

<u>15</u>	<u>ACCIDENT ANALYSES</u>	<u>1</u>
15.0	GENERAL	2
15.0.1	INITIAL CONDITIONS	2
15.0.1.1	Assumed Values of Initial Conditions	2
15.0.2	POWER DISTRIBUTION	3
15.0.3	REACTIVITY COEFFICIENTS ASSUMED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES	4
15.0.4	ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY INSERTION CHARACTERISTICS	4
15.0.5	TRIP POINTS AND TIME DELAYS TO TRIP ASSUMED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES	4
15.0.6	INSTRUMENTATION DRIFT AND CALORIMETRIC ERRORS - POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX	5
15.0.7	COMPUTER CODES	5
15.0.7.1	FACTRAN	6
15.0.7.2	RETRAN	6
15.0.7.3	TWINKLE	6
15.0.7.4	VIPRE	7
15.0.7.5	ADVANCED NODAL CODE (ANC)	7
15.0.8	CLASSIFICATION OF PLANT CONDITIONS	7
15.0.8.1	Condition I - Normal Operation	8
15.0.8.2	Condition II - Faults of Moderate Frequency	8
15.0.8.3	Condition III - Infrequent Faults	8
15.0.8.4	Condition IV - Limiting Faults	8
15.0.9	UFSAR Re-write	9
15.0.9.1	General Layout	9
15.0.9.2	Interpretation of Operator Action Times	9
15.0	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.0	10
Table 15.0-1	NSSS PCWG Parameters for Ginna Station Uprate Program	11
Table 15.0-1	NSSS PCWG Parameters for Ginna Station Uprate Program	12
Table 15.0-2	Non-LOCA Analysis Limits and Analysis Results	13
Table 15.0-3	Non-LOCA Plant Initial Condition Assumptions	16
Table 15.0-4	Pressurizer and Main Steam System (MSS) Pressure Relief Assumptions	17
Table 15.0-5	Core Kinetics Parameters and Reactivity Feedback Coefficients	21
Table 15.0-6	Summary of RPS and ESFAS Functions Actuated	22

Table 15.0-7	Overtemperature and Overpower ΔT Setpoints	25
Table 15.0-8	DETERMINATION OF MAXIMUM OVERPOWER TRIP POINT - POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX CHANNEL - BASED ON NOMINAL SETPOINT CONSIDERING INHERENT INSTRUMENT ERRORS	26
Table 15.0-9	Summary of Initial Conditions and Computer Codes Used	27
15.1	INCREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM	30
15.1.1	DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE	30
15.1.1.1	Description of Event	30
15.1.1.2	Frequency of Event	31
15.1.1.3	Event Analysis	31
15.1.1.3.1	Protective Features	31
15.1.1.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	31
15.1.1.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	31
15.1.1.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	31
15.1.1.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	31
15.1.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	32
15.1.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	32
15.1.1.4.2	Methodology	32
15.1.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	32
15.1.1.4.4	Results	32
15.1.1.5	Radiological Consequences	32
15.1.1.6	Conclusions	32
15.1.2	INCREASE IN FEEDWATER FLOW	33
15.1.2.1	Increase in Feedwater Flow at Full Power	33
15.1.2.1.1	Description of Event	33
15.1.2.1.2	Frequency of Event	33
15.1.2.1.3	Event Analysis	33
15.1.2.1.3.1	Protective Features	34
15.1.2.1.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	34
15.1.2.1.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	35
15.1.2.1.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	35
15.1.2.1.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	35
15.1.2.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	35
15.1.2.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	35
15.1.2.1.4.2	Method of Analysis	36

15.1.2.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	36
15.1.2.1.4.4	Results	36
15.1.2.1.5	Radiological Consequences	37
15.1.2.1.6	Conclusion	37
15.1.2.2	Increase in Feedwater Flow at Zero Power	37
15.1.2.2.1	Description of Event	37
15.1.2.2.2	Frequency of Event	37
15.1.2.2.3	Event Analysis	37
15.1.2.2.3.1	Protective Features	37
15.1.2.2.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	38
15.1.2.2.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	38
15.1.2.2.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	38
15.1.2.2.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	38
15.1.2.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	38
15.1.2.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	38
15.1.2.2.4.2	Methodology	39
15.1.2.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	39
15.1.2.2.5	Radiological Consequences	39
15.1.2.2.6	Conclusion	39
15.1.3	EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE INCIDENT	39
15.1.3.1	Description of Event	39
15.1.3.2	Frequency of Event	40
15.1.3.3	Event Analysis	40
15.1.3.3.1	Protective Features	40
15.1.3.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	41
15.1.3.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	41
15.1.3.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	41
15.1.3.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	41
15.1.3.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	41
15.1.3.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	41
15.1.3.4.2	Methodology	42
15.1.3.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	42
15.1.3.5	Radiological Consequences	42
15.1.3.6	Conclusions	42
15.1.4	INADVERTENT OPENING OF A STEAM GENERATOR RELIEF/ SAFETY VALVE	43
15.1.5	SPECTRUM OF STEAM SYSTEM PIPING FAILURES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT	43

