

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 P A B V S 1 2 0 0 - 7 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CON'T
 01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 4 7 0 7 2 3 7 9 8 0 8 1 7 7 9 9
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
 02 As a result of a review of SIS cable used in containment, it was determined wire from
 03 four manufacturers may have been installed. Three of the four vendors have supplied
 04 documentation indicating their production runs covering the time period that the SIS
 05 wire was purchased and installed would have qualified for the hostile Post LOCA
 06 containment environment.

09 SYSTEM CODE I E 11 CAUSE CODE B 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE E L E C O N 14 COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
 10 A review of the affected equipment in containment by the Onsite Safety Committee has
 11 determined that four valves require wire replacement prior to startup. The remaining
 12 valves that do not have qualified SIS wire close on CIB and would not be required to
 13 be reopened to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The cable for safety related
 14 equipment in containment will be replaced during refueling.

15 FACILITY STATUS G 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY D 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Attachment To LER 79-19/01T-1
Beaver Valley Power Station
Duquesne Light Company
Docket No. 50-334

There are four manufacturers of SIS wire presently installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1. Three of the four vendors have supplied documentation indicating their production runs covering the time period that the SIS wire was purchased and installed would have qualified for the hostile Post LOCA containment environment.

The following is a list of valves which were reviewed by the Onsite Safety Committee and determined to require wire replacement prior to startup:

1. Chilled Water Containment Isolation Valve [TV-CC-110E3] which supplies chilled water to the containment air coolers and air compressors.
2. Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves [PCV-RC-455C, 455D, 456].

The following is a list of valves that do not have qualified SIS wire that close on containment isolation CIB and would not be required to be reopened to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There is a possibility that a wire failure and shorting of the wires inside the terminal boxes could cause some of the valves to open; but, due to wire dressing within the box, this is a remote possibility. The Onsite Safety Committee has determined that even in the event the valve would reopen, the outside isolation valve would maintain containment integrity and no cable replacement is required at this time. Because of lack of qualification from one vendor and inadequate documentation of qualification for the other three vendors, the SIS wire for safety related equipment in containment will be replaced during the fall refueling outage with fully qualified and documented wire.

1. Sample System Containment Isolation Valves [TV-SS-100A1, 102A2, 103A1, 104A1, 105A1, 109A1, 111A1 and 112A1].
2. Primary Drains Transfer Pump Discharge Containment Isolation [TV-DG-108A].
3. Containment Sump Pump Discharge Containment Isolation [TV-DA-100A].
4. Sealed Reference Pressure System Containment Isolation [TV-LM-101A, 101B] - normally closed.
5. Nitrogen Supply to Safety Injection Accumulators Containment Isolation [TV-SI-101].
6. "A" Reactor Coolant Loop Bypass Valve [MOV-RC-587] limit switch.
7. Component Cooling Water Containment Isolation Valves [TV-CC-103C1, 107E1, 107A, 107D1, 107C, and 105C].
8. Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves [TV-CH-200A, 200B, 200C].
9. Letdown Containment Isolation Valve [TV-CH-460B].