


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

R. H. LEASBURG
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

March 9, 1982



Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Serial No. 329B
NO/RGS:lms
Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Gentlemen:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
CABLE TERMINATIONS AND SPLICES
I.E. BULLETIN 79-01B 90-DAY REVIEW
SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 2

This letter provides additional information to our letter Serial No. 329A dated February 24, 1982, regarding cable terminations and splices in the Containment of Surry Unit 2.

In our response to the Safety Evaluation Report on environmental qualification submitted on August 24, 1981, we indicated that, "all terminal blocks in safety-related circuits located inside containment were replaced with qualified Raychem splices (WCSF-N)." During a January, 1982 review meeting with our architect-engineer on the environmental qualification modification project, we discovered that apparently a number of cable terminations on Unit 2 had not been modified. In response to this information, we conducted a search of our documentation files and made a full-power Unit 2 Containment entry on February 12, 1982 to check a sample of the circuits. As a result of the Containment entry, it appeared that a large percentage of the subject cable terminations had not been replaced with the qualified Raychem splices.

In our February 24, 1982 letter to you, we provided our plans to modify the cable terminations in the Unit 2 Containment and justification for continued operation of the unit until the next scheduled outage. Further assessment of the cable termination matter lead us to the conclusion that Unit 2 should be removed from service as a prudent measure to fully evaluate the manner of cable terminations for the 73 "Master List" Class IE devices.

On February 27, 1982, Unit 2 was removed from service to complete the cable termination work. During the outage, our investigation determined that 31 of the devices were properly terminated. These terminations were either by direct cable feedthroughs from the equipment to electrical penetrations or design modifications implemented in 1981 utilizing qualified Raychem splices. In this outage, Raychem splice material was utilized to terminate 41 of the remaining 42 devices. Terminations for one inoperable solenoid operated valve will be reworked during the upcoming May 1982 Spring Maintenance Outage.

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In summary, all terminations identified on the "Master List" will have qualified splices installed when the final SOV is made operable. This schedule is consistent with the June 1, 1982 implementation date given in I.E. Bulletin 79-01B. Our previous statement that the terminations had been completed was based on a misinterpretation of information supplied from the field in preparation of our "90-Day Response". The normal review process failed to detect this error. We believe this is an isolated occurrence and does not reflect an inherent weakness in our review process.

If you require any additional information in this matter, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



R. H. Leasburg

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Mr. Zoltan R. Rosztoczy, Branch Chief
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