15.1.5.1	Description of Event	43
15.1.5.2	Frequency of Event	43
15.1.5.3	Event Analysis	44
15.1.5.3.1	Protective Features	44
15.1.5.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	45
15.1.5.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	45
15.1.5.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	45
15.1.5.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	45
15.1.5.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	46
15.1.5.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	46
15.1.5.4.2	Methodology	47
15.1.5.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	48
15.1.5.4.4	Results	48
15.1.5.5	Radiological Consequences	49
15.1.5.6	Conclusions	50
15.1.5.7	Supplemental Evaluations	50
15.1.5.7.1	SEV-1073	50
15.1.5.7.2	HZP 6 Inch Steamline Break	50
15.1.5.7.3	High Steam Flow Setpoint Increase Evaluation	50
15.1.5.7.4	Steamline Rupture a Full Power	51
15.1.5.8	Potential for Containment Overpressurization	51
15.1.6	COMBINED STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE (ARV) AND MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE (MFRV) FAILURES	51
15.1.6.1	Description of Event	51
15.1.6.2	Frequency of Event	52
15.1.6.3	Event Analysis	52
15.1.6.3.1	Protective Features	53
15.1.6.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	53
15.1.6.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	53
15.1.6.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	54
15.1.6.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	54
15.1.6.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	54
15.1.6.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	54
15.1.6.4.2	Methodology	55
15.1.6.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	56
15.1.6.4.4	Results	56
15.1.6.5	Radiological Consequences	56

15.1.6.6	Conclusions	57
15.1	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.1	58
Table 15.1-1	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION TRANSIENTS HOT FULL POWER - SINGLE LOOP - WITH ROD CONTROL	59
Table 15.1-2	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION TRANSIENTS HOT FULL POWER - SINGLE LOOP - WITHOUT ROD CONTROL	60
Table 15.1-3	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION TRANSIENTS HOT FULL POWER - MULTI LOOP - WITH ROD CONTROL	61
Table 15.1-4	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION TRANSIENTS HOT FULL POWER - MULTI LOOP - WITHOUT ROD CONTROL	62
Table 15.1-5	Table DELETED	63
Table 15.1-6	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR STEAM LINE RUPTURE	64
Table 15.1-7	SUMMARY OF MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (MFRV)/STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE (ARV) COMBINATION FAILURE CASES EVALUATED	66
Table 15.1-8	MSLB DOSE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS	67
Table 15.1-9	RESULTS FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK, REM TEDE	69
Table 15.1-10	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE COMBINED FAILURE OF TWO MFRV's AND TWO ARV's AT HOT FULL POWER	70
15.2	DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM	71
15.2.1	STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION OR FAILURE THAT RESULTS IN DECREASING STEAM FLOW	71
15.2.2	LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD	71
15.2.2.1	Description of Event	71
15.2.2.2	Frequency of Event	71
15.2.2.3	Event Analysis	71
15.2.2.3.1	Protective Features	72
15.2.2.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	72
15.2.2.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	72
15.2.2.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	73
15.2.2.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	73
15.2.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	73
15.2.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	73
15.2.2.4.2	Method of Analysis	74
15.2.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	75
15.2.2.4.4	Results	75
15.2.2.5	Radiological Consequences	76

15.2.2.6	Conclusions	76
15.2.2.7	Supplemental Evaluations	76
15.2.3	TURBINE TRIP	76
15.2.4	LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM	76
15.2.5	LOSS OF ALL ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES	77
15.2.5.1	Description of the event	77
15.2.5.2	Frequency of Event	77
15.2.5.3	Event Analysis	78
15.2.5.3.1	Protective Features	78
15.2.5.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	79
15.2.5.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	79
15.2.5.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	79
15.2.5.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	79
15.2.5.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	80
15.2.5.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	80
15.2.5.4.2	Method of Analysis	81
15.2.5.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	81
15.2.5.4.4	Results	82
15.2.5.5	Radiological Consequences	82
15.2.5.6	Conclusions	82
15.2.5.7	Supplemental Evaluations	83
15.2.6	LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW	83
15.2.6.1	Description of Event	83
15.2.6.2	Frequency of Event	84
15.2.6.3	Event Analysis	84
15.2.6.3.1	Protective Features	84
15.2.6.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	85
15.2.6.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	85
15.2.6.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	85
15.2.6.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	85
15.2.6.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	85
15.2.6.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	85
15.2.6.4.2	Method of Analysis	87
15.2.6.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	87
15.2.6.4.4	Results	87
15.2.6.5	Radiological Consequences	88
15.2.6.6	Conclusions	88

15.2.6.7	Supplemental Evaluations	88
15.2.7	FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS	89
15.2.7.1	Description of Event	89
15.2.7.2	Frequency of Event	89
15.2.7.3	Event Analysis	89
15.2.7.3.1	Protective Features	89
15.2.7.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	90
15.2.7.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	91
15.2.7.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	91
15.2.7.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	91
15.2.7.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	91
15.2.7.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	91
15.2.7.4.2	Method of Analysis	93
15.2.7.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	93
15.2.7.4.4	Results	94
15.2.7.5	Radiological Consequences	95
15.2.7.6	Conclusions	95
15.2	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.2	96
Table 15.2-1	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD	97
Table 15.2-2	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR LOSS OF OFFSITE ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES	99
Table 15.2-3	Table DELETED	
Table 15.2-4	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW	101
Table 15.2-5	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE FEEDWATER LINE PIPE BREAK (0.3 FT ² BREAK AREA)	102
15.3	DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE	103
15.3.1	FLOW COASTDOWN ACCIDENTS	103
15.3.1.1	Description of Event	103
15.3.1.2	Frequency of Event	103
15.3.1.3	Event Analysis	103
15.3.1.3.1	Protective Features	104
15.3.1.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	105
15.3.1.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	105
15.3.1.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	105
15.3.1.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	105
15.3.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	105
15.3.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	105

