

RC Temp.: 579°F

PRZR Level: 220 inches

PRZR Temp.: 655°F

(6) Description of Occurrence:

At 2230 hours on September 17, 1975, after terminating make-up flow to the Nuclear Services Cooling-River Water Circulating Water System, NR-V-4A (De-Ice Make-Up Valve) failed in the open position. Since the valve could not be closed using the remote pushbutton, it was closed locally using its handwheel. The engineered safety (ES) position for this valve is closed.

The redundant valve (NR-V-4B) had just previously been closed to secure make up flow to the system thus verifying its operability.

The NR-V-4A control circuit was investigated to determine the cause of the failure and a high resistance contact in the closing control circuit was discovered. The contact was cleaned and checked for proper operation. The valve was then tested satisfactorily and returned to service.

(7) Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was material in that investigation revealed that NR-V-4A failed to close as the result of a high resistance contact in the closing control circuit. This contact serves as part of an electrical interlock to prevent the valve from receiving an open and close command at the same time. When the valve is stopped at any position this contact is normally closed.

The contact developed a high resistance and when a close signal was applied to the circuit, enough voltage was dropped across the contact to prevent the closing contactor coil from fully energizing, thereby preventing the valve from closing. The high resistance contact was an auxiliary contact on the opening contactor.

(8) Analysis of Occurrence:

The failure of NR-V-4A did not represent a threat to the health and safety of the public in that:

- a. One Isolation valve is sufficient to isolate the Nuclear River Water System from the Circulating Water System.
- b. The redundant isolation valve, NR-V-4B had been closed (ES position) to isolate make up flow to the Circulating Water System just prior to the failure of NR-V-4A, verifying its operability and providing the necessary isolation.

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(9) Corrective Action:

In addition to the immediate corrective actions previously mentioned long term corrective actions are as follows:

- a. All the contacts in the NR-V-4A control circuit will be checked for proper continuity and operation.
- b. The running current, torquing currents, and travel time of the valve will be measured. Repairs or adjustments will be made as required.


The Plant Operations Review Committee and the Station Superintendent have reviewed and approved the above listed corrective actions and have taken steps to ensure completion of the yet to be completed long term corrective actions.

(10) Failure Data:

ITE Auxiliary Contact Block
No. F10 NOCR

Similar Occurrences: None

Sincerely,


R. C. Arnold
Vice President

RCA:CWS:tas

File: 20.1.1 / 7.7.3.5.1

cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1

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NFB

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

POST OFFICE BOX 542 READING, PENNSYLVANIA 19603

TELEPHONE 215 - 929-3601

September 29, 1975
GQL 1553

Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Docket No. 50-289
Operating License No. DPR-50
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)



Pursuant to our letter of July 11, 1975, please be informed that as a result of analyses performed on the rip rap of the dikes at TMI, the following deficiencies have been identified:

1. In several areas the rip rap is smaller or thinner than originally specified. To correct this situation, additional rip rap of the proper size will be placed in these areas.
2. In one 225-foot-long area just south of the Unit 2 intake structure the existence of a toe can not be verified due to the presence of a thick covering of spoil material. To provide such verification, a trench will be dug through the spoil. If this excavation reveals the presence of a toe, all spoil material covering the toe will be removed; if it does not, a toe will be placed.
3. In the area between the two intake structures and in another 250 foot-long area just north of the Unit 1 intake structure a toe probably does not exist. To correct this situation, additional, coarse rip rap material will be placed at the base of the rip rap facing in these two areas to serve as a toe.
4. In the area between the two intake structures and just north of the Unit 1 intake structure there is essentially no filter blanket present. This is not considered to represent a serious situation in that any additional rip rap which is placed on the facing to restore lost filter volume will increase the thickness of the facing and thereby decrease the need for a filter; therefore, no attempt will be made to replace the filter blanket in these areas except by the application of additional rip rap to the dike facing.

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Mr. [Signature]


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All of the repairs mentioned in items 1 through 4 above are expected to be completed by the end of 1975, river conditions and other factors permitting. In the meantime, a region-by-region analysis performed by our consultants indicates that the existing rip rap facing of the dike will be adequate to withstand design flow velocities and wave heights.

We trust this submittal is adequate; however, should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. C. Arnold". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

R. C. Arnold
Vice President

RCA:JFV:tas

File: 20.1.1 / 7.7.4.1.1

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

50-289/73-33
SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION

POST OFFICE BOX 420 MIDDLETOWN, PENNSYLVANIA 17057

TELEPHONE 717-941-4011

September 19, 1975

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa., 19406

POOR ORIGINAL

Operating License SPR-50
Docket 50-289

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence No. 75-33

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


This telegram is to confirm the telecon between A. N. Fasano (Region 1-NRC) and J. J. Colitz (TMI Unit 1 Superintendent) at 1630 hours, September 18, 1975.

The following report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 5.7.2.a.4 (page 6-11) of the Technical Specifications.

On September 17, 1975 following completion of adding make-up water to the Circulating Water System through NR-V-4A & 4B, NR-V-4A failed to close using the remote pushbutton in the Control Room. NR-V-4A was then closed locally by use of the handwheel.

The redundant valve, NR-V-4B, was initially used to isolate make-up flow to the Circulating Water System before the NR-V-4A failure was discovered. Since NR-V-4B had just been closed (ES position) verifying its operability, it was not retested. Initial investigation revealed a high resistance contact in NR-V-4A's closing control circuit. The contact was cleaned which corrected the problem. NR-V-4A was tested by opening and closing the valve with the remote control room pushbuttons and returned to service.

Very truly yours,


J. J. Colitz

Unit 1 Superintendent
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station

JJC:lca

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J. P. O'Reilly

-2-

September 13, 1971

The Surveillance Procedures used to leak check both the Reactor Building Personnel and Reactor Building equipment door seals will be reviewed and if required revised to prevent future occurrence.

Very truly yours,

J. J. Colitz

J. J. Colitz
Unit 1 Superintendent
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station

JJC:lca

POOR ORIGINAL

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