

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 8/5/79, at 0015 hours the supply breaker for essential unit substation bus "F1" tripped, de-energizing the bus. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of T.S. 3.8.2.1 which requires the operability of all essential AC busses in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. While selectively reloading the bus to determine the location of the fault, the supply breaker again tripped on overcurrent at 0620 hours when the breaker supplying the Boric Acid Addition Tank (BAAT) room heaters was reclosed. There was no danger. The redundant essential bus "E1" was operable. (NP-33-79-102)

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Bus "F1" was stripped and re-energized at 0030 hours, removing the unit from the Action Statement. After re-entering the Action Statement at 0620 hours, the bus was re-energized at 0625 hours on August 5, 1979, removing the unit from the Action Statement. The problem with the BAAT room heaters will be corrected under Maintenance Work Order 79-2734. Ground fault protection on the individual 480 VAC MCCs will be installed.

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-102

DATE OF EVENT: August 5, 1979

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Overcurrent fault tripping on the neutral of essential unit substation bus "F1"

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 914

Description of Occurrence: On August 5, 1979, at 0015 hours essential unit substation bus "F1" supply breaker tripped, de-energizing "F1" bus. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 which requires all essential AC electrical busses operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Action Statement requires the inoperable bus be re-energized within eight hours or the unit be in hot standby within the next six hours. "F1" bus was stripped and re-energized at 0030 hours, removing the unit from the Action Statement. The bus was selectively reloaded to determine the source of the fault.

At 0620 hours when operations personnel reclosed the boric acid addition tank (BAAT) room heaters supply breaker BR1315 on MCCF13, the overcurrent trip recurred. This again placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.8.2.1. Bus "F1" was re-energized at 0625 hours removing the unit from the Action Statement.

The breaker to the BAAT room heater, BF1315, was left de-energized and was tagged to prevent operation of the breaker until the fault was repaired.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was an electrical fault in the BAAT room heater which caused the neutral overcurrent device to operate and trip the supply breaker to "F1" bus, de-energizing "F1" bus. This occurred because there is no ground fault protection on the 480 V AC motor control centers (MCC). Any ground fault on the low voltage side of the unit substation will cause the neutral overcurrent device to actuate and trip the substation supply breaker. This condition was previously identified as a potential problem and Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-223 was written on June 24, 1979. This FCR would install ground fault protection at the MCC supply breakers to prevent loss of a substation due to a ground on downstream loads.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The redundant essential bus "E1" was operable throughout the occurrence. "F1" bus was de-energized for a period of 15 minutes at 0015 hours and for 5 minutes at 0620 hours.

LER #79-088

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Corrective Action: On August 5, 1979, Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 79-2734 was written to correct the problem with the BAAT room heaters. Supplemental work orders were issued to inspect and test the supply breakers to F13 and the BAAT room heaters to assure proper operation. The breakers tested properly and no deficiencies were found.

Installation of ground fault protection on the feeder breakers to individual 480 V AC MCCs will be accomplished per FCR 79-223. This FCR is presently in the design engineering stage and is scheduled to be completed during the March 1980 refueling outage.

Failure Data: There have been two previously reported occurrences of essential busses tripping because of ground faults; see Licensee Event Reports NP-33-77-48 and NP-33-79-13.

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