15.3.1.4.2	Method of Analysis	106
15.3.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	106
15.3.1.4.4	Results	106
15.3.1.5	Radiological Consequences	107
15.3.1.6	Conclusions	107
15.3.2	LOCKED ROTOR ACCIDENT	108
15.3.2.1	Description of Event	108
15.3.2.2	Frequency of Event	108
15.3.2.3	Event Analysis	108
15.3.2.3.1	Protective Features	108
15.3.2.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	109
15.3.2.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	109
15.3.2.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	109
15.3.2.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	109
15.3.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	110
15.3.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	110
15.3.2.4.2	Method of Analysis	110
15.3.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	111
15.3.2.4.4	Results	112
15.3.2.5	Radiological Consequences	112
15.3.2.6	Conclusions	112
15.3	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.3	113
Table 15.3-1	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR LOSS OF REACTOR COOL- ANT FLOW	114
Table 15.3-2	SUMMARY OF LIMITING RESULTS FOR LOCKED ROTOR ACCIDENT	115
Table 15.3-3	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR LOCKED ROTOR INCIDENT	116
Table 15.3-4	LR Dose Analysis Assumptions	117
Table 15.13-5	RESULTS FOR LOCKED ROTOR	118
15.4	REACTIVITY AND POWER DISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES	119
15.4.1	UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITH- DRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION	119
15.4.1.1	Description of Event	119
15.4.1.2	Frequency of Event	119
15.4.1.3	Event Analysis	119
15.4.1.3.1	Protective Features	119
15.4.1.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	120
15.4.1.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	120
15.4.1.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	120
15.4.1.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	120

15.4.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	120
15.4.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	120
15.4.1.4.2	Methodology	122
15.4.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	122
15.4.1.4.4	Results	122
15.4.1.5	Radiological Evaluation	123
15.4.1.6	Conclusions	123
15.4.2	UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITH-DRAWAL AT POWER	123
15.4.2.1	Description of Event	123
15.4.2.2	Frequency of Event	123
15.4.2.3	Event Analysis	123
15.4.2.3.1	Protective Features	124
15.4.2.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	124
15.4.2.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	124
15.4.2.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	124
15.4.2.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	124
15.4.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	125
15.4.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	125
15.4.2.4.2	Methodology	126
15.4.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	126
15.4.2.4.4	Results	127
15.4.2.5	Radiological Evaluation	128
15.4.2.6	Conclusions	128
15.4.3	STARTUP OF AN INACTIVE REACTOR COOLANT LOOP	129
15.4.3.1	Description of Event	129
15.4.3.2	Frequency of Event	129
15.4.3.3	Event Analysis	129
15.4.3.3.1	Protective Features	129
15.4.3.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	129
15.4.3.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	129
15.4.3.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	130
15.4.3.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	130
15.4.3.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	130
15.4.3.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	130
15.4.3.4.2	Methodology	130
15.4.3.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	131

15.4.3.4.4	Results	131
15.4.3.4.5	Effect of 18 Month Fuel Cycle Changes	132
15.4.3.5	Radiological Evaluation	132
15.4.3.6	Conclusions	132
15.4.4	CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	132
15.4.4.1	Description of Event	132
15.4.4.2	Frequency of Event	133
15.4.4.3	Event Analysis	133
15.4.4.3.1	Protective Features and Single Failures Assumed	133
15.4.4.3.1.1	Reactor in Mode 1 or Mode 2	133
15.4.4.3.1.2	Reactor in MODES 3 to 6	134
15.4.4.3.1.3	Indication and Alarms	134
15.4.4.3.2	Operator Actions Assumed	134
15.4.4.3.3	Chronological Description of Event	135
15.4.4.3.4	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	135
15.4.4.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	135
15.4.4.4.1	Methodology	135
15.4.4.4.2	Acceptance Criteria	135
15.4.4.4.3	Dilution During Refueling (MODE 6)	136
15.4.4.4.3.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	136
15.4.4.4.3.2	Results	137
15.4.4.4.4	Dilution During Cold Shutdown (MODE 5)	137
15.4.4.4.5	Dilution at Startup (MODE 2)	137
15.4.4.4.5.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	137
15.4.4.4.5.2	Results	138
15.4.4.4.6	Dilution at Power (MODE 1)	138
15.4.4.4.6.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	138
15.4.4.4.6.2	Results	139
15.4.4.4.7	Dilution from a Single Failure While in Residual Heat Removal Mode - Inadvertent Draining of the Spray Additive Tank.	139
15.4.4.4.8	Dilution from a Single Failure While in Residual Heat Removal Mode (MODE 5) -Boron Dilution from the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank.	139
15.4.4.4.8.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	139
15.4.4.4.8.2	Results	140
15.4.4.4.9	Dilution from a Single Failure While in Residual Heat Removal Mode (MODE 5) -Boron Dilution Due to Resin Changing in the Purification System.	140

