



**Consumers  
Power  
Company**

*NSB*

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 • Area Code 517 788-0550

August 6, 1980

Mr James G Keppler  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region III  
U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -  
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT  
REPORT 80-021 - MISALIGNED CONTAINMENT  
SUMP VALVE

The attached Licensee Event Report 80-021 is reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.2.A.2 and involved the misalignment during power operation of containment sump isolation (CV-3030) valve.

*David P. Hoffman*

David P Hoffman  
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

Attachment - 3 pages

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**AUG 11 1980**

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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 ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M I P A L L												2	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0										3	4 1 1 1 1				4			5
7	8	LICENSEE CODE												14	LICENSE NUMBER										25	LICENSE TYPE				30	CAT		58

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0	1	L										6	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5										7	0 7 2 5 8 0										8	0 8 0 6 8 0										9
7	8	REPORT SOURCE										60	DOCKET NUMBER										68	EVENT DATE										74	REPORT DATE										80

**EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)**

0 2 | On July 25, 1980, during the performance of a quarterly surveillance test

0 3 | (valve ISI program) an operator inadvertently opened containment sump

0 4 | valve CV-3030. This valve on the suction side of the containment spray HPSI

0 5 | and LPSI pumps is normally closed during plant operation. CV-3030 was

0 6 | open 36 hours. This condition is reportable under Technical Specifications

0 7 | 6.9.2.A.2.

0 8 |

2 8 9

SYSTEM CODE [ 0 ] [ 9 ]		CAUSE CODE [ S ] [ F ] (11)		CAUSE SUBCODE [ A ] (12)		COMPONENT CODE [ V ] [ A ] [ L ] [ V ] [ E ] [ X ] (14)				COMP. SUBCODE [ E ] (15)		VALVE SUBCODE [ D ] (16)	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17) [ 8 ] [ 0 ]		EVENT YEAR [ 8 ] [ 0 ]		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [ 0 ] [ 2 ] [ 1 ]		OCCURRENCE CODE [ 0 ] [ 1 ]		REPORT TYPE [ T ]		REVISION NO. [ 0 ]			
ACTION TAKEN [ X ] (18)		FUTURE ACTION [ X ] (19)		EFFECT ON PLANT [ Z ] (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD [ Z ] (21)		HOURS [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ 0 ] (22)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [ Y ] (23)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [ N ] (24)	
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [ A ] (25)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [ W ] [ 0 ] [ 3 ] [ 0 ] (26)											

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Operator error resulted in the opening of CV-3030 during a routine quarter-ly valve ISI surveillance activity. Valve CV-3001 (containment spray valve) was the intended valve to be cycled. The handswitches for CV-3030 and CV 3001 are side by side on the main control console. Corrective action and additional details are provided on the attachment.

FACILITY STATUS (1) (5) (E) (28) % POWER (0) (9) (0) (29) NA OTHER STATUS (30)  
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) Licensed Operator DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (1) (6) (Z) (33) (Z) (34) NA AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)  
 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
1	7	0	0	0	37	38	NA			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	80			

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
18	0000	40	NA

1 9		7 8		9 10		80	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)							
TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
Z (42)		NA					

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) Press Release  
2 0 1 Y (44) 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY

Attachment to LER 80-021/T-0

PALISADES PLANT

Docket 50-255

License DPR-20

Description of Occurrence

During routine testing of valves at approximately 1930 on July 25, 1980, an operator inadvertently opened the isolation valve between the containment sump and engineered-safeguards pumps P-54B and P-54C (containment spray), P-67B (LPSI) and P-66B and P-66C (HPSI). The valve (CV-3030) is normally closed, remains closed during the injection phase of a safety injection sequence, and is opened by low level in the Safety Injection and Refueling Water (SIRW) tank. The corresponding valve (CV-3029) in the second line from the containment sump to the redundant set of engineered-safeguards pumps was closed. CV-3030 remained open until approximately 0730 on July 27, 1980. Determination that this occurrence was reportable occurred at 1215 on July 28, 1980.

Significance/Probable Consequences

The open valve caused the pumps described above to have two suction paths; one from the SIRW tank (normal) and another from the normally dry containment sump. During this event, the plant was operating at approximately 90 percent power and the misaligned valve did not have any adverse impact on plant operation or on public health and safety. Under postulated accident conditions with high containment pressure (eg, greater than SIRW tank head of approximately 32 psig), the affected set of LPSI, HPSI and containment spray pumps could become airborne. In addition, under postulated accident conditions a release path from containment to the vented SIRW tank could exist until the Recirculation Actuation Signal occurs. The alternate set of HPSI, LPSI and containment spray pumps would have had their normal suction supply from the SIRW tank. A review of operating records revealed no inoperable engineered safety features associated with the unaffected flow path.

Corrective Actions

After discovery of CV-3030 being open, the valve was closed. The operator involved was relieved of watchstanding duties, provided additional counseling as to his responsibilities and attentiveness while on duty, and after resumption of duties will be closely observed by the Shift Supervisor.

The valve's position is displayed on the control panel and changes of position of the valve are recorded on a data logger. "Benchmarks" indicating normal system alignments for power operation have been placed on control room panels to aid operators in determining off-normal conditions. The shift turnover checklist has been revised to include verification of system alignment of all engineered safety features by comparison of switch positions and indicating lights with their benchmarks. CV-3029, CV-3030 and other valves essential for engineered safety features performance have been added to the checklist. The checklist also includes a requirement to document any keys inserted into keylocks and to explain their presence. Periodic review of data logger printouts are being performed to detect system alignment changes.

This occurrence has been discussed with Shift Supervisors and other licensed operators. Their responsibilities in maintaining correct system alignments and in recognizing the significance of off-normal alignments was re-emphasized.

Attachment to LER 80-021/T-0  
August 6, 1980

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To provide continuity during shift change periods, Shift Technical Advisor (STA) relief times have been staggered by two hours from the remainder of the shift. The STA's responsibility in providing engineering evaluation for varying plant operating conditions has been re-emphasized.