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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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| IN THE MATTER OF<br><br>COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY<br><br>(Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2) | Docket Nos: 50-456, 50-457 |

# PETITION TO INTERVENE - SUPPLEMENTAL AND AMENDED CONTENTIONS

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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The petitioners, BOB NEINER FARMS, INC., as authorized by its shareholders; and BOB E. NEINER, ELEANOR M. NEINER, PAT NEINER, LORRAINE CREEK, LEO WALSH and ALTA WALSH, individually, hereby amend their contentions stated in their Petition to Intervene in this proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §2.714(b) through their attorneys, C. Allen Bock and Thomas J. Gordon.

I

AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL CONTENTIONS

Intervenors herein below list the contentions and the basis for the contentions which they seek to have litigated.

1. Intervenors contend that the 765 Kv transmission lines that will be used to transport the electrical output from the Braidwood Station create an unacceptable, hazardous and dangerous condition to persons living or working on a daily basis within 600 feet from the closest line, and that 765 Kv transmission lines should not be placed closer than 600 feet from any structure or area in which people can be expected to be present six or more hours per day. The hazardous and dangerous conditions include: audible noise impairing hearing, increasing tension, interfering with sleep, interfering with speech; interference with the operation of cardiac pacemakers; biological effects on humans because of exposure to electric fields excluding the use of nearby areas for working, living or recreation, and the danger of shock to persons and animals.

The basis for this contention is that Commonwealth Edison testified before the Illinois Commerce Commission that as of March 3, 1978, approximately 60% of all transmission right-of-way acquisitions included right-of-way for 345 Kv and 765 Kv transmission lines. Opinion No. 78-13, involving Case No. 26529, issued by the Public Service Commission of New York discusses the hazards associated with 765 Kv lines.

2. Intervenors contend that there must be an NRC approved plan for decommissioning the Braidwood nuclear facility before it opens due to the economic, environmental and safety effects that will exist at the time decommissioning is necessary, it is unacceptably hazardous not to have a plan ready in case of an accident requiring quick and complete decommissioning of the plant.

3. Intervenors contend there are inadequate emergency plans for the Braidwood Station in case of a radiological emergency and that such plans should include the following:

a) a program for educating and informing the public within 20 miles of the Station of the response they should take and also of the means for obtaining instructions for evacuation or other protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency originating at the Station.

b) a specific plan for notifying people residing within 20 miles or using recreational facilities within ten miles of the Station of the existence of a radiological emergency.

c) assurance that institutions within 20 miles of the Station, such as the federal prison in Joliet, hospitals and nursing homes, can be evacuated or adequately protected in the event of a radiological emergency.

d) identification of the medical facilities and available transportation that may be needed to provide treatment to members of the general public who may be exposed to radiation in the event of a radiological emergency and assurance that these facilities are capable of handling the treatment of persons injured as a result of a nuclear accident.

e) a suitable plan for providing medical treatment to operating personnel who might be exposed to radiation in the event of an accident, including transportation to medical facilities equipped to treat radiation casualties.

f) an identification of the public and private organizations which will have primary responsibility to organize and execute evacuation plans or other protective measures.

4. Intervenors contend that the proximity of the Illinois Central Railroad to the plant site and the use of the rail system to transport explosive materials from the Joliet, Illinois arsenal and other plants or depositories creates an unacceptably hazardous condition not considered by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, which issued the partial initial decision on environmental and site suitability matters for the Braidwood Station (LBP-75-1, 8 AEC 1197 (January, 1975)). At the construction permit stage the analysis of the probability of an explosion was inadequate in that:

a) the six-month period during 1974 for which the traffic from the Joliet arsenal was analyzed is not representative of other traffic periods in the past and may not be representative of the traffic to be expected in the future.

b) the analysis of the traffic was based on peacetime traffic only.

c) only the probability of accidental or inadvertent explosions were assessed and the probability of sabotage or purposefully caused explosions were not explored.

Intervenors believe that adequate protection to the facility requires relocation of the railroad line, a redesign of the features of the Braidwood Station to mitigate the consequences of an explosion of a magnitude that could develop if greater traffic loads of explosive materials were considered or the development of procedures by the railroad to reduce the probability of explosion.

5. Intervenors contend that in order to detect unacceptable contamination to groundwater supplies resulting from seepage from the cooling lake, Applicant must establish a monitoring program which specifies the number and location of offsite monitoring points and the frequency of sampling at each point.

6. Intervenors contend that since the Illinois River will be cumulatively affected by chemical and radiological discharges from the Braidwood, Collins and Dresden power stations, that the existing environmental impact studies are inadequate to show that an unacceptable impact on aquatic biota and fishing will not be created.

7. Within ten miles of Braidwood Station there are public and private recreational facilities with a total annual attendance of 1,053,873 persons (Table 2.2-7 ER-OLS)

Intervenors contend that the potential that these facilities would have to be closed, either temporarily or permanently, due to the release of substantial quantities of radioactive materials during an accident creates an unacceptable environmental impact.

8. Intervenors contend that for purposes of determining compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 100.11(a)(3), Applicant and the NRC Staff should have used the population expected to be at the nearby (within eight miles) recreational facilities in aggregate as a population center. (Table 2.2-7 ER-OLS)

9. Intervenors contend that the listed sources in Tables 2.1-17 through 2.1-21 of the Braidwood ER-LOS does not include data from the Farm Census - which data would be more accurate than that provided. The inaccurate estimate of the agricultural product from the area results in an underestimation of the total radiological dose to the population within 50 miles of the Station.

10. Intervenors contend that prior to the operation of the Braidwood Station, Applicant should present data showing the expected radiation exposure to individuals and livestock from radioactive releases from the LaSalle and Dresden Stations, as well as the Braidwood Station, in order that the cumulative total dose to individuals and livestock can be assessed.

11. Intervenors contend that the dike surrounding the Braidwood Station cooling lake is subject to failure due to rain liquification of the calcareous material from which the dike is constructed. In the event of a failure of the dike, the water remaining in the ultimate heat sink basin might not be adequate to cool the reactor from full power operation or to allow safe shutdown in the event of an accident.

II

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Based upon the foregoing, petitioners respectfully request that the Contentions as presented herein be litigated and that Commonwealth Edison's application for an operating permit be denied.

Dated: August 7, 1979

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

We hereby certify that copies of Petition to Intervene - Supplemental and Amended Contentions in the above-capitoned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, this 7th day of August, 1979.

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