

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 P A B V S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 58

CON'T

01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 4 7 0 7 2 7 7 9 8 0 8 1 7 7 9 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 As a result of review of ASCO Solenoid Valves per IE Bulletin 79-01A, it has been
03 determined that there are 44 ASCO valves installed in the Reactor Containment which
04 have deficiencies in Environmental Qualifications. Several of these valves have Class
05 HT or HB high temperature coils but none of the valves are of the new nuclear grade
06 type NP-1. The plant safety committee has determined there is no hazard to the
07 general public during the interim operating period.

08

09 S A 11 B 12 A 13 V A L V O P 14 F 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9 21 22
18 ACTION TAKEN A 18 D 19 33 34
19 FUTURE ACTION 35
20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 35
21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 36
22 HOURS 0 0 0 0 37 40
23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41
24 NPRO-4 FORM SUB Y 24 42
25 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 43
26 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER A 4 9 9 26 44 47
27 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 4 24 26
28 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 28 29
29 REPORT TYPE T 30 31
30 REVISION NO. 1 32 33

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Inadequate design resulted in the installation of subject solenoid valves. The 44
11 solenoid valves will be replaced with Type NP-1 valves or other qualified valves during
12 the fall refueling outage. The solenoid valves on a pressurizer PORV and two component
13 cooling water isolation valves to the excess letdown heat exchanger have been rebuilt
14 with high temperature coils and renewed internal parts.

15 G 28 0 0 0 29 N/A 30 D 31 IE Bulletin investigation 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 N/A 36 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

18 0 0 0 40 N/A 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

19 N/A 42
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

20 N/A 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
PUBICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION

NAME OF PREPARER J. A. Werling

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NRC USE ONLY

GPO 81-7-926

Attachment To LER 79-24/01T-1
Beaver Valley Power Station
Duquesne Light Company
Docket No. 50-334

A review of installed ASCO solenoid valves inside containment revealed that none of the valves were of the new nuclear grade type NP-1.

The station Onsite Safety Committee has reviewed the safety significance of eventual inoperability of the affected valves, most of which are containment isolation valves, after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The committee has determined that none of the valves has to operate after the initial closure during containment isolation at the start of the LOCA accident. Redundant valves outside containment will also close to assure continued isolation. During the accident, control air will be lost inside the containment, and, therefore, even if a solenoid valve were to somehow mechanically reopen without the solenoid being energized, there will be no air available to reopen the valve as they are all fail-closed on loss of air. Therefore, the committee has determined the health and safety of the public will not be affected by plant operation with the existing valves.

The committee has also noted that during the interim operating period, prior to replacement of the limited qualification solenoid valves during the fall refueling, the solenoid valves on a pressurizer power operated relief valve and two component cooling water isolation valves for the excess letdown heat exchanger have been upgraded with high temperature operating coils and renewed internal parts good for 400,000 Rads.

Operability of these components was not assumed in the BVPS 1 small break analysis. However, it is felt their operability will enhance ability of the station to recover from very small break LOCAs.