

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 21, 1979

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II LETTER
RII: MJG 50-327/79-43 AND 50-328/79-24 - INSPECTION REPORT - RESPONSE
TO INFRACTION 50-328/79-24-06

The subject letter dated September 4, 1979, cited TVA with one infraction.
Enclosed is our response to that infraction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch
with D. L. Lambert at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 RESPONSE TO INFRACTION 328/79-24-06

Infraction

As required by Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, and as implemented by the FSAR, paragraph 17.1A.5, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings. . . and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings." TVA Process Specification 1.M.1.2(b) dated December 8, 1978, states in paragraph 4.1, "Each welder or welding operator shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX (Process Specification 1.M.2.2) prior to performing welds to the requirements of the particular ASME Code listed in paragraph 1 of this specification."

Contrary to the above, on August 13, 1979, Class 1 piping weld 2CVC-163 was performed by a welder not qualified to the specified weld procedure (GT88-01) for the thickness welded. Welds 2CVC-164, 2CVC-165, and 2CVC-166 had previously been performed by the same welder and were also made to a wall thickness which exceeded the qualification of the welder to the specified weld procedure. The four welds are located in the chemical and volume control system.

Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved

Welds 2CVC-163, 2CVC-164, and 2CVC-165 were repaired by removing all weld metal in excess of 3/8-inch thickness and then rewelding by a qualified welder using SMAW process weld procedure GTSM 8801A. Weld 2CVC-166 was not complete at the time of the NRC inspection and was completed by a qualified welder. Therefore, no corrective action was necessary on this weld. A review of all other safety-related construction welds was conducted and those welds which were found to have been completed by unqualified welders have been nonconformed in accordance with Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Construction Procedure No. P-2, "Handling Nonconformances," and are now being dispositioned.

Corrective Steps that Shall Be Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance

To preclude further noncompliance, welder foremen will be reinstructed on the requirements for welder certification. Also, measures will be taken to ensure that newly appointed foremen and assistant foremen are instructed in these requirements. Additionally, the weld record review process at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant has been revised to ensure that errors are identified and properly addressed.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

We will be in full compliance on October 12, 1979.

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