

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (7)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'TEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)018CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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NRC USE ONLY

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Description of Event

On July 14, 1979, the packing in MOV-QS102B was adjusted to correct for leakage. The ASME Section XI subsection IWV program requires that this valve be tested to determine that its opening time is within the time specified. Contrary to the above, and reportable per 10 C.F.R. 69.1.9.c., the valve opening time was not determined after maintenance. Quality Control review of the completed maintenance report on August 8, 1979 revealed that the valve had been functionally tested but not timed as required by IWV.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

MOV-QS102B is one of two redundant valves in a parallel flow path. Both valves are on the discharge line of the chemical addition tank and open on a Containment Depressurization Actuation signal to discharge sodium hydroxide into the refueling water storage tank for containment quench spray. The redundant valve in parallel with MOV-QS102B was always available if required. Furthermore MOV-QS102B was timed and its opening time was less than the maximum time allowed. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. There are no generic implications associated with this incident.

Cause

Opening time was not determined after maintenance because of an oversight by the personnel involved.

Immediate Corrective Action

MOV-QS102B was timed and it met applicable acceptance criteria for performance.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective action required.

Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence

The personnel involved have reviewed the event and were instructed on the importance of satisfying all requirements.