



Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000

Frederick W. Schneider Vice President — Production

## Regulatory Docket File

January 3, 1977

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Director of USNRC  
Office of Inspections and Enforcements  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 76-15/3L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 76-15/3L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

This report replaces Reportable Occurrence 76-15/1P which was incorrectly determined to be an LER and inadvertently reported on December 1, 1976.

Sincerely yours,



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CC Director, Office of Inspection  
and Enforcement (30 copies)  
Director, Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
(3 copies)

Report Number: 76-5/3L  
Report Date: 12/14/76  
Occurrence Date: 12/04/76  
Facility: Salem Generating Station  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) inoperable.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 operation, Plant pressure 2235 psig, Plant temperature 547°F.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On 12/4/76, an inadvertent safety injection prompted the investigation of all Main Steam Safety Valve setpoints. No. 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) was found to be set at a lift pressure greater than the 1% tolerance allowed. The operational setpoint is 1070 psig + 1%, whereas the setpoint was found to be 1088 psig. The Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) was reset to meet the correct tolerance.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

During Hot Functional Testing, No. 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) seat was lapped due to signs of weeping. The safety valve setting was not re-verified after subsequent maintenance. In correspondence with the manufacturer, it was indicated that lapping of the valve seat would not change the opening setpoint.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

All main steam line code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be operable. With one or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in Mode 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided that within four hours the inoperable valve is restored to operable status. The main steam safety valve was restored to operable status within Technical Specifications allotted time. At no time was there any hazard to the general public or site personnel.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

No. 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) was reset to the specified tolerance and the remaining nineteen safety valves were checked. Administrative controls have been established to ensure that pressure testing in accordance with Maintenance Procedure M9E will be performed after maintenance that could affect opening setpoints.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the first occurrence of this type.

Component: 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15)  
Manufacturer: Crosby Valve & Gage Company  
Type: 6R10 HC-65W

Prepared by B. Canfield

  
Manager - Salem Generating Station

SORC Meeting No. 122-76

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK									
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>LICENSEE NAME 01 N J S G S 1</div> <div>LICENSE NUMBER 000-0000000-000</div> <div>LICENSE TYPE 411111</div> <div>EVENT TYPE 011</div> </div>									
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>REPORT TYPE 01 CONT</div> <div>REPORT SOURCE P O L</div> <div>DOCKET NUMBER 0501-0272</div> <div>EVENT DATE 120476</div> <div>REPORT DATE 121476</div> </div>									
EVENT DESCRIPTION									
02 During Mode 3 operation, No. 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) setpoint									
03 was found to be greater than the 1% tolerance during investigation of an									
04 inadvertent safety injection actuation. The operational setpoint is									
05 1070 psig + 1% whereas the setpoint was found to be 1088 psig. The Main									
06 Steam Safety Valve (13MS15) was reset to meet the correct tolerance.									
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>SYSTEM CODE 07 C C</div> <div>CAUSE CODE E</div> <div>COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X</div> <div>PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER L</div> <div>COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 7 1 1 0</div> <div>VIOLATION Y</div> </div>									
CAUSE DESCRIPTION									
08 During Hot Functional Testing, No. 13 Main Steam Safety Valve (13MS15)									
09 seat was lapped due to signs of weeping. The safety valve setting was									
10 not re-verified after subsequent maintenance. In correspondence with									
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>FACILITY STATUS 11 G</div> <div>% POWER 0 0 0</div> <div>OTHER STATUS N/A</div> <div>METHOD OF DISCOVERY C</div> <div>DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION N/A</div> </div>									
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED 12 Z</div> <div>CONTENT OF RELEASE Z</div> <div>AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A</div> <div>LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A</div> </div>									
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
13 NUMBER 0 0 0 TYPE Z DESCRIPTION N/A									
PERSONNEL INJURIES									
14 NUMBER 0 0 0 DESCRIPTION N/A									
OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES									
15 N/A									
LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY									
16 TYPE Z DESCRIPTION N/A									
PUBLICITY									
17 N/A									
ADDITIONAL FACTORS									
18 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND CAUSE DESCRIPTION Continued on Page 2.									
19									

NAME: B. E. Canfield PHONE: (609) 365-7000 Ext. Salem-52

## EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)

The redundant safety valves were operable throughout this event. This is the first occurrence of this type. (76-15/3L)

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued)

the manufacturer, it was indicated that lapping of the valve seat would not change the opening setpoint. The remaining nineteen main steam safety valves were tested and found to be operable. Administrative controls have been established to ensure that pressure testing in accordance with Maintenance Procedure M9E shall be performed after maintenance that could affect opening setpoints. Manufacturer: Crosby Valve & Gage Co., Type - 6R10 HC-65W

This report replaced Reportable Occurrence 76-15/1T.