

# ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

## REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9204010319 DOC.DATE: 92/03/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL:50-281 Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Virginia Electric & Power 05000281  
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 KANSLER,M.R. Virginia Power (Virginia Electric & Power Co.)  
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Forwards corrected Page 3 to LER 92-001-00, correcting date from 910128 to 920228.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 141  
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:lcy NMSS/IMSB/PM.

05000281

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL		RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD2-2 LA	1 1		PD2-2 PD	1 1
	BUCKLEY,B	1 1			
INTERNAL:	ACNW	2 2		ACRS	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1		AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	AEOD/ROAB/DSP	2 2		NRR/DET/EMEB 7E	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10	1 1		NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/OEAB	1 1		NRR/DREP/PRPB11	2 2
	NRR/DST/SELB 8D	1 1		NRR/DST/SICB8H3	1 1
	NRR/DST/SPLB8D1	1 1		NRR/DST/SRXB 8E	1 1
	<del>REG FILE</del> 02	1 1		RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1
	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE,J.H	3 3		L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	NRC PDR	1 1		NSIC MURPHY,G.A	1 1
	NSIC POORE,W.	1 1		NUDOCS FULL TXT	1 1
NOTES:		1 1			

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK,  
 ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION  
 LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED  
 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33

Virginia Electric and Power Company  
Surry Power Station  
P. O. Box 315  
Surry, Virginia 23883

March 26, 1992


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Serial No.: 92-139  
Docket No.: 50-281  
License No.: DRP-37

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, on February 26, 1992, Virginia Electric and Power Company submitted Licensee Event Report 92-001-00 for Unit 2. On page 3 of 4, paragraph 3.0, Cause of the Event, line 5, the date January 28, 1991 should have read January 28, 1992. Attached is a revised page 3 of 4. Please remove the old page 3 of 4 and replace with the attached page revision. Should you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



M. R. Kansler  
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

010003

9204010319 920326  
PDR ADOCK 05000281  
S PDR

JE22

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Surry Power Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	— 0 0 1	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

**2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS**

The charging pumps provide makeup and seal water injection flow to the Reactor Coolant System during normal operation and also serve as high head safety injection pumps in a design basis accident. Three charging pumps are provided. Each pump can provide 100% of normal charging or design high head safety injection flow. The pumps were not fully operable in accordance with the definition in Technical Specification 1.0.D. However, either the "A" or "B" charging pump was capable of performing its high head safety injection function during a design basis accident until the "C" charging pump could be placed in service. Engineering calculations performed previously for Station Blackout indicate that a charging pump could run while its associated damper was closed for up to four hours. Therefore, the accident design basis assumptions would have been satisfied and no actual or potential consequences to public health and safety were created by the event.

**3.0 CAUSE OF THE EVENT**

The January 30, 1992 event was caused by mechanical failure due to an oil leak from the "A" charging pump bearing and the damper remaining closed on the "B" charging pump. The failure of the damper resulted from human error due to a procedural deficiency and weakness in training on the manual operation of the damper. On January 28, 1992 testing had been performed on the Emergency Ventilation System. This testing required the charging pump ventilation damper (2-VS-MOD-201B) for the "B" charging pump to be de-energized and the handwheel manually depressed. The charging pump ventilation dampers are equipped with a manual cut off switch which is actuated when the handwheel is depressed for manual operation. The cut-off switch prevents injury due to unexpected restoration of power and is automatically reset when the handwheel is returned to the raised position. It was concluded that the handwheel was left in the manual position upon completion of the testing. The manual operation of the damper is infrequently performed and not covered by a procedure. In addition, the operator training program does not provide training on this feature.

**4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)**

Troubleshooting by on shift Operations and Maintenance personnel determined that the handwheel on the operator for damper 2-VS-MOD-201B was depressed for manual operation which prevented the

9204010320 920326  
PDR ADOCK 05000281  
S PDR