No. 76- 1517 Logging Date 3/30/76

NRC SECRETARIAT

TO:
- ☐ Commissioner _____ Date _____
- ☒ Exec. Dir./Oper.
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- ☐ Gen. Counsel
- ☐ Solicitor
- ☐ Secretary
- ☐ _____

Incoming: Robert E. Jones, H.R.

From: _____

To: Chairman Anders Date 3/25/76

Subject: Distressed to learn of the action of the AS&LB in calling public hearings re Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2.

- ☒ Prepare reply for signature of:
  - ☐ Chairman
  - ☐ Commissioner _____
  - ☒ EDO, GC, CL, SOL, PA, SECY SUSPENSE: April 13
  - ☐ Signature block omitted
  - ☐ _____
  - ☐ Return original of incoming with response

- ☐ For direct reply*
- ☐ For appropriate action
- ☐ For information
- ☐ For recommendation

Rec'd Off. Dir.
Date 3/30/76
Time 4:15

Remarks: Logged ex parte. Cy of incoming to OGC, OCA, Secy, AS&LB.
OCA to acknowledge.
Original to Docket File.
Send cy of response to NRC-62 DGSS.

For the Commission: _____

*Send three (3) copies of reply to Secy Mail Facility

NRC-62 ACTION SLIP

FROM:
Rep. Robert E. Jones

TO:
Chairman Anders

ACTION CONTROL	DATES
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DATE OF DOCUMENT 3/25/76

PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF:
☐ CHAIRMAN
☐ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OTHER: Gossick

DESCRIPTION ☒ LETTER ☐ MEMO ☐ REPORT ☐ OTHER

Distressed to learn of action of the ASLB in calling public hearings on whether Browns Ferry should be permitted to go back into operation

Encl: Ltr to Yore 3/25/76

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS

Send copy of reply to DSS

LPDR

SECY 76-1517

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ASSIGNED TO:	DATE

NO LEGAL OBJECTIONS
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☐ EDO ADMIN & CORRES BR
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COMMENTS, NOTIFY:
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JCAE NOTIFICATION RECOMMENDED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

NRC FORM 232 (11-75)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL

ROBERT E. JONES
5TH DISTRICT, ALABAMA

HOME ADDRESS:
SCOTTSBORO, ALABAMA

COMMITTEES:
PUBLIC WORKS
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
March 25, 1976

Mr. William A. Anders, Chairman
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Anders:

I was most distressed to learn of the action of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in calling public hearings regarding Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

A copy of my letter to Mr. James R. Yore, Acting Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is enclosed for your information.

The expense of public hearings and the exorbitant cost to electric power consumers in the Tennessee Valley Authority area caused by the delay for the hearings is uncalled for.

It would seem any responsible public agency should be required to examine the background of petitioners who seek to intervene and thus delay and impede projects to the total cost of the public.

Sincerely,

Robert E. Jones

J:cvh
Enclosures

HOME ADDRESS:
SCOTTSBORO, ALABAMA

TRANSPORTATI
CHAIRMAN

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 25, 1976

Mr. James R. Yore
Acting Chairman
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Yore:

I have been told that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has ordered public hearings regarding whether Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 should be permitted to go back into operation.

Coming as it does after full and complete review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, such a hearing is a flagrant abuse of regulatory process and a complete waste of time and government funds. In addition, delay in operation of the units is costing Tennessee Valley Authority consumers approximately $10 million a month for increased fuel costs.

I want to strongly protest this delay and point out that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has an obligation to the public to look into the background and qualifications of petitioners to intervene as well as into the substance of any claims.

Before ordering a hearing, it would certainly seem appropriate to determine whether or not the allegations are some fiction of the petitioner. If the foolishness of unexamined petitions continue, there will be no fact finding of any finality nor an administrative decision worthy of its salt.

Such travesties of justice are all the more absurd when the hearings are based on the charges of some prejudiced person with a notorious reputation for being discredited time and time again. When the petitioner is an attorney, representing himself and other similar landowners, and

has chronically sought to delay and impede development of numerous nuclear generating facilities, it would seem his motives and background should be carefully examined before the public is put to the expense of a hearing and the extra cost resulting from delays in operation of a power plant.

If the people in the administrative side of government are going to examine the facts alleging injury, they owe the responsibility to all the people to see who is making the allegations.

