

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 6614

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Metropolitan Edison Co Reading, Pa R C Arnold			DATE OF DOC 6-16-75	DATE REC'D 6-19-75	LTR XXX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: DL			ORIG one signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXXXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-289		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr reporting abnormal occurrence #75-16
on 6-5-75....concerning out of limit settings
for the reactor coolant pressure trip
setpoints.....

ENCLOSURES:

PLANT NAME: Three Mile Island #1

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 6-19-75 ehf

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (L) W/ Copies	STOLZ (L) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (L) W/3 Copies
PARR (L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	SPELS W/ Copies
KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u> NRC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A GOSSICK/STAFF CASE GIAMBUSO BOYD MOORE (L) DEYOUNG (L) SKOVHOLT (L) GOLLER (L) (Ltr) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION (2) MIPC/PE (3) STEELE	<u>TECH REVIEW</u> SCHROEDER MACCARY KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO **STELLO **HOUSTON **NOVAK ROSS IPPOLITO TEDESCO J. COLLINS LAINAS BENAROYA VOLLMER	DENTON **GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER ENVIRO MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR HARLESS	<u>LIC ASST</u> R. DIGGS (L) H. GEARIN (L) E. GOULBOURNE (L) P. KREUTZER (E) J. LEE (L) M. MAIGRET (L) S. REED (E) M. SERVICE (L) S. SHEPPARD (L) M. SLATER (E) H. SMITH (L) S. TEETS (L) G. WILLIAMS (E) V. WILSON (L) R. INGRAM (L)	<u>A/T IND.</u> BRAITMAN SALTZMAN MELTZ <u>PLANS</u> MCDONALD CHAPMAN DUBE (Ltr) E. COUPE PETERSON HARTFIELD (2) KLECKER EISENHUT WIGGINTON F. WILLIAMS HANAUER
--	--	--	--	--

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

1 - LOCAL PDR <u>Harrisburg, Pa</u>	1 - NATIONAL LABS	1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 - Newton Anderson		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201 GT
5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST Teets		
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		

1476 162

7910240 901



METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION

POST OFFICE BOX 542 READING, PENNSYLVANIA 19603

TELEPHONE 215 - 929-3601

June 16, 1975
GQL 1160

Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Docket No. 50-289
Operating License No. DPR-50

In accordance with the Technical Specifications of our Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1), we are reporting the following abnormal occurrence.

- (1) Report Number: AO 50-289/75-16
- (2a) Report Date: June 16, 1975
- (2b) Occurrence Date: June 5, 1975
- (3) Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1
- (4) Identification of Occurrence:


Title: Out of Limit Settings for the Reactor Coolant Pressure Trip Setpoints.

Type: An abnormal occurrence as defined by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.8a, in that the out of limit settings for the reactor protection system (RPS) were less conservative than the limiting settings established in the Technical Specifications.

- (5) Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The reactor was in a cold shutdown condition with major plant parameters as follows:

Power: Core: 0%
Elec.: 0 MWe



1476 163

6614

RC Flow: 0 lbs/hr.
RC Press: 0 psig
RC Temp: 122° F
PRZR Level: 270 in.
PRZR Temp.: 122°F

(6) Description of Occurrence:

On June 5, 1975, Surveillance Procedure 1303-4.1, "Reactor Protection System Surveillance", was being performed in preparation for a reactor startup. Test results showed that the variable low reactor coolant system pressure trip setpoints for three RPS channels were less conservative than required by the Technical Specifications.

The out-of-specification channels were recalibrated and retested, and the resulting trip setpoints were verified as being within Technical Specification limits. In addition, complete electronic checks of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safeguards System were performed using a voltmeter which was known to be in calibration. All checks were satisfactory.

The "as-found" setpoint (before recalibration) and the required setpoint for the channels out of specification were

Channel	Table 2.3-1 Trip Setpoint	Actual Trip Point
	at 590°F (16.257 out-7755)	Measured at the Bistable
A	1831.5 psig	1827.4 psig
B	1831.5	1828.9
D	1831.5	1827.5

(7) Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of the occurrence is not known for sure, although it is suspected that it may be either

- material, in that the RPS temperature-to-pressure signal converters were out of calibration, which in turn may have been the result of converter instrument drift being greater than it should be,
- procedural, in that a voltmeter utilized at one point of the follow-up checks was found to be out of calibration, and it is possible that it may have been utilized in previous calibrations of the converters, or
- personnel, in that work done in nearby sections of RPS cabinets could have possibly adversely effected calibration of the converters.

1476 104

(8) Analysis of Occurrence:

It has been determined that the out-of-limit trip point settings did not constitute a threat to the health and safety of the public, since the maximum setpoint error (4.1 psig low) was more conservative than the 30 psig measurement error assumed in the accident safety analysis.

(9) Corrective Action:

Short-term corrective action was taken as described above to recalibrate and retest the affected channels.

Long-term corrective action is planned as follows:


- a. The variable low pressure trip feature for all four RPS channels will be tested each week for the next month to determine instrument drift.
- b. The out-of-calibration voltmeter will be returned to the calibration laboratory for inspection and repair. Further, a report detailing the extent of and reasons for the problem will be generated and appropriate corrective actions taken.
- c. Surveillance procedure data sheets will be amended to show test equipment serial numbers which will in turn help identify potential problems involving calibration equipment.
- d. An investigation will be conducted to determine if any other work in the RPS cabinets could have effected calibration of the signal converter, and if so, appropriate corrective actions will then be taken.

The Plant Operations Review Committee and Station Superintendent reviewed and approved the above actions.

(10) Failure Data:

- a. Previous Failures: None
- b. Equipment Identification:
 1. Bailey System 880 Reactor Protection System
 2. Hewlett-Packard Digital Voltmeter Model 3460 B

Sincerely,


R. C. Arnold

RCA:RSB:tas

File: 20.1.1 / 7.7.3.5.1

cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I

1476 165