31T	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	51	AC	D	0	—
X49	6	↓	Y	B	A	MOV 31U	RM	0	GT	MO	RM	M	32	AC	D	0	—
X49	1 1/2	SERVICE AIR	N	B	A	—	—	0	CB	RF	—	—	N/A	—	—	0	—
X49	1 1/2	↓	N	B	A	—	—	0	CB	M	—	—	N/A	—	—	0	—

POOR ORIGINAL

Penetration Number	Line Size, In.	System	Is System an Engineering Safety Function	Figure	Process Fluid	Valve Number	Isolation Signal Code(s)	Location	Type	Actuator	Primary Actuation Mode	Secondary Actuation Mode	Full Closure Time, sec.	Power Source	Position Indication in Control Rm.	Positions			Comments
																Normal	Shutdown	Post Accident	
XS-12	1 1/2	RAD MONITORING	N	B	A	MV032A	F, G, RM	I	GB	M0	A	RM	14	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
→	1 1/2		N	B	A	MV032B	→	O	GB	M0	A	RM	14	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
XS-13	1	→	N	B	A	MV032A	→	I	GB	M0	A	RM	14	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
→	1		N	B	A	MV032B	→	O	GB	M0	A	RM	14	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
XS-20	6	CENT. ARMOS. CONT.	Y	B	A	MV032A	RM	I	GT	M0	RM	—	32	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
→	6		Y	B	A	MV032B	→	O	GT	M0	RM	—	32	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
XS-21	6	→	Y	B	A	MV032A	→	I	GT	M0	RM	—	32	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
→	6		Y	B	A	MV032B	→	O	GT	M0	RM	—	32	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
XS-22	6	CENT. VENT TO RDVUS	N	B	A	ADV03A	L, RM	I	B	AD	RM	—	5	AC	✓	0	0	0	—
→	6		N	B	A	ADV03B	→	O	B	AD	RM	—	5	AC	✓	0	0	0	—
B-7	1 1/2	INST. AIR TO DRYWELL	N	B	A	—	—	I	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	0	0	AI
→	1 1/2		N	B	A	MV03A	RM	O	GB	M0	RM	—	7.5	AC	✓	0	0	0	AI
D-5	1 1/2	→	N	B	A	—	—	I	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	0	0	—
→	1 1/2		N	B	A	MV03B	RM	O	GB	M0	RM	—	7.5	AC	✓	0	0	0	—
F-10	3/4	RECIRC. COMP. SEAL INS	N	A	W	—	—	I	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	0	0	—
→	3/4		N	A	W	—	—	O	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	0	0	—
F-11	3/4	→	N	A	W	—	—	I	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	0	0	—
→	3/4		N	A	W	—	—	O	CK	—	RF	—	N/A	—	—	0	0	0	—

D

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Isolation Signal Codes (utility supply)</u>		
<u>Code</u> or Group	<u>Parameter(s) Sensed</u> for Isolation	<u>Set</u> Point (units)

Isolation Valve Type

- B = Butterfly
- BCK = Ball check
- BL = Ball
- CK = Check
- DCV = Diaphragm
- Control Valve
- GB = Globe
- GT = Gate
- PV = Relief
- SCV = Stop Check
- SV = Solenoid
- VB = Vacuum Breaker
- XV = Explosive

Others stated in Table
VFC = Festo/ve check Valve
ANG = Angle Valve

Isolation Valve Power Source

- A = Air
- AC = AC
- DC = DC
- H = Hand
- P = Process fluid
- Others stated in Table

Isolation Valve Actuator

- A0 = Air
- M0 = Motor
- S0 = Solenoid
- Others stated in Table
- XC = Explosive Charge*
- M = MANUAL*

