

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 7, 1979

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USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 79-14 - RII:JPO 50-327,  
50-328, 50-390, 50-391, 50-438, 50-439, 50-518, 50-519, 50-520, 50-521,  
50-553, 50-554, 50-566, 50-567 - SEQUOYAH, WATTS BAR, BELLEFONTE,  
HARTSVILLE, PHIPPS BEND, AND YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANTS

In response to your July 27, 1979, letter which transmitted OIE Bulletin  
79-14, we are enclosing the results of our investigations for Sequoyah,  
Watts Bar, Bellefonte, Hartsville, Phipps Bend, and Yellow Creek Nuclear  
Plants.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call Tish Jenkins  
at FTS 854-2014.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. Victor Stello, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Director of the Division of Operating Reactors  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE TO NRC-OIE BULLETIN 79-14

SEISMIC ANALYSES FOR AS-BUILT SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS

SEQUOYAH, WATTS BAR, AND BELLEFONTE (50-327, 50-328, 50-390, 50-391, 50-438, 50-439)

Through a system of written procedures and documentation, TVA (OEDC) verifies that all safety-related piping is installed such that piping analyses will correspond to the actual piping configuration. Verification begins in the design stage. As the design of a piping system passes from design input documents to isometric drawings to analysis and then to mechanical (construction) drawings, TVA (EN DES) oversees design verification through its system of engineering procedures to ensure that all design requirements are satisfied. TVA (EN DES) then verifies through its QA procedures at the fabrication and installation stages that design requirements are again satisfied. When the installation of a piping system is complete to the point of tentative or final transfer to P PROD, the as-built configuration is noted on the drawings and sent to EN DES for final verification. This final verification by TVA (EN DES) that seismic analysis applied to actual configuration, has been initiated within the last six months for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and verification is continuing in accordance with "as-built" procedures. For Watts Bar Nuclear Plant and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, although procedures have been written, the final verification program has not been initiated at this time. When these programs are initiated, adherence to the "as-built" procedures will provide final verification that seismic analysis applies to actual configuration.

A copy of the construction procedures with summary information for the respective plants which pertain to this verification is provided in Attachment A. In addition, a list of design input documents for the respective plants, with descriptive information, is provided in Attachment B.

The above described program and procedures for verification of as-built safety-related systems are equivalent to the requirements identified in Bulletin 79-14.

HARTSVILLE, PHIPPS BEND, AND YELLOW CREEK (50-518, 50-519, 50-520, 50-521, 50-553)

At Hartsville, installation of safety-related piping has not progressed sufficiently for TVA's (OEDC) as-built verification program to be initiated. At Phipps Bend and Yellow Creek, no safety-related piping has been installed. Procedures are being prepared for these plants which will assure that final verification will be provided to a degree equivalent to that identified by Bulletin 79-14.