

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	-	0	3	2	4	7	0	8	1	3	7	9	8	0	9	1	1	7	9	9
60	61								68	69						74	75							80
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE				

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While attempting to place the "B" loop of RHRSW under clearance for maintenance, the

0 3 | "2A" RHRSW pump breaker was racked out by mistake, making both loops of RHRSW inoper-

0 4 | able. The "2A" pump was out of operation for approximately 15 minutes. The error was

0 5 | discovered quickly after it occurred, as a result of the normal clearance process when

0 6 | the auxiliary operator who hung the tag returned to the Control Room to sign the tag

0 7 | sheet and observed that it did not reflect the actual equipment cleared.

0 8 | Technical Specification 3.7.1.1, 6.9.1.9c

09		SYSTEM CODE S H		11	CAUSE CODE A		12	CAUSE SUBCODE A		13	COMPONENT CODE C K T B K R						14	COMP. SUBCODE F		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16								
7	8	9	10		11		12									18															
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 7 9		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 7 3		24	25	26	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		28	29	REPORT TYPE L		30	REVISION NO. 0		32									
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION X		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		33	34	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		36	37	38	39	HOURS 0 0 0 0		40	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		41	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		42	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A		43	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G 0 8 0		44	45	46	47
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47		

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The "2A" RHRSW pump was immediately racked in. The tag and the tag-out sheet had been

1 1 prepared incorrectly by the control operator in that "2A" pump was designated to be

1 2 racked out vice "2B" pump. The following corrective action were or will be taken:

1 3 1) An immediate meeting and counseling session was held with the control operator in-

1 4 volved, the shift foreman, the acting operation supervisor, and the (CON'T)

FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (E) (28) % POWER (0) 5 (4) (29) NA OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) Operator Surveillance DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

1 6 Z 33 NA 44

7 8 9 10 11

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES										
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION						
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA				

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY																																																											
TYPE										DESCRIPTION																																																	
1	9	Z	42	NA																																																							
7909170382																																																											
956217																																																											

PUBLICITY								NRC USE ONLY														
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION																				
2	0	N	(44)	NA																		
7	8	9	10					68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80		

NAME OF PREPARER A. C. Tollison, Jr.

PHONE: 919-457-9521

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 8-13-79

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Operations & Maintenance Superintendent. Subjects discussed were the sequence of events, the seriousness of such situations, potential consequences, requirement for alertness, and actions to prevent reoccurrence.

2) The plant Manager held a personal interview with the control operator involved and the shift foreman. In this interview, he stressed the seriousness of events of this type, the reasons for management and regulatory concern, and the need to eliminate personnel errors to the maximum extent.

3) AOI-2, Operating Principles and Philosophy, will be reviewed by all operations personnel.

4) The clearance procedure is being revised to require that the tag-out sheets and tags for any clearance on a Technical Specification covered system be reviewed and approved by a licensed senior reactor operator prior to issuance. This review must be independent of the person filling out the clearance.

5) The LER will be reviewed by all operations personnel as a reminder of problems created by a simple mistake.