NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NUMBER 50-289

FILE NUMBER INCIDENT REPORT

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TO:	FROM:	DATE OF DOCUMENT
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly	Metropolitan Edison Company Reading, Pa. J. G. Herbein	5/23/77
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PLANT NAME: (3-P)(1-P)

Three Mile Island Unit No 1

RJL

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-289/77-07/1T) on 5/9/77 concerning both doors of the reactor building emergency personnel access hatch being open at the same time.....

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

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GQL 0701
May 23, 1977

Regulatory Docket File

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sir:

Docket No. 50-289
Operating License No. DPR-50

In accordance with the Technical Specifications of our Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1), we are reporting the following reportable occurrence:

(1) Report Number: 77-07/1T

(2a) Required Report Date: 5-23-77

(2b) Date of Occurrence: 5-09-77

(3) Facility: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station - Unit 1

(4) Identification of Occurrence:

Title: Both doors of the reactor building emergency personnel access hatch were open at the same time.

Type: A reportable occurrence as defined by Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.(2) in that both doors of the reactor building emergency personnel access hatch were open at the same time, thus leading to a loss of containment integrity as stated in section 1.7 when the conditions were as stated in section 3.6.1 of the Technical Specifications.

1476 332

771520008

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1

May 23, 1977
GQL 0704

(5) Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Power:	Core: 0
	Elec. 0
RC Flow:	102×10^6 lb/hr
RC Pressure:	490 psig
RC Temp:	300°F
PRZR Level:	100 inches
PRZR Temp:	465°F

(6) Description of Occurrence:

A maintenance man, while opening the inner door of the reactor building emergency personnel access hatch, noticed that the outer door was also partially open. He immediately re-closed the inner door and notified the Shift Foreman who investigated and returned the outer door in its closed position.

(7) Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence has been determined to be both design and personnel in that:

1) Attempting to close the doors against an obstruction or too rapidly swinging the door open and closed can cause excessive stress on the upper hinge shift extension causing it to bend, and thereby creating excessive door free-travel. The free-travel then allows violation of the door mechanical interlock.

2) The upper hinge shaft extension may not be adequately supported (to take the strain from occasional door misuse). The manufacturer has proposed an additional bearing be installed to provide additional support.

(8) Analysis of Occurrence:

Personnel at the scene immediately re-established containment integrity therefore, both doors were open for less than one minute. The inner door seals were tight thus the occurrence did not constitute a threat to the health and safety of the public.

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1

May 23, 1977
GQL 0704

(9) Corrective Action:

IMMEDIATE:

1. Returned the doors to their closed position.

2. Verified that the Control Room alarms for the reactor building doors functioned properly.

3. Restricted use of this door to emergency use only.

4. Performed door seal leakage test-satisfactory.

LONG TERM:

A design change is being evaluated to install additional shaft support bearings and to provide an additional interlock device.

The Plant Operations Review Committee and Unit Superintendent have reviewed and approved the above corrective action and have taken steps to assure its completion.

(10) Failure Data:

Manufacturer - Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.

Contract No. - 68-2631U
Gilbert Associates

Hinged Shaft Extension - 2" steel shaft is part of hinge assembly.

Similar Occurrences:

74-11
74-32

Sincerely,

J. G. Herbein
Vice President

JGH:DGM:rk

Attachment: Licensee Event Report

1476 134