

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6
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 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

5	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
V A S P S 2														0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0																4 1 1 1 1																																																																						
LICENSEE CODE														LICENSE NUMBER																LICENSE TYPE				CAT																																																																		

CONT
 REPORT SOURCE L E 0 1 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 6 2 5 8 2 8 0 7 12 0 18 2 9
 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 With the unit at full power, performance of P.T. 6.0 disclosed that control rods
013 from Power Cabinet 2AC would not respond to demand signal. Since the problem was
014 in the power cabinet, the provisions of T.S.3.12.C.3 were applicable. This event
015 is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b(2). Since reactor control was maintained at all
016 times and the control rods were returned to service within the time span allowed
017 by T.S.3.0.1, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

100

C E		SYSTEM CODE		R B		CAUSE CODE		E		CAUSE SUBCODE		G		COMPONENT CODE		I N S T R U		COMP. SUBCODE		X		VALVE SUBCODE		Z	
7	6	5	10	11	12	12	13	13	18	15	16	15	20	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29	
SER/RD REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		8 2		—		0 3 4		/		0 3		L		—		0		NO.		0		32	
33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45	
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		A Z		EFFECT ON PLANT		Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD		Z		HOURS		0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		N	
33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45	
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		N		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		W 1 2 0		25		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 | The rod failure was caused by a blown fuse and a failed phase control card in
111 | the power cabinet. The failed components were replaced and all rods were
112 | tested to verify proper operation.

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FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
115	E (28)	1100 (29)		N/A	B (31)	Periodic Test 6.0

[illegible]

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES.

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
0	0	0
0	37	Z
0	38	

N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES						EO
	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION				(4)
11	0	0	0	0	0	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
11191	7 (42)	N/A

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) ~~8207270228-820720~~ PDR ADDCK 05000280
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

DUPE

NAME OF PERSON: J. I. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184

NAME OF SUBSCRIBER J. L. Wilson

$\Delta H_{\text{vap}} = (80.4) \times 357 - 3184$

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 82-034/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 06-25-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Rod Control Urgent Failure

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With the Unit at full power, it was discovered through performance of PT-6.0 (Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement), that the rods powered by power cabinet 2AC (Group 2 of shutdown bank A, Control Banks A and C) would not respond to demand signal. It was determined that the problem was in the power cabinet, which is external to the control rod drive mechanisms. Therefore, the provisions of Technical Specification 3.12.C.3 were applicable. This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The control rods must be capable of being inserted to fulfill part of the shutdown margin requirement necessary to shut down the reactor. At all times during this event, all control rods were capable of being tripped. The controlling bank, D Control Bank, remained operable throughout this event. Boron is used in addition to control rods for reactivity control of the reactor. There were numerous ways in which boron could have been injected into the core if needed, including the charging pumps, Boron Injection Tank, RWST, and the accumulators. The Control Rods were returned to service in 2 hours, 50 min., which is within the limits prescribed by Technical Specification 3.0.1.

3. CAUSE:

Failure of the control rods to respond to the demand signals was caused by a blown fuse and a failed phase control circuit card in the 2AC power cabinet.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to initiate A.P 1-1.1 (Rod Control System Malfunction) and to begin repairs to the power cabinet.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The failed fuse and card were identified and replaced. The Control Rods were then returned to service in accordance with PT 6.0.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The failure of the fuse and card are considered random failures. Therefore, no further action is required.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.