An agency which is to be only a citadel to receive the complaints of chronic gripers ought to get out of the business. There will be nothing but constant agitation without substance. If those kind of people are going to be allowed to constantly visit this kind of injury on the public, there should be some remedial legislative effort made to dampen your reception to delay. These preliminary sparring exhibitions should be ended.

It seems to me that you have over extended your authority in your miscalculation of and callousness for the energy problem of this country.

My hope is that more substantial thoughts will be given to this whole problem rather than acquiescence to the gadflies that seek interventio

For your information, I am enclosing an outline of the extensive review and testing procedures which have been accomplished already at Browns Ferry.

Sincerely,

Robert E. Jones

J:cvh
Enclosures

cc: Honorable John O. Pastore
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Mr. William A. Anders, Chairman
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

MAJOR REVIEWS OF BROWNS FERRY FOLLOWING THE MARCH 22, 1975, FIRE

I. TVA review

Immediately following the March 22, 1975, fire, TVA initiated a fact-finding investigation into events leading up to, during, and after the incident until plant conditions were stabilized. The review was conducted by a special committee composed of TVA management from various professional disciplines. Other committees were subsequently formed to study closely many specific aspects of the overall situation and to recommend TVA actions with regard to these items. In addition, a comprehensive report, "Plan for Evaluation, Repair, and Return to Service of Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 as a Result of the March 22, 1975, Fire," has been prepared that fully discusses all aspects of the fire, its effects, and plans for restoration activities. This four-volume report was initially submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on April 13, 1975, and has been supplemented and modified as more detailed information became available. The report is very comprehensive and involved hundreds of TVA engineers, scientists, management employees, and outside consultants. It has been reviewed in detail by several segments of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and has been available to the public through the Public Document Room.

II. Inspection and Enforcement Review

Upon notification that the fire was in progress the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) dispatched investigators to the site. They performed a detailed on-site investigation into the events surrounding the fire. The I&E investigation was very detailed and took about two and one-half months. A total of 17 investigators took part in the investigation which culminated in issuance of a voluminous report on July 28, 1975.

III. NRC staff review

The NRC staff reviewed in detail all aspects of the TVA plans for restoration of the Browns Ferry plant. The NRC review included detailed evaluation of fire damage, fire protection syste administrative controls, design modifications, fire stop designs, fire detection systems, and the retesting program. Results of the NRC staff investigations are summarized in their "Safety Evaluation by the Division of Operating Reactors Supporting the Operation After the Restoration and Modification of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Following the March 22, 1975 Fire," issued February 23, 1976.

The NRC review was performed over a many-month period. The staff concluded that pending resolution of some items "the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation of the facility as restored and modified." (Quote from p. 10-1 of the NRC staff Safety Evaluation, February 23, 197

IV ACRS Review

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards performed an independent review of the fire and restoration activities.

On February 27, 1976, TVA and the NRC staff met with the Browns Ferry ACRS subcommittee charged with conducting a detailed review of the repairs and modifications that are to be made before restart of the fire-affected units. This was a full day meeting, open to the public, during which TVA and the NRC made detailed presentations covering all aspects of the evaluation of fire damage, plant cleanup, repair and design modifications that will be implemented and answered questions from the ACRS subcommittee which had arisen as a result of their review. Then on March 4, 1976, TVA and the NRC staff met with the full ACRS to further review the fire and restoration activities. This meeting was also open to the public. ACRS review resulted in an affirmative recommendation regarding restart of the Browns Ferry units and summarized their findings in their March 11, 1976, letter from Dade W. Moellar to William A. Anders.

V. Special NRC Review Group

A special review group was appointed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to study the circumstances and implications of the Browns Ferry fire. The purpose of this review group was to identify the broad lessons to be learned

from the fire and to make recommendations for the future based on these lessons. The review group report concludes ".....that the probability of disruptive fires of the magnitude of the Browns Ferry event is small and there is no need to restrict operation of nuclear power plants for public safety." (Quote from p. 3, Report of Special Review Group, February 28, 1976.)

VI. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

The JCAE investigated the Browns Ferry fire and held public hearings on the fire in September 1975. The hearing transcripts are available to the public and are part of the congressional record. (Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, September 16, 1975.)

