

FROM:
Metropolitan Edison Company
Reading, Pennsylvania 19603
J.G. Miller

TO:
Dr. Peter A. Morris

CLASSIF: **U** POST OFFICE
REG. NO:

DESCRIPTION: (Must Be Unclassified)

**Ltr re our 9-16-70 ltr...ltr providing
addl info on requirements of INER-279
& proposed General Design Criteria....**

ENCLOSURES:

REMARKS:

DATE OF DOCUMENT:

12-21-70

DATE RECEIVED

12-28-70

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1 Signed & 3 cys con'f

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CONCURRENCE ☐

DATE ANSWERED:

NO ACTION NECESSARY ☐

COMMENT ☐

BY:

FILE CODE:

50-289

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w/4 cys for ACTION**

12-29-70

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

P. O. Box 542

READING, PENNSYLVANIA 19603

JOHN G. MILLER
Vice President and Chief Engineer

December 21, 1970

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station
Unit No. 1
Docket 50-289

Dear Dr. Morris:

In reference to question 7.1.3 contained in your letter of September 16, 1970, we stated in revised pages to the FSAR filed in Amendment 15, dated December 15, 1970, that the reactor protection system is designed to meet all the requirements of IEEE-279 and the commissions proposed General Design Criteria. In our opinion, IEEE-279 does not apply to the RC flow tubes.

The flow tubes are an integral part of the Reactor Coolant outlet piping, one tube in each Reactor Coolant loop and are not redundant. The Delta-p output from each tube is measured by redundant Delta-p instruments. A failure analysis of this arrangement has established its acceptability. The analysis considered all possible failure modes and common mode events which could conceivably deprive the protection system of needed information. No credible failure or common failure mode was discovered which could not be detected in the on-line operation of the plant.

Since no failure can initiate a need for protection system action, or go undetected, the system is acceptable.

Very truly yours,

J. G. Miller
J. G. Miller



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