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F. L. CLAYTON, JR.
Senior Vice President



November 7, 1979

Docket No. 50-348
NRC letter concerning surveillance
testing errors (dated 9/21/79)

Mr. D. G. Eisenhut, Acting Director
Division of Operating Reactors
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

As requested in your letter dated September 21, 1979, concerning surveillance testing errors, Alabama Power Company submits the following response for Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1.

Response: An investigation of reactor trips and safety injections determined that six reactor trips, one safety injection and one safety injection with reactor trip occurred during the performance of surveillance test procedures. As shown in the table below, only four of the reactor trips and/or safety injections were caused by personnel error. The other four were caused by either procedural error (one), equipment malfunction (one), or maintenance error (two). The procedure leading to the reactor trip has been revised.

RT's	SI's	DATE	CAUSE
	X	7-21-77	Personnel Error
X		8-12-77	Procedural Error
X	X	12-28-77	Personnel Error
X		1-12-78	Personnel Error
X		5-26-78	Equipment Malfunction
X		6-20-78	Personnel Error
X		1-18-79	Maintenance Error
X		2-14-79	Maintenance Error

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
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Potential for problems associated with these occurrences has been previously considered. Management policies and procedures and surveillance procedures have been reviewed and were determined to be adequate. It is plant practice that subsequent to inadvertent safeguards actuation or reactor trips, procedure changes to prevent recurrence are incorporated if appropriate. Current plant surveillance procedures include prerequisites and cautions to avoid challenges to the protective safeguard features. A memo will be written to Plant Operators and Supervisors emphasizing the importance of avoiding unnecessary challenges to the protective safeguard features.

Yours very truly,


F. L. Clayton, Jr.

FLCjr/HRF/rmb

cc: Mr. R. A. Thomas
Mr. G. F. Trowbridge
Office of I&E
Divn. of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D.C.

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