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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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DESCRIPTION

Advising it is felt that
the TMI-1 FSAR, in Chapter 14,
provides adequate safeguards to
prevent boron dilution accidents...

1p

ENCLOSURE

PLANT NAME: THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT # 1
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December 16, 1977
GQL 1707

Mr. R. W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY



Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289

The TMI, Unit 1 FSAR, in Chapter 14, discusses the potential for, and the termination of, boron dilution accidents created by operator errors or multiple valve failures during power operations with the reactor head in place. This chapter also covers potential accidents occurring during refueling and maintenance operations with the head removed. However, one potential accident not covered in this chapter is boron dilution by a Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) injection during operation of the Decay Heat Removal System.

The TMI-1 Decay Heat Removal System procedure requires opening the breakers for both NaOH E.S. motor operated isolation valves. This action prevents inadvertent opening of the valve due to operator error. The TMI-1 plant cooldown procedure requires closing and tagging the manual valves upstream of the E.S. motor operated isolation valves. The performance of these procedures, as required prior to operation of the Decay Heat Removal System, results in redundant isolation between the NaOH tank and the Decay Heat Removal System. Therefore, it is felt that TMI-1 provides adequate safeguards to prevent boron dilution accidents.

Sincerely,

J. G. Herbein
J. G. Herbein
Vice President

JGH:DGM:tas

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