AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 757

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: Tennessee Valley Auth. Chattanooga, Tenn. 37401 J.E. Gilleland	DATE OF DOC 1-20-75	DATE REC'D 1-23-75	LTR XXX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. E.CASE	ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XX SENT LOCAL PDR XX		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-259 260	

DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURES: Browns Ferry Plant Units 1 & 2 NonRoutine 30-Day Report re failure in the piping system....

(1 cy encl rec'd)

ACKNOWLEDGED
Do Not Remove

PLANT NAME: Browns Ferry 1 & 2

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION DHL 1-24-75

BUTLER (S) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (S) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (S) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (S) W/ Copies	STOLZ (S) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (S) W/ Copies
PARR (S) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (S) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	SPEIS (S) W/ Copies
KNIEL (S) W/ Copies	PURPLE (S) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE (2)	TECH REVIEW	DENTON	LIC. ASST.	A/T IND
AEC PDR (2)	SCHROEDER	GRIMES	DIGGS (S)	BRAITMAN
OGC, ROOM P-506-A	MACCARRY	GAMMILL	GEARIN (S)	SALTZMAN
MUNTZING/STAFF	KNIGHT	KASTNER	GOULBOURNE (S)	B. HURT
CASE	PAWLICKI	BALLARD	KREUTZER (E)	
GIAMBUSSO	SHAO	SPANGLER	LEE (S)	PLANS
BOYD	STELLO		MAIGRET (S)	MCDONALD
MOORE (S) (BWR)	HOUSTON	ENVIRO	REED (E)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (S) (PWR)	NOVAK	MULLER	SERVICE (S)	DUBE w/input
SKOVHOLT (S)	ROSS	DICKER	SHEPPARD (S)	E. COUPE
GOLLER (S)	IPPOLITO	KNIGHTON	SLATER (E)	R. Hartfield (2)
P. COLLINS	TEDESCO	YOUNGBLOOD	SMITH (S)	KLECKER
DENISE	LONG	REGAN	TEETS (S)	F. WILLIAMS
REG OPR	LAINAS	PROJECT LDR	WILLIAMS (E)	
FILE & REGION (2)	BENAROYA		WILSON (S)	
T.R. WILSON	STEELE	VOLLMER	HARLESS	INGRAM (S)

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

1-LOCAL PDR Athens, Ala.	(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LABS	1-PDR SAN/LA/NY
1-TIC(ABERNATHY)	1-W. PENNINGTON, RM E-201 G.T.	1-BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1-NSIC(BUCHANAN)	1-CONSULTANTS NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1-G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1-ASLB		1-AGMED(RUTH GUSSMAN) RM B-127 G.T.
1-NEWTON ANDERSON		1-J. RUNKLES, RM E-201 G.T.
5-ACRS SENT TO LIC. ASST. H. Smith 1-24-75		

BN

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

January 20, 1975



Mr. Edson G. Case
Acting Director of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. Case:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33, DPR-52

The enclosed report, submitted as required by Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Technical Specification 6.7.2.B(3), is to provide details concerning Browns Ferry's units 1 and 2 control bay air conditioning equipment. It was discovered on December 19, 1974, that the control bay air conditioning equipment could be disabled by a single failure.

Very truly yours,

J E Gilleland

J. E. Gilleland
Assistant to the Manager of Power

Enclosure
CC (Enclosure):
Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



757

ENCLOSURE

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

NONROUTINE 30-DAY REPORT

Received with letter dated 1-20-75

Description of Occurrence

Certain single failures in the piping system of the control bay air conditioning equipment (CBACE) could result in the loss of cooling water to all control bay cooling equipment.

Causes of Deficiency

The deficiency arises due to the fact that the normal and emergency water supplies to the control bay chillers share a common distribution header. The discharge lines have a similar situation.

Safety Implications

Since the operability of the control bay air conditioning equipment must be assured, system separation will be desirable to increase reliability. This will require a provision for separate operation of the emergency cooling equipment from the normal control bay air conditioning system.

Corrective Measures

Seismically qualified piping and valves will be added to the existing system to obtain the desired separation. This involves connecting the EECW water supply directly to the emergency chiller and providing separate discharge piping from this chiller into the EECW discharge conduit. ECN-L1321 was issued to make these design changes. Corrective measures will be implemented by March 15, 1975.