15.4.4.4.9.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	140
15.4.4.4.9.2	Results	141
15.4.4.4.10	Dilution from a Single Failure While in Residual Heat Removal Mode (MODE 6) -Boron Dilution from Reactor Coolant Drain Tank After Refueling.	141
15.4.4.4.10.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	141
15.4.4.4.10.2	Results	141
15.4.4.5	Radiological Evaluation	142
15.4.4.6	Conclusions	142
15.4.5	RUPTURE OF A CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM HOUSING - ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY EJECTION	142
15.4.5.1	Description of Event	142
15.4.5.1.1	Nuclear Design	143
15.4.5.1.2	Effects on Adjacent Housings	143
15.4.5.2	Frequency of Event	143
15.4.5.3	Event Analysis	143
15.4.5.3.1	Protective Features	143
15.4.5.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	144
15.4.5.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	144
15.4.5.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	144
15.4.5.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	144
15.4.5.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	145
15.4.5.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	145
15.4.5.4.2	Methodology	145
15.4.5.4.2.1	Average Core Analysis	146
15.4.5.4.2.2	Ejected Rod Worths and Hot Channel Factors	146
15.4.5.4.2.3	Hot Spot Analysis	146
15.4.5.4.2.4	Reactivity Feedback Weighting Factors	147
15.4.5.4.2.5	System Overpressure Analysis	147
15.4.5.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	148
15.4.5.4.4	Results	148
15.4.5.4.4.1	Beginning of Life, Full Power - Case (1)	149
15.4.5.4.4.2	Beginning of Life, Zero Power - Case (2)	149
15.4.5.4.4.3	End of Life, Full Power - Case (3)	149
15.4.5.4.4.4	End of Life, Zero Power - Case (4)	149
15.4.5.4.4.5	Pressure Surge	149
15.4.5.4.4.6	Lattice Deformations	150

15.4.5.5	Radiological Evaluation	150
15.4.5.6	Conclusions	150
15.4.6	ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY DROP	150
15.4.6.1	Description of Event	150
15.4.6.2	Frequency of Event	151
15.4.6.3	Event Analysis	151
15.4.6.3.1	Protective Features	151
15.4.6.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	152
15.4.6.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	152
15.4.6.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	152
15.4.6.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	152
15.4.6.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	152
15.4.6.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	152
15.4.6.4.2	Methodology	153
15.4.6.4.2.1	One or More Dropped Rod Cluster Control Assemblies From the Same Group	153
15.4.6.4.2.2	Dropped Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank	153
15.4.6.4.2.3	Statically Misaligned Rod Cluster Control Assembly	153
15.4.6.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	153
15.4.6.4.4	Results	154
15.4.6.4.4.1	One or More Dropped Rod Cluster Control Assemblies	154
15.4.6.4.4.2	Dropped Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank	154
15.4.6.4.4.3	Statically Misaligned Rod Cluster Control Assembly	154
15.4.6.5	Radiological Evaluation	155
15.4.6.6	Conclusions	155
15.4	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.4	156
Table 15.4-1	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUB- CRITICAL	158
Table 15.4-2	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL AT POWER	159
Table 15.4-3	PARAMETERS USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY EJECTION ACCIDENT	160
Table 15.4-4	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY EJECTION	161
Table 15.4-5	REA CONTAINMENT ASSUMPTIONS	162
Table 15.4-6	RESULTS FOR REA DOSE, REM TEDE	164
15.5	INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY	165
15.5	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.5	166
15.6	DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY	167

15.6.1	INADVERTENT OPENING OF A PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE OR PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE (PORV)	167
15.6.1.1	Description of Event	167
15.6.1.2	Frequency of Event	167
15.6.1.3	Event Analysis	167
15.6.1.3.1	Protective Features	167
15.6.1.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	167
15.6.1.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	167
15.6.1.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	167
15.6.1.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	167
15.6.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	168
15.6.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	168
15.6.1.4.2	Methodology	168
15.6.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	168
15.6.1.4.4	Results	169
15.6.1.5	Radiological Consequences	169
15.6.1.6	Conclusions	169
15.6.2	RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SMALL LINES CARRYING PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	169
15.6.3	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	170
15.6.3.1	Description of Event	170
15.6.3.2	Frequency of Event	170
15.6.3.3	Event Analysis	171
15.6.3.3.1	Protective Features	171
15.6.3.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	172
15.6.3.3.2.1	Single Failure - Margin to Overfill	172
15.6.3.3.2.2	Single Failure - Mass Release	173
15.6.3.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	173
15.6.3.3.3.1	Operator Actions to Terminate Tube Rupture Flow	173
15.6.3.3.3.2	Operator Actions Due to Single Failures	175
15.6.3.3.3.3	Operator Actions for Cooldown to MODE 5 (Cold Shutdown)	175
15.6.3.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	176
15.6.3.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	176
15.6.3.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	177
15.6.3.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	177
15.6.3.4.2	Methodology	178
15.6.3.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	179

15.6.3.4.4	Results	179
15.6.3.4.4.1	SGTR Margin to Overfill Transient Analysis	179
15.6.3.4.4.2	SGTR Mass Release Transient Analysis	181
15.6.3.5	Radiological Consequences	182
15.6.3.6	Conclusions	183
15.6.4	PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURES	183
15.6.4.1	Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or From Cracks in Large Pipes Which Actuates Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)	183
15.6.4.1.1	Description of Event	183
15.6.4.1.2	Frequency of Event	184
15.6.4.1.3	Event Analysis	184
15.6.4.1.3.1	Protective Features	184
15.6.4.1.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	185
15.6.4.1.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	185
15.6.4.1.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	185
15.6.4.1.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	186
15.6.4.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	186
15.6.4.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	186
15.6.4.1.4.2	Methodology	187
15.6.4.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	188
15.6.4.1.4.4	Results	188
15.6.4.1.4.5	Effect of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Model Modifications	189

