

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

PHONE: 201-455-8784

POOR  
ORIGINAL

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QRC USE ONLY



Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
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Morristown, New Jersey 07960  
(201) 455-8200

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-29/3L-0

Report Date

September 21, 1979

Occurrence Date

August 22, 1979

Identification of Occurrence

Exceeding a limiting condition for operation as defined in Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1.K.2, when the rod block associated with the SRM position was found to be set below 100 cps. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Power: Generator, 653 MWe  
Reactor, 1915.5 MWt  
Flow: Recirculating,  $15.8 \times 10^4$  gpm  
Feedwater,  $7.175 \times 10^6$  lb/hr  
Stack Gas:  $3.10 \times 10^4$   $\mu$ Ci/sec

Description of Occurrence

A Quality Assurance records review of executed Source Range Monitor Test and Calibration (Front Panel Test) Procedures identified twenty-six times when the rod block trip setting was below one-hundred counts per second. Further investigation revealed that only one channel out of four tripped at a setpoint less than that desired. Channel 22 tripped at 94 cps.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The calibration procedure set the rod block trip at the Technical Specification limit, allowing no margin for instrument drift. The Front Panel Test called for the operator to note the setpoint when the indicated value was changing rapidly. Thus, the operator perception of the setpoint was a general check of the value rather than a calibration.

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### Analysis of Occurrence

The source range monitors consist of four fission chambers that provide neutron monitoring of the core during refueling and startup. The SRM's primary purpose is to guide the reactor operator by indicating neutron flux (power) level and distribution. This information is needed for knowledgeable and efficient reactor startup and low level operations. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal since only one channel out of four tripped at a setpoint less than that desired. In addition, procedural control does not permit the operator to withdraw the SRM detectors unless a count rate of  $10^3$  cps exists.

### Corrective Action

The rod withdrawal block setpoint associated with SRM detector position was increased to 500 cps  $\pm$  100 cps.

### Failure Data

Not applicable.