Engineered Safety Function

- N = NO
- Y = YES

Position Indication in Control Room

- D = Direct
- I = Indirect
- N = None
- Others stated in Table

Fluid

- A = Air
- S = Steam
- W = Water

Others stated in Table
B = Brake Solution

Isolation Valve Location

- I = Inside Containment
- O = Outside Containment
- Others stated in Table

Isolation Valve Actuation Mode

- A = Automatic
- OP = Overpressure
- RF = Reverse Flow
- RM = Remote Manual
- Others stated in Table

M = Manual

Isolation Valve Positions

- AI = As Is
- C = Closed
- O = Open
- Others stated in Table

POOR ORIGINAL

SEE ATTACHED SHEET

1391

105

1391 206

ISOLATION SIGNAL CODES


SIGNAL	DESCRIPTION	SET POINT ^{1/}
A*	Reactor vessel low water level 3	12.5"
B*	Reactor vessel low water level 2	-38"
C*	High radiation - main steam line	3.0 x Full Power Background
D*	Line break - main steam line (high steam flow)	106 psid
E*	Line break - Main steam line (steam line tunnel high temperature)	200 F
F*	High drywell pressure	1.69 psig
G	Reactor vessel low water level 1	-132.5"
J*	Line break in reactor water cleanup system - high space temperature, high differential flow	30 F above ambient, **
K*	Line break in steam line to/from turbine (high steam line space temperature, high steam flow, low steam line pressure or high turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure)	HPCI - 30 F above ambient, \pm 248 H ₂ O, 110 psig, 10 psig RCIC - 30 F above ambient, \pm 105 H ₂ O, 57 psig, 10 psig
L	Reactor building standby ventilation system initiation	System initiation
P*	Low main steam line pressure at inlet to turbine (RUN mode only)	825 psig
R	Low condenser vacuum	**
T	High temperature in turbine building	50 F above ambient
U	High reactor vessel pressure	109 psig + flood level static head
W*	High temperature at outlet of cleanup system nonregenerative heat exchanger	7" Hg vac.
X	Low steam pressure, drywell high pressure	HPCI - 110 psig, 1.69 psig RCIC - 57 psig, 1.69 psig
Y	Standby liquid control system actuated	System initiation
Z	Low level in RBCLCW head tank	\leq 5'-9"
RM*	Remote manual switch from main control room	Not applicable

* These are the isolation functions of the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control system; other functions are given for information only.

** Not yet established.

^{1/} Set points are preliminary. Final values will be documented by the Technical Specifications.

POOR ORIGINAL



1391 207

POOR ORIGINAL

MSIV-LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM
TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR
4 OUTBOARD MSIV'S)

→ X1D MAIN STEAM
→ MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN

→ X1C MAIN STEAM
→ MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN

→ X1B MAIN STEAM
→ MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN

→ X1A MAIN STEAM
→ MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN

→ X3 MAI' STEAM LINE DRAIN

→ X12 HPCI TURBINE STEAM
INLET LINE

→ X16 RCIC TURBINE STEAM
INLET LINE

→ X6B RHR INJECTION LINE TO
RECIRCULATION SYSTEM RETURN LINE

→ X5 RHR SHUTDOWN
COOLING LINE FROM RPV

→ F10 RECIRCULATION PUMP
SEAL INJECTION

LEGEND

☐ - GLOBE VALVE (CLOSED)
◇ - GLOBE VALVE (OPEN)
◇ - GATE VALVE (OPEN)
◼ - GATE VALVE (CLOSED)
◻ - CHECK VALVE (OPEN)
◼ - CHECK VALVE (CLOSED)
M - MOTOR OPERATOR
A - AIR OPERATOR
S - SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE
P - PUMP
E - EXPLOSIVE VALVE
X - LEAK TEST CONNECTION (L.T.C.)