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY RESTORATION ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS SINCE MARCH 22, 1975, CABLE FIRE

March 22	Cable fire at Browns Ferry
	Began identifying condition of the units, establishing minimum requirements for safe shutdown cooling, and installing temporary cables.
March 23	Established ad hoc committee to conduct official TVA investigation of March 22 fire.
March 26	Began cleanup of plant equipment and systems.
March 28	Established preliminary plans including six major categories of outage work: (1) cable repair, (2) cleanup, (3) drywell evaluation, (4) retests, (5) modifications, and (6) maintenance.
	Established division of responsibilities for repair and retests among DPP, DED, and DEC.
	Appointed DPP Outage Director.
	Established a "cleanup group" to prepare procedures and provide technical guidance for plant cleanup and evaluation of effects of fire residue.
	Established a Drywell Evaluation Team to determine condition of drywell.
March 31	Established daily telephone conferences between DPP, DEC, and DED to assist in planning and scheduling of restoration efforts.
April 3	Designated a DPP Overall Restoration Coordinator and principal coordinators for DPP, DED, and DEC.
	Prepared and distributed within TVA the outline for the overall "Plan for Evaluation, Repair, and Return to Service of Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2."
	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) meets on the subject of BFNP fire.
April 7	Courier mail service established between Knoxville, Chattanooga, Browns Ferry, and Muscle Shoals.

April 12	Meeting held in Chattanooga for final agreement on detailed plan for restoration of units 1 and 2. Attendees included the Manager of Power, Assistant Manager of Power, Director of Power Production, and other TVA management.
April 13	Detailed restoration plan hand carried to NRC in Washington.
April 15 & 16	First formal meeting with DEC in Bethesda. NRC asked for additional information before commencement of cable removal.
April 17	NRC issued requirements for removal and restoration of fire-affected features and for operation of BFNP units 1 and 2.
April 18	DED issued plan for identification and evaluation of affected structures and mechanical equipment.
April 23 & 24	Second meeting with NRC at Browns Ferry (to review TVA's safety analysis for the plant configuration for cable removal).
May 2	NRC issues letter ordering all activities halted.
May 2-5	TVA met with NRC to develop restoration technical specifications.
May 3	TVA submits to NRC the safety evaluation for plant configuration for cable removal with fuel remaining in the reactor pressure vessels. TVA makes decision to remove fuel from units 1 and 2 vessels to speed up cable removal, cable termination, and other work in the reactor vessel which could more easily be done with the fuel out of the reactor vessels. TVA publishes first schedule for return to service of units 1 and 2--unit 1, December 1, 1975, and unit 2, September 14, 1975. Main plant activities during month of May were cleanup of fire residue and installation of temporary cables for safe shutdown cooling.
May 7	Ad hoc committee releases final report of its official investigation. NRC issues letter permitting resumption of activities.

May 9	NRC issues Safety Evaluation Report supporting license amendment to change technical specifications to take into account existing conditions at plant.
May 29	TVA establishes top-level Browns Ferry Management Review Committee including the Manager of Power, the Manager of Engineering Design and Construction, and other affected division directors and principal staff.
	Submittal of revised safety analysis report to NRC for cable removal (revision was made to allow removal of fuel from both units 1 and 2).
June 2	NRC issues letter with instructions for converting and retaining damaged cables and cable trays.
June 13	TVA met with NRC in Bethesda and presented proposed design changes resulting from evaluation of the March 22 fire.
	NRC issues Safety Evaluation Report supporting license amendment to change technical specifications to permit defueling units 1 and 2. Letter also approved plans for removal of fire-affected features.
June 16	Commencement of removal of units 1 and 2 drywell leads.
	Additional engineering manpower for DEC Modifications Group started reporting at site.
June 22	Units 1 and 2 reactor pressure vessel head removal began in preparation for fuel removal.
	NRC I&E issued inspection report with no items of noncompliance.
June 25	Installation of temporary cables complete for I&E and plant configuration (configuration allowing cable removal).
July 1	TVA met with NRC in Bethesda to describe design changes and cable splicing for plant restoration.
	Fuel removal began on unit 2 (fuel removal was delayed from NRC approval date of June 13 until July 1 because of final work in getting in the physical plant configuration required by the safety analysis report and removal of the

