

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

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| 0 | 1 |
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REPORT SOURCE

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 9 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 0520 hours, 9-29-79, with the unit off line and approximately 20 per cent steam flow, the "B" main steam isolation valve (2-CV-2017) failed to close. Past experience indicates that the reverse type check valve would have closed in high steam flow conditions. Therefore, the valve would have performed its safety function had it been required to do so. This event is reportable per T. S. 15.6.9.2.A.9 and was similar to LER 79-001/01T-0.

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|--------------|----|-----------------------|----|-----------------|----|-----------------|----|--------------|----|----------------------|----|------------------|----|----------------------|----|------------------------|----|
| SYSTEM CODE | | CAUSE CODE | | CAUSE SUBCODE | | COMPONENT CODE | | | | COMP. SUBCODE | | VALVE SUBCODE | | | | | |
| C | D | E | | B | | V | A | L | V | E | X | C | D | | | | |
| 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | | | | |
| EVENT YEAR | | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | | OCCURRENCE CODE | | REPORT TYPE | | REVISION NO. | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 9 | | 0 | 0 | 7 | | 0 | 1 | T | | 0 | | | | | | |
| 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | | | | | | | | |
| ACTION TAKEN | | FUTURE ACTION | | EFFECT ON PLANT | | SHUTDOWN METHOD | | HOURS | | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | |
| E | F | Z | | Z | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | | Y | | N | | A | 5 |
| 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The packing was loosened and the Atwood-Morrill reverse swing check

1 1 valve closed with steam flow at 0533 hours, 9-29-79.

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1 4

FACILITY STATUS (28) G 0 2 0 (29) N/A (30) OTHER STATUS
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A Operator observation (32) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
 ACTIVITY CONTENT (33) Z (34) N/A (35) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
 RELEASED OF RELEASE (36) LOCATION OF RELEASE
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES (37) 0 0 0 (38) Z (39) DESCRIPTION
 NUMBER TYPE
 PERSONNEL INJURIES (40) 0 0 0 (41) DESCRIPTION
 NUMBER DESCRIPTION
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (42) Z (43) N/A
 TYPE DESCRIPTION
 PUBLICITY (44) 2 0 (45) DESCRIPTION
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION
 7910190429 NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

C. W. Fay

PHONE

414/277-2811

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 79-007/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2
Docket No. 50-301

At 0120 hours on September 29, 1979, with Unit 2 off line for secondary side plant maintenance, four condenser steam dump valves were opened (approximately 20% steam flow) during the closing operation of the main steam isolation valves. The "B" main steam valve (2-CV-2017) failed to leave the full open position upon the receipt of a close signal. The "A" main steam isolation (2-CV-2018) valve closed fully.

The "B" valve partially closed with some mechanical assistance. The valve was then reopened and with both mechanical assistance and steam flow, it swung to a position one inch short of the fully closed position. The valve was again reopened and the gland stuffing box packing was loosened. Steam flow was initiated, the close signal given and the valve fully closed at 0533 hours, September 29, 1979.

After a recent similar event (see Licensee Event Report No. 79-001/01T-0), the plant staff concluded that the main steam isolation valves would have functioned in the unlikely event of a steam line break and the resulting high steam flow since the valve discs hang at three degrees into the steam flow and have closed on several instances in the past at 4×10^6 lbs./hr. (6.6×10^6 lbs./hr. corresponds to 100% power) steam flow even without receiving a close signal. Therefore, it is concluded that the valve would have performed its safety function had it been required to do so.

Recognizing the repetitiveness of this type of valve failure to fully close at zero or low flow condition without mechanical assistance or the slacking off of the gland packing, plant staff involvement in investigation of solutions to this problem will continue.