

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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 ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

7 8 9 80

0 9 7 8

SYSTEM CODE X X (11)

CAUSE CODE B (12)

CAUSE SUBCODE B (13)

COMP. SUBCODE Z (15)

VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

COMPONENT CODE X X X X X X X (14)

SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 7 (24)

OCURRENCE CODE 0 1 (28)

REPORT TYPE T (30)

REVISION NO. 0 (32)

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 8 (17)

EVENT YEAR 7 8 (21)

ACTION TAKEN F (18)

FUTURE ACTION Z (19)

EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)

SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21)

HOURS 0 0 0 0 (22)

ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23)

NPRO-4 FORM SUB. N (24)

PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A (25)

COMPONENT MANUFACTURER V 1 2 0 (26)

8 9 FACILITY STATUS (28) % POWER (29) OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 G 0 0 0 N/A Inspection of Connectors

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
1	2	0	0
7	8	9	11
		40	N/A
		12	

7909210452

PUBLICITY  
 ISSUED N (44) DESCRIPTION N/A (45)

7 8 9 10 68 69 80

NRC USE ONLY

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POOR ORIGINAL

Background/Discussion - During the refueling outage which commenced on January 6, 1978, the decision was made to seal certain electrical connectors with potting compound, in order to provide a greater degree of assurance that they would function normally in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The connectors chosen were those supplying electrical power to components and instruments which are required to be operable during a DBA. During the potting process, several connectors were found to be deficient in that they contained socket locations which were not sealed. This condition results in a path which permits moisture to pass through the connector and thereby could short the circuits associated with the connector.

Connectors Affected - A total of thirteen connectors were deficient. They were furnished by Viking Industries and were the twelve or nineteen pin variety. Sealing of the connectors at socket locations is normally accomplished by a very tight fit at the point the conductor jacket mates with the connector body. The deficient connectors were missing conductors.

Components Affected - As a result of the deficient connectors, the components listed below might not have been able to perform under post-LOCA conditions:

MO 3008 - Loop 1A Low-Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) motor-operated valve (MOV)

MO 3010 - Loop 1B LPSI MOV

MO 3007 - Loop 1A High-Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) MOV

MO 3009 - Loop 1B HPSI MOV

MO 3013 - Loop 2B HPSI MOV

MO 3062 - Loop 2B HPSI MOV (Redundant Path)

MO 3064 - Loop 2A HPSI MOV (Redundant Path)

MO 3066 - Loop 1B HPSI MOV (Redundant Path)

MO 3068 - Loop 1A HPSI MOV (Redundant Path)

SV 2113 - Loop 1A Charging Distribution Stop Valve

PT 0751A/PT0751C/PT0752A/PT0752C - Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter

PT 0102A/PT0102C - Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter

990071

Cause - The most probable causes of this condition appear to be inadequate procedures for wiring the connectors, combined with insufficient controls over the installation process during initial plant construction.

Corrective Action - The connectors will be sealed with a potting compound which has been demonstrated to withstand the LOCA environment. The repair will be completed prior to resumption of power operations.