	drywell heads and reactor pressure vessel heads).
July 3	Fuel removal began on unit 1.
	First penetration fire test conducted at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant test facility.
July 11	TVA met with NRC in Bethesda to discuss TVA's administrative controls for fire protection.
July 13	Reactor building cleanup in final stages.
July 17	Fuel removal completed on unit 2.
July 18	Fuel removal completed on unit 1.
July 28	NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement issues its report on the fire (about two inches in thickness).
July 31	Joint Committee on Atomic Energy announces that hearings would be held on the BFNP fire.
August 1	First cutting of fire-damaged cables began.
	TVA agrees with NRC to repull divisional cables.
August 13	NRC requested additional informational necessary to complete review to permit commencement of restoration work.
August 18	Fire-damaged cable cutting and removal of cable trays and conduit essentially complete.
August 19 and 20	TVA met with NRC to discuss restoration plan, especially in the areas of fire protection water systems, fire barriers, and use of polyurethane in penetration seals.
August 28	TVA met with NRC in Bethesda regarding additional NRC design requirements.
	NRC issues letter accepting TVA criteria for determining what structural and mechanical components must be replaced and authorized proceeding with this work. Letter withheld approval of restoration of electrical components and wiring and approval of installation of fire protection system modifications.

	NRC forwards to TVA report, dated July 30, of NRC consultant's analysis of TVA's plans for upgrading plant fire protection.
September 2	TVA answers NRC I&E report and alleged violations.
	NRC approves remaining restoration work and the design changes proposed in TVA's recovery plan (through 20th revision).
	NRC issues Safety Evaluation Report of restoration activities and fire protection system design changes as described in TVA's "Plan for Evaluation, Repair, and Return to Service of Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2" and revisions thereto up to and including revision 20. Letter authorized proceeding with restoration.
September 14	Removal of damaged concrete and steel from fire area complete.
September 16	TVA meets with JCAE in Washington.
September 28	Cleanup of building and mechanical components from fire residue complete.
October 1	TVA met with NRC in Bethesda to discuss TVA's plans for removal of existing penetration sealant material and to discuss the new design for penetrations. NRC gave oral approval to begin removal of existing sealant materials.
October 3	All DED drawings for construction of fire protection systems complete and issued.
October 6	Commenced installation of cable tray hangers and cable trays.
	Completed liquid-penetrant examination of piping and components which were exposed to fire residue (no stress corrosion problems apparent).
October 7	Completed installation of cable trays.
October 8	Established weekly DPP, DED, and DEC management meetings at Browns Ferry to plan, organize, and implement all work associated with restoration of units 1 and 2.

October 22	TVA met with NPC in Knoxville to discuss (1) zones of influence between electical divisions, (2) extension of the auto water fire extinguishing system, (3) application of fire barriers to protect conduit, (4) design of the high-pressure water fire protection system, and (5) further tests on electrical sleeve penetrations.
November 3	Commenced splicing of fire-damaged cables and installation of new cables where required. Also began installation of conduit.
	TVA submits SAR C and revised technical specifications.
November 9	Commenced installation of fire protection electrical equipment and piping.
November 12 and 13	TVA met with NRC at Browns Ferry to discuss (1) the fire protection commitments still outstanding with NRC, (2) the problem of physical separation of electrical divisions, and (3) outstanding items required by NRC before NRC could prepare a safety evaluation report for return to operation of units 1 and 2.
November 26	Final Browns Ferry penetration test at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant test facility. This was the tenth in a series of tests.
November 30	Commenced termination of cables.
December 18	NRC notifies TVA that they are delaying review of fire hazards analysis and fire protection analyses pending review by TVA's fire protection consultant.
	NRC approves electrical design changes described in TVA's recovery plan.
December 19	NRC approves revised technical specifications and SAR C.
December 21	Commencement of preoperational retests of unit 2.
December 31	NRC approval to install electrical penetrations according to DED design.
January 9	DED restoration work essentially complete.
January 11	Splicing of fire-damaged cables essentially complete.
January 21	TVA submits to NRC responses to comments from TVA's

	fire consultant and other items NRC has required.
January 22	TVA met with NRC to discuss TVA's responses to comments from TVA's fire consultant and other final cleanup items TVA had been asked to submit in preparation for NRC preparing their safety evaluation for return to operation.
February 23	NRC issues Safety Evaluation Report supporting return to full power operation of BFNP units 1 and 2.
February 27	ACRS Browns Ferry subcommittee meets with NRC and TVA for detailed discussion of repairs and modifications at BFNP.
February 28	NRC Special Review Group issues their study of the BFNP fire.
March 4	ACRS meets with NRC and TVA to review repairs and modifications at BFNP.
March 11	ACRS issues affirmative recommendation regarding restart of BFNP units 1 and 2.