15.6.4.1.5	Radiological Evaluation	189
15.6.4.1.6	Conclusions	189
15.6.4.2	Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss-of-Coolant Accident)	189
15.6.4.2.1	Description of Event	189
15.6.4.2.2	Frequency of Event	191
15.6.4.2.3	Event Analysis	191
15.6.4.2.3.1	Protective Features	191
15.6.4.2.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	192
15.6.4.2.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	192
15.6.4.2.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	192
15.6.4.2.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	194
15.6.4.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	194
15.6.4.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	194
15.6.4.2.4.2	Methodology	197
15.6.4.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	202
15.6.4.2.4.4	Results	202
15.6.4.2.5	Radiological Evaluation	203
15.6.4.2.6	Conclusions	204
15.6	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.6	205
Table 15.6-1	COMPARISON OF NOMINAL AND PLANT PARAMETERS USED IN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR) ANALYSIS	209
Table 15.6-2	OPERATOR ACTION TIMES	210
Table 15.6-3	SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - MARGIN TO OVERFILL ANALYSIS	211
Table 15.6-4	OPERATOR ACTION TIMES FOR DESIGN BASIS STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ANALYSIS	212
Table 15.6-5	SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - OFFSITE RADIATION DOSE ANALYSIS	213
Table 15.6-6	SGTR DOSE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS	214
Table 15.6-7	STEAM RELEASES AND RUPTURE FLOW	216
Table 15.6-8	RESULTS FOR SGTR, REM TEDE	217
Table 15.6-9	TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - ACCIDENTAL DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE RCS	218
Table 15.6-10	TOTAL SMALL BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT SAFETY INJECTION AND SPILL FLOW	219
Table 15.6-11	SMALL BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT KEY ASSUMPTIONS	220
Table 15.6-12	SMALL BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE (MSSV) ASSUMPTIONS	222

Table 15.6-13	SMALL BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS	223
Table 15.6-14	SMALL BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT FUEL CLADDING RESULTS	224
Table 15.6-15	LARGE BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR DECLG BREAK	225
Table 15.6-16	Key LBLOCA Parameters and Initial Transient Assumptions for R. E. Ginna Analysis	226
Table 15.6-17	LARGE BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VERSUS PRESSURE	229
Table 15.6-18a	PARAMETERS FOR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE - DRY CONTAINMENT DATA	231
Table 15.6-18b	STRUCTURAL HEAT SINK DATA	232
Table 15.6-19	PLANT OPERATING RANGE ALLOWED BY THE BEST-ESTIMATE LARGE BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS (R. E. GINNA)	234
Table 15.6-20	LIMITING LARGE BREAK PCT AND OXIDATION RESULTS FOR R. E. GINNA	236
Table 15.6-21	ASSUMPTIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT	237
Table 15.6-21A	LBLOCA DOSE SUMMARY, REM TEDE	239
Table 15.6-22	Total Core Activity (Curies) at End of 525-day Fuel Cycle - including Decay	240
Table 15.6-23	Core Inventory Fraction Released into Containment	243
Table 15.6-24	TABLE DELETED	245
15.7	RADIOACTIVE RELEASE FROM A SUBSYSTEM OR COMPONENT	246
15.7.1	RADIOACTIVE GAS WASTE SYSTEM FAILURE	246
15.7.1.1	Gas Decay Tank Rupture	246
15.7.1.1.1	Description of Event	246
15.7.1.1.2	Frequency of Event	246
15.7.1.1.3	Event Analysis	246
15.7.1.1.3.1	Single Failures Assumed	247
15.7.1.1.3.2	Operator Actions Assumed	247
15.7.1.1.3.3	Chronological Description of Event	247
15.7.1.1.3.4	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	247
15.7.1.1.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	247
15.7.1.1.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	247
15.7.1.1.4.2	Methodology	248
15.7.1.1.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	248
15.7.1.1.4.4	Results	248

15.7.1.1.5	Radiological Evaluation	248
15.7.1.1.6	Conclusions	248
15.7.1.2	Volume Control Tank Rupture	249
15.7.1.2.1	Description of Event	249
15.7.1.2.2	Frequency of Event	249
15.7.1.2.3	Event Analysis	249
15.7.1.2.3.1	Single Failures Assumed	249
15.7.1.2.3.2	Operator Actions Assumed	249
15.7.1.2.3.3	Chronological Description of Event	249
15.7.1.2.3.4	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	250
15.7.1.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	250
15.7.1.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	250
15.7.1.2.4.2	Methodology	250
15.7.1.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	251
15.7.1.2.4.4	Results	251
15.7.1.2.5	Radiological Evaluation	251
15.7.1.2.6	Conclusions	251
15.7.2	RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM FAILURE	251
15.7.2.1	Description of Event	251
15.7.2.2	Frequency of Event	252
15.7.2.3	Event Analysis	252
15.7.2.3.1	Single Failures Assumed	253
15.7.2.3.2	Operator Actions Assumed	253
15.7.2.3.3	Chronological Description of Event	253
15.7.2.3.4	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	253
15.7.2.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	253
15.7.2.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	253
15.7.2.4.2	Methodology	254
15.7.2.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	254
15.7.2.4.4	Results	254
15.7.2.4.4.1	Accidental Release of Liquid Waste Assessment	254
15.7.2.4.4.2	Spent Resin Storage Tank Assessment	255
15.7.2.4.5	Effects of 18-month Fuel Cycle	256
15.7.2.5	Radiological Evaluation	256
15.7.2.6	Conclusions	256
15.7.3	FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS	256
15.7.3.1	Description of Event	256

