



ROP Monthly Meeting

May 22, 2019

10:00 am – 12:15 pm



Agenda

10:00 am	Introduction/Opening Remarks	
10:15 am	Update on Changes to the Engineering Inspection Program	D. Bollock
10:45 am	Operating Experience - Brunswick CryoFit Coupling Failure	J.Carneal
11:00 am	FAQ 19-02 – Brunswick CryoFit Coupling Failure	NEI
11:15 am	Transition of FAQ 19-01 to Final Approval	J.Quinones
11:20 am	NEI's Response Letter on the 3/27/19 Executive ROP Meeting	NEI
11:40 am	ROP Enhancement – Next Steps	R. Gibbs
12:00 pm	Opportunity for Public Comments	Members of the Public
12:10 pm	Closing Remarks	NRC Management
12:15 pm	Adjourn	



Update on Engineering Inspections

**Douglas Bollock
NRR/DIRS/IRIB**

Engineering Inspection Implementation Plan

- Draft Inspection Procedures (IPs) complete - June 2019
- Develop and deliver training on new procedures for NRC staff
 - Inspection procedure changes, ties to the regulation, examples of more than minor findings, lessons learned from previous inspections
- Inspection scheduling and inspection implementation

Focused Engineering Inspections

- **Selection Criteria for Focused Engineering Inspections (FEIs)**
 - Risk significance, including PRA insights and common cause failure potential
 - Operating Experience, including past industry performance trends in SSC failures and insights from NRC inspections
 - Potential for challenges, including changing conditions, which would not be identified through other inspections.

Next Steps

- Inform the Commission of staff selections for FEIs.
 - Fire Protection (FP) FEI replaces current triennial FP and Power-Operated Valves (POV) replaces Environmental Qualification
- Work with regions to make adjustments to inspection schedules



Questions?



Brunswick Unit 1: RCS Leak - NOUE and Manual Scram

Jason Carneal
NRR/DIRS/IOEB

RCS Leak – Event Timeline

- Unit 1: Operating at 100% power on 03/28/2019
- NOUE declared at 14:50 for leak rate greater than 10 gpm for 15 minutes
- Inserted a manual reactor scram from 34% power at 16:03 in accordance with procedural guidance
- Indications of leak from reactor vessel level reference leg because of erratic readings
- Licensee cooled down to Mode 4. Terminated NOUE on leak rate below 10 gpm





United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment


U.S.NRC CryoFit Coupling Failure

- Leak was identified on 1-inch CryoFit Coupling
- Coupling supplied by Raychem (defunct in 1999)
- Made from Titanium – Nickel Alloy (Tinel)
- Expands when cooled / contracts to original shape when warmed to ambient temperature
- Forms metal to metal swaged connection with pipes and CryoFit compatible fittings
- Susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement in water environment at high temperatures, pressures and when in the presence of hydrogen

CryoFit Coupling



Expanded couplings have an inside diameter slightly larger than the tube outside diameter



As the coupling warms and recovers it swagers on the tubing generating a highly reliable metal to metal seal

Seabrook Failures (1991)

- NRR performed operating experience search of licensee event reports, inspection reports and other data looking for existence of CryoFit failures
- Identified a fracture of a CryoFit coupling on a pressurizer gas space sampling line (360° circumferential fracture at midpoint of coupling)
- A second CryoFit coupling in the same line fractured in a similar manner after an accidental physical impact during repair.
- NRC issued Information Notice 91-87, “Hydrogen Embrittlement of Raychem CryoFit Couplings.”
- No other known failures of CryoFit couplings since.

Extent of Condition

- Only identified failures were the previously discussed failures at Seabrook in 1991
- Working with INPO to help verify extent of condition and raise industry awareness of the event.
- Possibly work with NEI to validate extent of condition

Remaining Questions

- Extent of Condition?
- Was failure mode actually hydrogen embrittlement?
- Possible material aging component that could cause hydrogen embrittlement in addition to the known causal factors related to high temperature, pressure and hydrogen concentration?



Questions?



FAQ 19-02 – Brunswick Reactor Coolant System Leakage

Nuclear Energy Institute



Transition of FAQ 19-01 to Final Approval

Joylynn Quinones-Navarro
NRR/DIRS/IRAB



Proposed SECY on ROP Enhancement

Nuclear Energy Institute



ROP Enhancement Next Steps

**Russell Gibbs
NRR/DIRS/IRAB**

ROP Enhancement – Longer Term Activities (1)

- Perform holistic review of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) inspections
- Examine effectiveness of the Cross-Cutting Issues Program
- Evaluate significance determination process decision-making to improve efficiency and effectiveness

ROP Enhancement – Longer Term Activities (2)

- Evaluate changes to supplemental inspection for White findings (IP 95001)
- Optimize independent spent fuel storage installation and radiation protection inspections
- Evaluate crediting licensee performance in other safety cornerstones for emergency preparedness inspection findings



Questions?



Opportunity for Public Comments

Members of the Public



Closing Remarks

NRC/NEI Management