

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	C	B	E	P	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

CGN'T

REPORT SOURCE 0 1 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 5 7 1 1 0 1 9 7 9 8 9

7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

ROCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal full power operation, a reactor scram was received due to a high
0 3 | radiation signal on the Main Steam Line High Radiation Monitors. After the scram,
0 4 | the monitors returned to a normal reading and all MSIV's were opened. No stack
0 5 | off gas spikes were seen during the evolution; however, spikes did occur at the
0 6 | steam jet air ejectors and the flux tilt monitor at the time of the scram. Approx-
0 7 | imately seven seconds before the scram, the following parameters behaved as indicat-
0 8 | ed and returned to normal: (Cont'd)

[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause for the reactor scram was a resin injection from the RWCU system. The

1 1 RWCU system had been out of service for approximately six hours prior to the scram

1 2 for system maintenance. During this period, it is believed that the filter cake

1 3 dropped from the filter septums with possible air entrainment due to system leakage.

1 4 When the maintenance was completed, the RWCU system was pressurized and the (Cont'd)

FACILITY STATUS: 1 5 E (28) % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) OTHER STATUS: NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Reactor Scram (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 2 34

7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
NA

44

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
NA

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	POOR ORIGINAL

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION
NUMBER		
1 2	40	NA

8 9 11 12 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 2 (42) NA 7911200 544

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

2 0 y (44) Local radio, television, and newspaper

NAME OF PREPARER A. C. Tollison, Jr.

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LER CONTINUATION -- RO# 1-79-74

Facility: BSEP Unit # 1

Event Date: 10-19-79

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (Cont'd)

Slight Increase

Power (APRM)
Vessel Pressure
Core Flow
"A" Feed Flow
Total Steam Flow

No Change

Core Δ P
Vessel Level
"B" Feed Flow
Throttle Pressure
Gross Megawatts
Turbine Vibration

Events noted during and after the scram were as follows:

1. #1 Diesel Generator did not start on the low level (-38") initiation signal at the time of the scram.
2. While trying to go into torus cooling and later, shutdown cooling, on "B" RHR heat exchanger, no Δ T could be developed across the heat exchanger.
3. After being used intermittently throughout the day for vessel level control, the RCIC turbine could not be started on the afternoon of the scram.
4. Vessel chemistry exceeded 2 μ mho for approximately 31.5 hours, reaching a maximum value of 6.63 μ mho.
5. The CRD scram discharge volume drain line was found to have several pipe supports damaged from an apparent water hammer event.

Technical Specifications 6.9.1.9b

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LER CONTINUATION -- RO# 1-79-74

Facility: BSEP Unit # 1

Event Date: 10-19-79

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

RWCU pump was started. Approximately one minute later, the reactor scrambled. Resin injected into the vessel caused a change in coolant viscosity and surface tension resulting in flow and pressure disturbances. This imbalance in vessel chemistry results in a release of N-16 which carries over with the steam. The N-16 high energy gamma caused the scram.

The failure of the #1 Diesel Generator was due to a split metallic bellows on the lube oil diverting valve actuator, causing a loss of control air. The diverting valve actuator was replaced with a new vender modified design on all diesel generators. Diesel generator control air pressure has been added to the auxiliary operators Daily Surveillance Report to be checked once per shift.

The anti-rotation device on the RHR heat exchanger inlet valve F047B allowed the stem to rotate without moving the valve disk. The anti-rotation device was adjusted and the valve tested satisfactorily. This is considered an isolated event.

Disassembly of the RCIC steam exhaust check valve showed that the stud and nut on the back of the disk had broken and the disk had separated from the hinge and had lodged in the valve inlet. A new valve has been ordered and will be installed upon arrival. Engineering has been tasked to determine the cause of the failure.

Vessel conductivity increase to 6.63 μmho was due to the resin injection and resin breakdown due to temperature and neutron flux. The vessel was cleaned to less than 2 μmho in approximately 31.5 hours. Operating Procedure 14, RWCU, has been revised to direct the RWCU effluent to the condenser after precoating or an extended shutdown until a chemical analysis is run on the effluent. Also, the revision requires that (1) double valve isolation of the filter/demineralizer be used when going to "Hold/Start", (2) always backwash and precoat the filters when RWCU has been depressurized for greater than thirty minutes, and (3) F042, the RWCU injection valve, will not be opened until the system is completely pressurized and stable.

The CRD scram discharge volume drain line had several of its supports damaged by water hammer during the scram. This water hammer is believed to have been caused by the excessively long closing time of the drain line isolation valve. This problem has been corrected by replacement of the solenoid valve which operates the drain and vent valves. The damaged supports were also replaced and an evaluation is underway to determine if additional support is required. PT inspections will be conducted on all welds on this line. The drain lines on the other unit were inspected with no detectable damage noted.

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