

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	W	I	P	B	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	LICENSE NUMBER										25	LICENSE TYPE					30	CAT		58	5

REPORT SOURCE 0 1 7 8

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

DOCKET NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6 7 0 8 0 4 7 9 8 0 8 1 4 7 9 9

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

02 At 0615 hours, 8-3-79, while proceeding to a cold shutdown condition  
03 with reactor coolant system at 393 psig and 343 degrees, containment  
04 integrity was briefly violated. The violation occurred when the inside  
05 containment door was opened with the outside door already open. Con-  
06 tainment integrity was quickly reestablished by shutting the inside door.  
07 TS 15.3.6.A.a requires that containment integrity not be violated unless  
08 the reactor is in a cold shutdown condition.

09		SYSTEM CODE S A		CAUSE CODE E		CAUSE SUBCODE B		COMPONENT CODE M E C F U N				COMP. SUBCODE Z		VALVE SUBCODE Z	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
LER-RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9		EVENT YEAR 7 9		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 1		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1		REPORT TYPE T		REVISION NO. 0		ACTION TAKEN B		FUTURE ACTION Z	
33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40	
EFFECT ON PLANT Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER P 2 7 0		41	
42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49	

1 0 Ordinarily the inside and outside doors are prevented from being opened  
1 1 simultaneously by a mechanical interlock. In this instance the inter-  
1 2 lock failed due to a roll pin falling out of a connecting rod in the  
1 3 mechanism. The interlock was repaired and satisfactorily tested along  
1 4 with a qualifying air test of the personnel hatch by 2045 hours, 8-4-79

FACILITY STATUS										% POWER										OTHER STATUS										METHOD OF DISCOVERY										DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
1	5	G	28	0	0	0	29	NA	A	31	NA	32																																					
ACTIVITY CONTENT										RELEASED OF RELEASE										AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY										LOCATION OF RELEASE																			
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36																																								
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										PERSONNEL INJURIES										LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY										PUBLICITY																			
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39	0	0	0	40	NA	41	Z	42	NA	43	44	NA	45	NRC USE ONLY																										
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	41	Z	42	NA	43	44	NA	45	7909120 582																																		
ISSUED										DESCRIPTION										NRC USE ONLY																													
2	0	N	44	NA	45																																												

PHONE: 414/277-2811

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 79-011/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company  
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-266

At 0615 hours, 08/03/79, while proceeding to a cold shutdown condition with the residual heat removal system lined up to the reactor coolant system (reactor coolant pressure 393 psig, temperature 343°F), containment integrity was briefly violated. The violation occurred as the result of an interlock's failure in the containment personnel hatch operating mechanism which allowed the inside door to be opened with the outside door already open. Containment integrity was quickly reestablished by shutting the inside door after ambient and in-containment pressures equalized.

Two persons were at the outside containment door at the time of the incident and two by the inner door. No one was injured in the event although one of the persons standing by the outer door was drawn into the air lock by the intrushing air, and was knocked down in the process.

Ordinarily the inside and outside doors are prevented from being opened simultaneously by a mechanical interlock. In this instance the interlock failed due to a roll pin falling out of a connecting rod in the mechanism. Apparently, the roll pin had loosened from use.

The interlock was repaired and satisfactorily tested along with a qualifying air test of the personnel hatch by 2045 hours, 08/04/79.

To prevent recurrence, high strength tape has been strapped around the connecting rod over the roll pin as a temporary measure, pending review of alternatives by the Manager's Supervisory Staff.