HPCI - HIGH PRESSURE
COOLANT INJECTION
RCIC - REACTOR CORE
ISOLATION COOLING
RHR - RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL
RPV - REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL
CRD - CONTROL ROD DRIVE
RWCJ - REACTOR WATER CLEANUP
MSIV - MAIN STEAM
ISOLATION VALVE

NOTES

1. MAIN STEAM PIPING UP TO ISOLATION VALVES
WAS PURCHASED TO B31.1 AND ANALYZED
TO ASME III (CODE CLASS 1) (CC1).
2. ALL L.T.C. VALVES (EITHER GATE OR GLOBE)
AND LINE SIZES ARE 3/4 INCH, ASME III CC2
AND HAVE AT LEAST ONE OF THE TWO VALVES
IN SERIES LOCKED CLOSED.

NO WITHDRAW LINES
(UNITS)


PLANT SHOREHAM UNIT 1

FIGURE A

CRITERION 55 CONTAINMENT
ISOLATION VALVES

1391 208

POOR ORIGINAL



1391 209

POOR ORIGINAL




NOTES

1. THESE ARE ALL ASME III CODE CLASS 2 (CC2) SYSTEMS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
2. ALL LTC VALVES (EITHER GATE OR GLOBE) AND LINE SIZES ARE 3/4 INCH, ASME III CC2 AND HAVE AT LEAST ONE LOCKED CLOSED VALVE.


PLANT SHOREHAM UNIT 1
 FIGURE B
 CRITERION 56 CONTAINMENT
 ISOLATION VALVES

1391 210

POOR ORIGINAL



POOR ORIGINAL



1391 212

E

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BARRIERS

Question: Discuss the extent to which the quality standards and seismic design classification of the containment isolation provisions follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.26, "Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-, and Radioactive-Water-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants", and 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification".

Response: The quality standards and seismic design classification of the containment isolation provisions follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.26, Rev. 1 - September 1974 and 1.29, Rev. 1 - August 1973.

See also response to Question G (Codes and Standards).

POOR ORIGINAL

1391 213

F

PROVISIONS FOR TESTING

Question: Discuss the design provisions for testing the operability of the isolation valves.

Response: In general, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Containment Isolation Valves (Figure A) can be tested for operability by stroking the valves (one at a time) during normal plant operation. This testing is accomplished by remote manual operation. The following exceptions to this general rule apply:

1. X5 - RHR Shutdown Cooling Line from RPV

Containment isolation valves in this line are normally shut, and cannot be opened with the RPV at full pressure. Operability may be demonstrated at any time, provided steam dome pressure is less than 135 psig.

2. Simple Check Valves Associated with X2A&B, X-36, F-10, and F-11

Inboard main feed water check valves may be demonstrated to shut on reverse flow when the reactor is shut down and feedwater is secured. Standby Liquid Control check valves may be demonstrated to shut on reverse flow at any time, by means of opening upstream test connections. Recirculation Pump Seal Injection check valves may be demonstrated to shut on reverse flow when the reactor is shut down, recirculation pumps are secured, and seal injection is secured.

With the following exceptions, the balance of the containment isolation valves (Figures B & C) may be tested for operability at any time by means of remote manual stroking of the valve:

1. Figure B Containment Isolation Check Valves may be demonstrated to shut on reverse flow during integrated containment leak rate testing. Inboard RBCLCW check valves may be tested when shutdown using vent and test connections.
2. TIP Drive Guide Tube Explosive Valves (X37B, C, D, & X38) may be tested with the TIP's withdrawn. However, there is no intention to perform this test.
3. TIP Purge Check Valve (X37A) is tested for operability during containment integrated leak rate testing by exposing the valves to containment pressure via two-way equalizing valves on the TIP indexer units.
4. Figure B Relief Valves may be demonstrated to be seated for containment isolation during containment integrated leak rate testing.

G

CODES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDES

Question: Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the containment isolation system and system components.

Response: The containment isolation system consists of the mechanical components which establish the isolation barriers, and the electrical and control components which are used to actuate active mechanical components. All components are designed in accordance with the applicable codes, standards, and regulatory guides established in the FSAR for engineered safety features.

