PSE&G

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Regulatory File Cy.

July 30, 1976



Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Karl Kniel, Chief
Light Water Reactors Branch 2

Gentlemen:

REQUEST FOR DEFERMENT
INCOMPLETE ITEMS
NO. 1 UNIT
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-272

Supplementing our letters of July 14, and July 20, 1976, PSE&G hereby transmits additional items for which deferment until after core load is requested.

The attachment to this letter identifies additional items which will be completed prior to initial criticality along with our safety evaluation. We have concluded that the items identified in the attachment do not involve an unreviewed safety question and will have no effect on the safe operation and reliability of the plant.

Very truly yours,

R. L. Mittl
General Manager - Projects
Engineering and Construction
Department

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The Energy People

ITEMS TO BE COMPLETED
PRIOR TO INITIAL CRITICALITY

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	SAFETY EVALUATION
Axial Flux Difference Monitor (AFDM)	The AFDM detects the difference in neutron flux between the top and bottom halves of the core.	The Technical Specifications require control of axial flux difference during power operations. The monitor will be installed in the control room at the time of core load and will be calibrated and tested prior to initial criticality. The device performs no function until power operation. Neutron flux is measured by other devices during initial core load. Not having this device calibrated at the time of core load will not affect the control or evaluation of reactor conditions and therefore will have no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.
Radiochemistry Procedures	.1 Procedure #PD 3.3.010 .2 Procedure #PD 3.3.011 .3 Procedure #PD 3.3.003	.1 Procedure to determine the average energy ($\bar{E}$) of gamma emitting isotopes. This procedure is required for normal operations (Mode 1) and relates to the buildup of fission products as the result of operation. The Technical Specifications (Table 4.4-4) require that the sample be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of power operation. Radiochemistry procedures for control of the Reactor Coolant

ITEMS TO BE COMPLETED
PRIOR TO INITIAL CRITICALITY

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	SAFETY EVALUATION
		.1 (Continued) System have been approved and are available for core load. The lack of this procedure at core load will not affect the capability to evaluate Reactor Coolant conditions, and therefore, will have no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public. This procedure will therefore be completed prior to initial criticality.
		.2 Procedure for detecting fission gases by gamma spectroscopy in the presence of other gases. This procedure is used following power operations to identify fuel element leakage. Other radiochemistry procedures are approved and available for core load to identify isotopes and elements in the reactor coolant. The lack of this procedure at core load will not affect the capability to evaluate reactor coolant conditions, since fission gases are not produced until criticality is achieved and therefore, will have no adverse affect on the health and safety of the public. This procedure will be completed prior to initial criticality.

ITEMS TO BE COMPLETED
PRIOR TO INITIAL CRITICALITY

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	SAFETY EVALUATION
		.3 Procedure to determine the Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 in the primary coolant. This procedure is used to equate the variety of iodine isotopes into a Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 value. It relates to the buildup of fission gases as th result of power operation. Radiochemistry Procedures for identifying all isotopes of Iodine are approved and available for core load. The lack of this procedure at core load will not affect the capability to evaluate Reactor Coolant conditions since there is no buildup of I-131 until after initial criticality is achieved and therefore, will have no affect on the health and safety of the public. This procedure will be completed prior to initial criticality.
Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Standby Charcoal Filter	This charcoal filter removes 90% of the elemental and methyl (organic) iodines contacted at the rated flow of 21,400 cfm. These iodines are those that become airborne in the auxiliary building due to leakage from the ECCS during recirculation after a design basis loss of coolant accident. The filters are presently installed and have the capability to remove 90% of the elemental iodine. These filters do not, however	The lack of this filter being able to remove 90% of the organic iodines at the time of core load will not affect the ability to reduce potential consequences of design basis accidents since there is no buildup of radioactive iodines in the core (and have no potential iodine activity in the RHR System) until after initial criticality is achieved.

ITEMS TO BE COMPLETED
PRIOR TO INITIAL CRITICALITY

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	SAFETY EVALUATION
	at present, have the capability to remove 90% of the organic iodines.	Therefore, the absence of organic iodine removal capability will have no adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.