15.7.3.1.1	MODE 6 (Refueling) Preparations	256
15.7.3.1.2	Fuel Handling Equipment Safety Features	257
15.7.3.1.3	Fuel Handling Operations Precautions	258
15.7.3.1.4	Consequence of Dropped Fuel Assembly	258
15.7.3.2	Frequency of Event	259
15.7.3.3	Event Analysis	259
15.7.3.3.1	Protective Features	260
15.7.3.3.2	Single Failures Assumed	260
15.7.3.3.3	Operator Actions Assumed	260
15.7.3.3.4	Chronological Description of Event	260
15.7.3.3.5	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	260
15.7.3.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	261
15.7.3.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	261
15.7.3.4.2	Methodology	261
15.7.3.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	261
15.7.3.4.4	Results	261
15.7.3.5	Radiological Evaluation	261
15.7.3.6	Conclusions	261
15.7	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.7	262
Table 15.7-1	FISSION PRODUCT INVENTORY AND ACTIVITY RELEASED FROM POOL	265
Table 15.7-2	FHA DOSE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS	266
Table 15.7-3	FHA DOSE. REM TEDE	267
Table 15.7-4	Table DELETED	268
Table 15.7-5	Table DELETED	269
Table 15.7-6	Table DELETED	270
15.8	ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM	271
15.8.1	ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)	271
15.8.2	Frequency of event	271
15.8.3	Event Analysis	271
15.8.3.1	Single Failures Assumed	271
15.8.3.2	Operator Actions Assumed	271
15.8.3.3	Chronological Description of Event	272
15.8.3.4	Impact on Fission Product Barriers	272
15.8.4	Reactor Core and Plant System Evaluation	273
15.8.4.1	Input Parameters and Initial Conditions	273
15.8.4.2	Methodology	274
15.8.4.3	Acceptance Criteria	274

15.8.4.4	Results	274
15.8.5	Radiological Evaluation	275
15.8.6	Conclusions	275
15.8	REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.8	276

FIGURES

Figure 15.0-1	Core Limits and Overpower-Overtemperature Delta T Setpoints ($T_{ref} = 576.0^{\circ}\text{F}$)
Figure 15.0-2	Reactivity Coefficients Used in Non-LOCA Safety Analysis
Figure 15.0-3	Reactivity Insertion Scram Curves
Figure 15.1-1	Feedwater Flow Increase at Full Power, Nuclear Power and Loop Average Temperature Versus Time
Figure 15.1-2	Feedwater Flow Increase at Full Power, Pressurizer Pressure and Steam Generator Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.1-3	Feedwater Flow Increase at Full Power, Steam Generator Mass Versus Time
Figure 15.1-4	Steam Line Rupture, Multiplication Factor Versus Core Average Temperature (Calculated at 1050 psia)
Figure 15.1-5	Steam Line Rupture, Integrated Doppler Defect Versus Fraction of Power
Figure 15.1-6	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, Two Loops in Service, Core Heat Flux and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.1-7	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, Two Loops in Service, Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.1-8	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, Two Loops in Service, Loop T_{AVG} and Cold Leg Loop Temperature Versus Time
Figure 15.1-9	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, Two Loops in Service, Faulted Loop Steam Flow and Total Feedwater Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.1-10	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, Two Loops in Service, Core Averaged Boron and Reactivity Versus Time
Figure 15.1-11	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break Without Power, Two Loops in Service, Core Heat Flux and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.1-12	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break Without Power, Two Loops in Service, Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.1-13	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break Without Power, Two Loops in Service, Loop T_{AVG} and Cold Leg Loop Temperatures Versus Time
Figure 15.1-14	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break Without Power, Two Loops in Service, Faulted Loop Steam Flow and Total Feedwater Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.1-15	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break without Power, Two Loops in Service, Core Averaged Boron and Reactivity Versus Time
Figure 15.1-16	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, One Loop in Service, Core Heat Flux and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.1-17	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, One Loop in Service, Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time

Figure 15.1-18	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, One Loop in Service, Loop TAVG and Cold Leg Loop Temperatures Versus Time
Figure 15.1-19	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, One Loop in Service, Faulted Loop Steam Flow and Total Feedwater Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.1-20	Steam Line Rupture, 1.4ft ² Break with Power, One Loop in Service, Core Averaged Boron and Reactivity Versus Time
Figure 15.1-21	Combined Atmospheric Relief Valve and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure, Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.1-22	Combined Atmospheric Relief Valve and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure, Loop Average Temperature and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.1-23	Combined Atmospheric Relief Valve and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure, DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.1-24	Combined Atmospheric Relief Valve and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure, Steam Generator Level and Steam Generator Mass Versus Time
Figure 15.2-1	Loss of Load, with Automatic Pressure Control, Nuclear Power and DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.2-2	Loss of Load, with Automatic Pressure Control, RCS Average Temperature and Pressurizer Water Volume Versus Time
Figure 15.2-3	Loss of Load, with Automatic Pressure Control, Steam Generator Pressure and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-4	Loss of Load, Without Pressure Control, Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.2-5	Loss of Load, Without Pressure Control, RCS Average Temperature and Pressurizer Water Volume Versus Time
Figure 15.2-6	Loss of Load, Without Pressure Control, Steam Generator Pressure and Reactor Coolant System Pressures Versus Time
Figure 15.2-7	Loss of Load, Peak MSS Pressure Case, Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.2-8	Loss of Load, Peak MSS Pressure Case, RCS Average Temperature and Pressurizer Water Volume Versus Time
Figure 15.2-9	Loss of Load, Peak MSS Pressure Case, Steam Generator Pressure and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-10	Figure Deleted
Figure 15.2-11	Figure Deleted
Figure 15.2-12	Figure Deleted
Figure 15.2-13	Loss of Offsite Alternating Current Power to the Station Auxiliaries, Nuclear Power and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-14	Loss of Offsite Alternating Current Power to the Station Auxiliaries, Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Steam Relief Rate Versus Time
Figure 15.2-15	Loss of Offsite Alternating Current Power to the Station Auxiliaries, Reactor Coolant Flow and Core Inlet/Outlet Temperatures Versus Time
Figure 15.2-16	Loss of Offsite Alternating Current Power to the Station Auxiliaries, Steam Generator Mass and Steam Generator Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-17	Loss of Normal Feedwater With Power, Nuclear Power and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time