Containment isolation portions of mechanical systems penetrating primary containment are designed in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.26 (Quality Group Classification) and 1.29 (Seismic Design Classification). The principal code for the containment penetrations is ANSI B31.7 (1969) based on purchase order date. For piping and valves which constitute containment isolation components and are, in addition, part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary as defined by 10CFR50.2(v), the principal code is ASME III Class 1. The major exception to this is main steam piping and valves out to, and including, the outboard isolation valves. Based on purchase order date, the principal code for main steam is ANSI B.31.1.0. For valves and piping constituting containment isolation components, but not reactor coolant pressure boundary, the principal code is ASME III Class 2.

The following standards and guides were applied in the design of the controls portions of the containment isolation system:

IEEE	279	-	1971
IEEE	317	-	1972
IEEE	323	-	1971
IEEE	336	-	1971
IEEE	338	-	1971
IEEE	344	-	1971
IEEE	379	-	1972
R. G.	1.11	(3/71)	
P. G.	1.22	(2/72)	
R. G.	1.29	(8/73)	
R. G.	1.30	(8/72)	
R. G.	1.47	(5/73)	
R. G.	1.53	(6/73)	
R. G.	1.62	(10/73)	
R. G.	1.63	(10/73)	

1391 215

PLANT - SHOREHAM UNIT 1

H

NORMAL OPERATING MODES AND ISOLATION MODES

Question: Discuss the normal operating modes and containment isolation provision and procedures for lines that transfer potentially radioactive fluids out of the containment.

Response: Upon actuation of containment isolation signals, there are no pumps, valves, or equipment which will actuate automatically and allow an inadvertent release of radioactive gases or liquids out of the primary containment. There are also no automatic equipment operations to provide inadvertent releases upon resetting the containment isolation signals. Systems designed to discharge potentially radioactive fluids from the primary containment will automatically isolate (e.g. drywell floor drains). Systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive fluids from the containment for accident mitigation (e.g. ECCS) are closed systems terminating back inside primary containment. Operating procedures for all systems capable of transferring potentially radioactive fluids from primary containment are being reviewed to ensure there are no operator actions which could result in an inadvertent release. A brief discussion is provided below for containment effluent lines which are normally operating or which may be used to mitigate an accident. A detailed summary of all containment isolation (normal and post-accident valve position, and isolation signals) is provided in response to question D.

1. Main Steam Lines and Main Steam Drain Line (X1A-D, X3)

These lines are automatically isolated during an accident and will not be reopened.

2. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Lines (X12&16)

Steam flow is automatically initiated during an accident. Duration of steam flow depends upon accident details.

3. RHR Shutdown Cooling Line (X-5)

Shutdown cooling may be initiated to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

4. CRD Withdraw Lines

Since a scram will occur prior to uncovering core, higher than normal radiation levels are not expected in these lines. Flow out the withdraw line is not expected after the scram.

5. RWCU Line from RPV (X-4)

This line is automatically isolated during an accident and will not be brought back on line if radiation levels are excessive.

6. Sample Coolant from RPV (X-30)

This line is automatically isolated during an accident and will not be brought back on line if radiation levels are excessive. Alternative post-accident sampling provisions are being investigated.

7. Primary Containment Atmospheric Control Lines (X-46, 47, 44, 45)

These lines are utilized after an accident to provide a closed flow path from the primary containment, through the hydrogen recombiners, and back to the primary containment.

8. Containment Drywell Radiation Monitoring (XS12)

These lines are automatically isolated after an accident.

9. Equipment Drains from Drywell (X31)

These lines are isolated after an accident and will not be reopened unless radiation levels are acceptable.

10. ECCS Pump Suction Lines from Suppression Pool (X9A-D, X21A, B, X19, X15)

These lines are utilized after an accident for core cooling. The flow paths are closed loops from the primary containment, through the pumps, and back to the primary containment.

11. RBCLCW (X25A, B, X23A, B)

These lines are not expected to be radioactive, since the flow loop is closed. They will be closed manually on actuation of containment isolation in accordance with plant procedures.

1391 217