

(7-77)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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60	61	DOCKET NUMBER						68	69	EVENT DATE						74	75	REPORT DATE						80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 8 | _____ 80

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

FACILITY	METHOD OF	
7	8	9

ACTIVITY CONTENT	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
RELEASED OF RELEASE	(35)	(36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		
NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
39		

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	(4)

ORIGINAL

TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
1	2	NA	945164

ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	2	NA	19091803/8	

PHONE: 919-457-9521

NRC USE ONLY

7909180 3/8

68 69

800-617-9286

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1

Event Date: 08-28-79

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Conservative operating limits for bundle LJO 197, based on analyzed values given the BSEP Unit No. 1 supplemental reload licensing package submitted for cycle 2 (NEDO 24166), were determined and power was reduced to approximately 88% in order to conserve these limits. The daily core parameter limits was revised to include these special limits for bundle LJO 197. It was verified that no other bundle was rotated in either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Analyses to determine the feasibility and desirability of continued operation were initiated by both CP&L and G.E. and the results of these analyses will be provided in a supplemental report.

It was verified that the fuel loading error is analyzed for in the current cycle and results in no safety limit violations. It was also verified that no transients upsets which have occurred this cycle could have caused a safety limit violation. It is General Electric's opinion that the single misoriented bundle does not compromise the current license basis.

The core verification procedure will be revised to include:

- 1) Initials for each bundle orientation requiring that at least 2 of 5 methods of verification be used, and those methods used, identified.
- 2) Complete core verification of core loading and orientation, from the core load videotapes, by an independent verification team consisting of at least two of the following personnel:
 - a) Operating Supervisor
 - b) Q.A. Supervisor
 - c) Engineering Supervisor
 - d) Representative from CP&L Nuclear Fuels
 - e) Reactor Project Engineer
 - f) Other technically qualified personnel
- 3) Fuel movement sheets will be revised to add columns for channel fastener orientation so that the refueling floor SRO can determine bundle orientation both before and after a move.

945166