




PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000

July 23, 1975



Regulatory Mail File
Mr. A. Giambusso
Director, Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

AUXILIARY BUILDING FLOOD PROTECTION
NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

Our letter of December 19, 1974 to the Director of Regulatory Operations reported the failure of No. 1 Unit 4 kV vital switchgear due to flooding from a severe northeast storm on December 1, 1974.

A telephone request for additional information was made by Mr. A. W. Dromerick of your staff. The attached response to Mr. Dromerick's request is hereby transmitted for your review.

Very truly yours,

R. L. Mittl
General Manager - Projects
Engineering and Construction Department

RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
AUXILIARY BUILDING FLOODING
NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

QUESTION 1

Are there any water lines in the electrical switchgear rooms? If so, please provide drawings.

ANSWER

A 12-inch Class I (Seismic) demineralized water line passes through the switchgear room at elevation 64'. This line is a non-essential backup water supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater System and will remain dry during normal plant operation, thereby precluding any potential for accidental water intrusion into vital electrical plant areas.

QUESTION 2

Would a crack in a moderate energy, Class I (Seismic) pipe anywhere in the Auxiliary Building prevent the safe shutdown of the unit?

ANSWER

We have investigated the effects of a "critical crack" in the moderate energy, Class I (seismic) piping in the Auxiliary Building.

The investigation indicated that a "critical crack" (taken to be 1/2 the pipe diameter in length and 1/2 the wall thickness in width) in any of these lines would not interfere with the safe shutdown of the unit.

Equipment arrangement and floor drainage systems are adequate to prevent flooding serious enough to impair the operation of equipment necessary for shutdown. In the event of any Class I (Seismic) line failure of "critical crack" size, the discharged effluent would be carried away via existing floor drains or via stairwells and pipe chases to the RHR sump.

RHR sump level alarms would alert the operator to take the necessary action required to maintain the plant in a safe condition. To minimize discharged effluent from yard tanks into the Auxiliary Building, given a "critical crack" in a Class I (Seismic) pipe, steps could be taken in the yard area to reduce tank inventories or divert the inventory to other storage facilities.

QUESTION 3

Will all floor penetrations be sealed?

ANSWER

It is planned to seal the floor penetrations between elevations 100' and 84', and 84' and 64' in the switchgear rooms.

QUESTION 4

What type fire protection is provided in the switchgear rooms? Is it water deluge?

ANSWER

CO₂ fire protection is provided in the switchgear rooms.