

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	-	0	3	4	6	7	1	1	1	0	7	8	8	1	2	0	7	7	8	9
60	61								68	69						74	75							80

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 At 1130 hours on 11/10/78 during the performance of surveillance testing, it was dis-

0 3 covered that the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) low level trip setpoint was out of

0 4 tolerance (at 59.25 inches H₂O) on Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 2.

0 5 Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 states that BWST level instrument strings shall be

0 6 operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 with trip setpoint ≥ 49.5 and ≤ 55.0 inches H₂O. The

0 7 other three BWST low level instrument strings were operable during the period that

0 8 the setpoint for Channel 2 was out of tolerance. (NP-33-78-133)

SYSTEM CODE I B 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE E 13		COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14		COMP. SUBCODE E 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16	
EVENT YEAR 7 8 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 1 1 4 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30		REVISION NO. 2 32			
ACTION TAKEN E 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 37 40		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 5 6 0 26							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | On May 2, 1979 during Mode 5 operation, investigation under IC-246-79 began. A noisy

1 1 | constant current test potentiometer located within the SFAS cabinet was found to be

1 2 | the cause of the drifting setpoint. The potentiometer was replaced, and the bistable

1 3 | successfully retested by the performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.01 and

1 4 | declared operable on May 4, 1979.

1 5 E (28) 0 4 9 (29) NA (30) B (31) Surveillance Test ST 5031.01 (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

1 6 2 33 2 34 NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	2	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	2	3	4	5	6
		0	0	0	NA

8		9		11		12	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY							
TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	9	Z	(42)	NA			
				1173 100			

7 8 9 10
PUBLCITY (45)
ISSUED N (44) DESCRIPTION NA 7910220299 NRC USE ONLY
2 0 68 69 80

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-133

DATE OF EVENT: November 10, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) low level trip setpoint in Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 2 was out of tolerance

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 1356, and Load (MWE) = 450.

Description of Occurrence: At 1130 hours on November 10, 1978 during the performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.01, "SFAS Monthly Test" on SFAS Channel 2, it was noticed that the BWST low level trip setpoint was out of tolerance (at 59.25 inches H₂O).

This occurrence placed the unit in Action Statement 9 of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. This technical specification states that BWST level instrument strings shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 with trip setpoint ≥ 49.5 and ≤ 55.0 inches H₂O. Action Statement 9 states that with one channel inoperable, operation may proceed provided (a) the inoperable unit is placed in the tripped condition within an hour, and (b) three other channels are operable.

2 | Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was initially attributed to instrument drift of the bistable. However, on May 2, 1979, under Maintenance Work Order IC 246-79, investigation showed the cause to be a noisy constant current test potentiometer located within the SFAS cabinet.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The other three BWST low level instrument strings were operable during the period that the setpoint for Channel 2 was out of tolerance. If a Loss of Coolant Accident had occurred, the suction of the Decay Heat Pumps and Containment Spray Pumps would have been transferred to the Emergency Sump at the proper BWST level since at least two channels are required to trip for an initiation of incident level 5.

2 | Corrective Action: On May 2, 1979, during Mode 5 operation, investigation under IC-246-79 began. A noisy constant current test potentiometer located within the SFAS cabinet was found to be the cause of the drifting setpoint. The potentiometer was replaced, and the bistable successfully retested by the performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.01 and declared operable May 4, 1979.

LER #78-114

1173 101

Failure Data: There has been no previously reported occurrence of an out of tolerance BWST level trip setpoint due to instrument drift. In Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-84, a BWST level indication channel was reported to have been out of tolerance due to component failure of the level trip module.

LER #78-114