

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

EVENT DESCRIPTION

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION		
0	7	E	B	C	K	T	B	R	K	L	I	O	O	5	N
7	8	9	10	11	12				17	43	44			47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	See Attachment	
09		80
10		80
		80

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
H		0 0 0			NA			C		Review of Technical Specifications									
FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY					LOCATION OF RELEASE									
12		2			NA					NA									

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	0	0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER				DESCRIPTION	
1	4	0	0	0	NA

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES - None. At all times during the event, the required heat removal loop was in operation. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE			DESCRIPTION
16	7		NA

17 PUBLICITY NA 7909210471

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | See Attachment

[illegible]

NAME: Richard D. Hease PHONE (616) 465-5901

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On January 11, 1977, at 1037 hours, with the Reactor in Refueling Mode 6, 600 volt bus 11C was crosstied with Bus 11A and the 11C feed breaker, 11C1, was opened. At 1348 hours, 600 volt bus 11B was crosstied with bus 11D and the 11B feed breaker, 11B11, was opened. Both feed breakers and their supply transformers were tagged out for Doble testing of the transformers.

This left all 600 volt buses energized, but only buses 11D and 11A would be energized from an emergency diesel generator in case of a blackout.

Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.2, Refueling Mode 6 requires one 600 volt bus to be operable and aligned to an operable diesel generator. Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 one 600 volt bus is defined as 11A and 11B or 11C and 11D.

At 1513 hours feed breaker 11A1 tripped due to overload. This deenergized buses 11A and 11C.

The clearance of 11C transformer was released and bus 11C energized from it's normal source at 1550 hours. This made 600 volt buses 11C and 11D operable.

An investigation of bus 11A found the middle horizontal bus bar burned open between bus cubicals 1 and 2. The bus bars for the other two phases in the burned open area were opened so that cubicals 1 and 2 were no longer tied together. To accomplish this bus 11C was deenergized at 1758 hours due to the proximity of bus 11C to the work area for opening the phases in bus 11A. While doing this work bus 11D was the only bus aligned to an operable diesel generator, however, bus 11B was energized from bus 11D.

Bus 11C was energized from it's normal source at 1917 hours.

Bus 11A, except for cubical 1, was energized from it's normal source at 2029 hours.

Cubical 1 of bus 11A was energized at 2031 hours by closing bus tie breaker 11AC. This made all feeders from bus 11A operable.

The Technical Specification requirement for leaving an operable 600 volt emergency bus aligned to an operable diesel generator was not met for a period of 2 hours and 15 minutes when the buses were crosstied for Doble testing and for a period of 1 hour and 20 minutes for the emergency repair work to the failed bus 11A. The total elapsed time from the start of the testing to completion of the temporary repair work was 5 hours and 29 minutes.

Bus 11A and 11C were again removed from service on February 12 for the permanent repair of bus 11A. The elapsed time that both buses were deenergized was 7 hours and 48 minutes.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

The cause of the first event was personnel error when the original switching was made for testing of the transformers.

The cause of the second event was equipment failure. The 11A bus bar burned open at a bolted connection which either had loosened during use or had never been properly tightened during manufacture. The latter reason is believed to be the most likely cause because all other bus connections that have been checked are of proper bolt tension and show no evidence of overheating.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

The personnel error was due to a misinterpretation of the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 which only specifies "1 - 600 volt emergency bus" being required in Modes 5 and 6.

The Technical Specifications involved will be reviewed by all licensed personnel prior to March 1, 1977.