Figure 15.2-18	Loss of Normal Feedwater With Power, Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Steam Relief Rate Versus Time
Figure 15.2-19	Loss of Normal Feedwater With Power, Reactor Coolant Flow and Core Inlet/Outlet Temperatures Versus Time
Figure 15.2-20	Loss of Normal Feedwater With Power, Steam Generator Mass and Steam Generator Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-21	Feedline Break With Offsite Power; Nuclear Power and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-22	Feedline Break With Offsite Power; Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Steam Relief Rate Versus Time
Figure 15.2-23	Feedline Break With Offsite Power; Cold Leg, Hot Leg and Saturation Temperatures Versus Time
Figure 15.2-24	Feedline Break With Offsite Power; Steam Generator Mass and Steam Generator Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-25	Feedline Break With Offsite Power; Feedwater Mass Flow Rates Versus Time
Figure 15.2-26	Feedline Break Without Offsite Power; Nuclear Power and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-27	Feedline Break Without Offsite Power; Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Steam Relief Rate Versus Time
Figure 15.2-28	Feedline Break Without Offsite Power; Cold Leg, Hot Leg and Saturation Temperatures Versus Time
Figure 15.2-29	Feedline Break Without Offsite Power; Steam Generator Mass and Steam Generator Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.2-30	Feedline Break Without Offsite Power; Feedwater Mass Flow Rates Versus Time
Figure 15.3-1	Full Loss of Flow (Undervoltage), Nuclear Power and RCS Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.3-1a	Full Loss of Flow (Underfrequency), Nuclear Power and RCS Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.3-2	Full Loss of Flow (Undervoltage), Core Average and Hot Channel Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.3-2a	Full Loss of Flow (Underfrequency), Core Average and Hot Channel Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.3-3	Full Loss of Flow (Undervoltage), RCS Pressures and DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.3-3a	Full Loss of Flow (Underfrequency), DNBR and Reactor Coolant System Pressures Versus Time
Figure 15.3-4	Partial Loss of Flow, Nuclear Power and RCS Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.3-5	Partial Loss of Flow, RCS Pressures and RCS Loop Flows Versus Time
Figure 15.3-6	Partial Loss of Flow, Core Average and Hot Channel Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.3-7	Partial Loss of Flow, DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.3-8	Locked Rotor, RCS Pressures and RCS Loop Flows Versus Time
Figure 15.3-9	Locked Rotor, Nuclear Power and RCS Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.3-10	Locked Rotor, Core Average Heat Flux and Cladding Inside Temperature Versus Time

Figure 15.4-1	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal From Subcritical Conditions, Heat Flux and Nuclear Power Versus Time (422V+Fuel)
Figure 15.4-2	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal From Subcritical Conditions, Clad Inside and Fuel Average Temperature Versus Time(422V+Fuel)
Figure 15.4-3	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Minimum Feedback, 100 pcm/sec, Nuclear Power and Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.4-4	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Minimum Feedback, 100 pcm/sec, Pressurizer Pressure and Pressurizer Water Volume Versus Time
Figure 15.4-5	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Minimum Feedback, 100 pcm/sec, T_{avg} and DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.4-6	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Maximum Feedback, 5 pcm/sec, Nuclear Power and Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.4-7	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Maximum Feedback, 5 pcm/sec, Pressurizer Water Volume and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.4-8	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Maximum Feedback, 5 pcm/sec, T_{AVG} and DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.4-9	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power, Minimum and Maximum Feedback, DNBR Versus Reactivity Insertion Rate
Figure 15.4-10	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal from 60% Power, Minimum and Maximum Feedback, DNBR Versus Reactivity Insertion Rate
Figure 15.4-11	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal from 10% Power, Minimum and Maximum Feedback, DNBR Versus Reactivity Insertion Rate
Figure 15.4-12	Startup of an Inactive Coolant Loop, Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-13	Startup of an Inactive Coolant Loop, T_{AVG} Versus Time
Figure 15.4-14	Startup of an Inactive Coolant Loop, Core Inlet Temperature Versus Time
Figure 15.4-15	Startup of an Inactive Coolant Loop, Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.4-16	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection Beginning-of-Life, Full Power, Fuel and Clad Temperature and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-16a	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection, Beginning of Life, Full Power, Fuel and Clad Temperature and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-16b	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection, Beginning of Life, Zero Power, Fuel and Clad Temperature and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-17	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection Beginning-of-Life, Zero Power, Fuel and Clad Temperature and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-17a	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection, End of Life, Full Power, Fuel and Clad Temperature and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-17b	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection, End of Life, Zero Power, Fuel and Clad Temperature and Nuclear Power Versus Time

