

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With unit in hot standby at less than 25 psig, containment isolation valve FCV-71-3

0 3 would not close and was inoperable. Contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.D.1, FCV 71-2

0 4 in the same line was closed to provide isolation. There was no hazard to the public's

0 5 health or safety. There were no previous occurrences.

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SYSTEM CODE: C E 11
CAUSE CODE: E 12
CAUSE SUBCODE: A 13
COMPONENT CODE: V A L V O P 14
COMP SUBCODE: B 15
VALVE SUBCODE: Z 16
EVENT YEAR: 7 9 21 22
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO: 0 2 1 24 25 26
OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 27 28 29
REPORT TYPE: L 30 31
REVISION NO: 0 32
ACTION TAKEN: A 18
FUTURE ACTION: Z 19
EFFECT ON PLANT: Z 20
SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21
HOURS: 0 0 0 0 37 38 39 40
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 23 41
NPRD-4 FORM SUB: N 24 42
PRIME COMP SUPPLIER: L 25 43
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: X 9 9 9 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Peerless electric motor, S/N GV 79985, had a motor failure. The cause of the problem

1 1 is not known. The motor was replaced. The operating limits of the valve were reset

1 2 and the valve was operationally tested. The failure was random and no recurrence

1 3 control is necessary.

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POOR ORIGINAL

1135 304

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

PHONE

7910010 344

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 7921 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.D.1

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.3

Date of Occurrence 9/2/79 Time of Occurrence 11:30 a.m. Unit 1

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

FCV 1-71-3 failed to close on isolation signal.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 was in a hot standby condition; reactor pressure was less than 25 psig.

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met
due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

FCV 71-2 was closed.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Electrical failure of the motor.

Analysis of Occurrence:

None available.

Corrective Action:

A new motor was installed on the valve operator. The valve operating limits were then reset, and the valve was satisfactorily operationally tested.

Failure Data:

None

*Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Administrative Supervisor

*Revision:

POOR ORIGINAL

1135 305