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PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM

October 19, 1979

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Washington, D.C. 20555

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dr. Frederick P. Cowan
Apt. B-125
6152 North Verde Trail
Boca Raton, Florida 33433

Re: Consumers Power Company
(Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-329, 50-330

Gentlemen:

Enclosed are four \$ 50.55(e) reports which have recently been submitted by Consumers Power Company to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Very truly yours,
Martha E. Gibbs
Martha E. Gibbs

MEG:cem
cc: Service List
Enclosures

POOR ORIGINAL

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Consumers
Power
Company

POOR ORIGINAL

PLATED CORRESPONDENCE

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October 15, 1979
Howe-269-79

Mr J G Keppler, Regional Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137



MIDLAND NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT NO 1, DOCKET NO 50-329
UNIT NO 2, DOCKET NO 50-330
SERVICE WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE FOR THE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS

Reference: S H Howell letter to J G Keppler; Midland Nuclear Plant;
Unit No 1, Docket No 50-329; Unit No 2, Docket No 50-330;
Service Water Supply Pressure for the Containment Air
Coolers; Serial Howe-219-79, dated August 7, 1979

The referenced letter was an interim 50.55(e) report regarding the failure to obtain the required design pressure at the outlet of the containment air coolers. This letter is the final report. Corrective actions and their implementation dates are provided in the attachment.

Stephen H. Howell

WRB/lr

Attachment: MCAR-30, Final Report, dated September 26, 1979

CC: Director of Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Att: Mr Victor Stello, USNRC (15)

Director of Office of Management
Information and Program Control, USNRC (1)

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DUPLICATE

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BCC: JLBacon, M-1085A
WRBird, JSC-216B
LHCurtis, Bechtel AA
JLCorley, Midland
LADreisbach, Bechtel-Midland
✓MEGibbs, IL&B
GSKeeley, P14-408B
BWMarguglio, JSC-220A
DEMiller, Midland
WGMoring, Bechtel AA
JFNewgen, Bechtel-Midland
JARutgers, Bechtel AA
RLTeuteberg, P14-418
File: 0.4.9.32

SUBJECT: MCAR 30 (issued 7/11/79)

Service Water Supply Pressure for the Containment
Recirculating Air Cooling Units

FINAL REPORT

DATE: September 26, 1979

PROJECT: Consumers Power Company
Midland Plant Units 1 and 2
Bechtel Job 7220

Introduction

This report is submitted to advise of the status of the project's action relating to the service water supply pressure for the containment recirculating air cooling units (CRACUs).

Description of Deficiency

During final system flow diagram review, project engineering discovered that the service water supply pressure to the CRACUs following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or main steam line break (MSLB) is less than the 40 psig (54.7 psia) stated in FSAR Subsection 6.2.2.2.3. The final calculations indicate that the service water pressure at the CRACU outlet could be as low as 13 to 14 psia under emergency operation, with the ultimate heat sink at its design elevation of 604 feet (see FSAR Subsection 9.2.5). The post-accident environment inside the containment reaches approximately 300F and causes service water inside the air coolers to boil, resulting in reduced performance of the CRACUs. Consequently, the CRACUs could not remove heat from the containment at the rate described in FSAR Subsections 6.2.2.2 and 9.2.1.3 following an MSLB or LOCA.

Summary of Investigation of the Causes of the Deficiency

While conducting the investigation, two principal circumstances contributing to the deficiency were identified.

- A. A review of the preliminary calculations identified several errors and nonconservative assumptions, each of which contributed to the deficiency.
1. It was assumed that the cooling pond was at the normal full-operating elevation of 627 feet rather than at the 604-foot initial design elevation of the ultimate heat sink. This assumption resulted in an overestimation of available service water pressure of 23 feet

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