Figure 15.4-18	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Drop Heat Flux and Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.4-19	Rod Cluster Control Assembly Drop Pressurizer Pressure and Core Average Temperature Versus Time
Figure 15.4-20	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawl from 8% Power (RCS Pressure Case), Minimum Feedback, 55 pcm/sec, Nuclear Power and Heat Flux Versus Time
Figure 15.4-21	Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawl from 8% Power (RCS Pressure Case), Minimum Feedback, 55 pcm/sec, Pressurizer Pressure and T_{avg} Versus Time
Figure 15.6-1	Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Overfill), Maximum Safety Injection Flow Versus Pressure
Figure 15.6-1a	RCS Depressurization, Nuclear Power Versus Time
Figure 15.6-1b	RCS Pressurization, Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.6-1c	RCS Depressurization, Indicated Loop Average Temperature Versus Time
Figure 15.6-1d	RCS Depressurization, DNBR Versus Time
Figure 15.6-2	SGTR (Overfill), Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.6-3	SGTR (Overfill), Secondary Pressure and Steam Generator Liquid Mass Versus Time
Figure 15.6-4	SGTR (Overfill), Hot and Cold Leg Temperatures for Intact and Ruptured Steam Generators Versus Time
Figure 15.6-5	SGTR (Overfill), Total Primary to Secondary Leakage and Total Integrated Primary to Secondary Leakage Versus Time
Figure 15.6-6	SGTR (Overfill), Steam Generator Relief Flow and Integrated Steam Generator Relief Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.6-7	SGTR (Overfill), Steam Generator Water Volume Versus Time
Figure 15.6-8	SGTR (Dose), Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.6-9	SGTR (Dose), Secondary Pressure and Steam Generator Liquid Mass Versus Time
Figure 15.6-10	SGTR (Dose), Hot and Cold Leg Temperatures for Intact and Ruptured Steam Generators Versus Time
Figure 15.6-11	SGTR (Dose), Total Primary to Secondary Leakage and Total Integrated Primary to Secondary Leakage Versus Time
Figure 15.6-12	SGTR (Dose), Steam Generator Relief Flow and Integrated Steam Generator Relief Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.6-13	SGTR (Dose), Steam Generator Water Volume Versus Time
Figure 15.6-14	SGTR (Dose), Tube Rupture Flow Flashing Fraction and Integrated Flashed Break Versus Time
Figure 15.6-15	Small Break LOCA - 2-Inch Break, Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.6-16	Small Break LOCA - 2-Inch Break, Core Mixture Level Versus Time
Figure 15.6-17	Small Break LOCA - 2-Inch High Break, Peak Cladding Temperature at PCT Elevation Versus Time
Figure 15.6-18	Small Break LOCA - 2-Inch High Break, Core Exit Vapor Flow Versus Time
Figure 15.6-19	Small Break LOCA - 2-Inch Break, Hot Rod Heat Transfer Coefficient at PCT Elevation Versus Time

Figure 15.6-20	Small Break LOCA - 2-Inch Break, Fluid Temperature at PCT Elevation Versus Time
Figure 15.6-21	Small Break LOCA - Axial Power Distribution, Heat Rate Versus Core Elevation
Figure 15.6-22	Small Break LOCA - 1.5-Inch Break, Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.6-23	Small Break LOCA - 3-Inch High Break, Pressurizer Pressure Versus Time
Figure 15.6-24	Small Break LOCA - 1.5-Inch Break, Core Mixture Level Versus Time
Figure 15.6-25	Small Break LOCA - 3-Inch Break, Core Mixture Level Versus Time
Figure 15.6-26	Small Break LOCA - 1.5-Inch Break, Peak Cladding Temperature at PCT Elevation Versus Time
Figure 15.6-27	Small Break LOCA - 3-Inch Break, Peak Cladding Temperature at PCT Elevation Versus Time
Figure 15.6-28	Figure Deleted
Figure 15.6-29	Figure Deleted
Figure 15.6-30	Figure Deleted
Figure 15.6-31	R.E. Ginna Vessel Model Noding Diagram ¹
Figure 15.6-32	R.E. Ginna Loop Model Noding Diagram
Figure 15.6-33	R.E. Ginna Initial Transient Axial Power Distributions
Figure 15.6-34	Containment Pressure Used for the R.E. Ginna Best-Estimate Large Break LOCA Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-35	Peak Clad Temperature of the 5 rods for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-36	Split Break Flow for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-37	Total Flow at the Bottom of the Core for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-38	Accumulator Injection Flow for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-39	High Head Safety Injection Flow for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-40	Low Head Safety Injection Flow for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-41	Average Collapsed Liquid Level in the Downcomer for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-42	Lower Plenum Collapsed Liquid Level for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-43	Core Collapsed Liquid Levels for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-44	Vessel Liquid Mass for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-45	Pressurizer Pressure for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-46	Hot Rod Peak Clad Temperature and Elevation for the Initial Transient
Figure 15.6-47	R.E. Ginna PBOT/PMID Analysis and Operating Limits
Figure 15.6-48	Lower Bound Containment Pressure for R.E. Ginna Analysis