



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
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July 27, 1979

1-079-15  
2-079-16

Mr. G. L. Madsen, Chief  
Reactor Operations & Nuclear Support  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76011

Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One-Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368  
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6  
I.E. Inspection Report  
No. 79-10  
(File: 0232, 2-0232)

Gentlemen:

We have reviewed the subject inspection report. Our response to the "Notice of Violation" is attached.

Very truly yours,

*David C. Trimble*  
David C. Trimble  
Manager, Licensing

DCT:DGM:nak

Attachment

cc: Mr. W. D. Johnson  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Post Office Box 2090  
Russellville, Arkansas 72901

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Item 1

Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that "Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering...

a. The applicable procedure recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33. As an implementing requirement of this specification Attachment A to procedures 2104.40, SIAS Standby, requires valve 2SI-5901-3, the LPSI Header Control Valve Bypass, to be locked open with the unit in Mode 3 operation.

Contrary to the above, on the morning of May 27, 1979, an NRC inspector found this valve to be closed and unlocked with the unit in Mode 3 operation.

Response

The subject valve, 2SI-5091-3, was returned to its required locked-open position immediately upon discovery. Therefore, the requirements of the procedure were met.

Discussions with operations personnel concluded that the reason for the mispositioning of the valve was operator error aggravated by procedural ambiguity. To prevent recurrence of this type event, all valves in the category "E" list requiring repositioning during heatup have been grouped separately, and the controlling procedure revised to explicitly require that group of valves to be locked into position when the LPSI system is set in a standby mode. Also, a standing order has been issued to all plant personnel stressing the importance of procedural adherence.

Based on the above, as well as the individual counselling given the operator who failed to properly position the subject valve, we believe full compliance has been achieved and chances of recurrence of this type event to be significantly reduced.

Item 2

Technical Specification 6.10.1d requires that surveillance records shall be maintained for at least five years.

Contrary to the above, the February, 1979, test data sheet for Supplement 3 of OP 2104.05, the Quarterly Spray and Sump Valve Stroke Test, was not retained.

Response

Review of surveillance schedule records during the inspection determined the spray and sump valve stroke test was conducted on the specified surveillance date, February 20, 1979. A file search, including unrelated files for possible misfiling, was conducted to locate the missing data sheet, but the data sheet was not found. Verification that the surveillance test was performed satisfactorily on February 20, 1979 was made.

This is believed to be an isolated incident. To preclude any further similar incidents, this infraction and the related Technical Specification which requires retention of Technical Specification surveillance documentation will be reviewed with all ANO supervisory and clerical filing personnel. This review will be completed by September 1, 1979.