NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: V A S P S 2 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 1 0 7 8 1 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 1 3 0 8 1 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, "A" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open while per-
03 forming PT-8.1. T.S.4.1, table 4.1-1, requires PT-8.1 to be performed monthly. This
04 event is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). The "B" Reactor Trip Breaker operated
05 satisfactorily during the performance of PT-8.1. Therefore, the health and safety of
06 the public were not affected.
07
08

09 | SYSTEM CODE: I A (11) | CAUSE CODE: E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: B (13) | COMPONENT CODE: C K T B R X (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: A (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 1 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 0 4 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: A (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: W 1 2 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 A sporadic failure of the under voltage device prevented the Breaker from opening. A
11 missing bushing created excessive playin the UV device's linkage. The under voltage
12 device was replaced and the breaker tested.
13
14

15 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): N/A | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Routine test

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): N/A

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): N/A

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): N/A

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION (43): N/A

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): N/A | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-2941 Ext 210

8102050582

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 81-004/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 1-7-81

TITLE of REPORT: REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FAILURE

1. DESCRIPTION of EVENT:

With Unit No.2 at 100% power, "A" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open while performing PT-8.1 (Monthly Reactor Protection System Logic). The "A" Reactor Trip bypass breaker was racked in at this time, The bypass breaker receives a trip signal from "B" train of RPS. Technical Specification 4.1, table 4.1-1, requires PT-8.1 to be performed monthly. This event is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT REQUIPMENT:

The power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDM) is fed through two series reactor trip breakers. Each trip breaker receives a trip signal from independent and redundant actuation trains. The tripping of either breaker will remove power from the CRDM's, thereby inserting the control rods into the core. The "B" Reactor Trip Breaker operated satisfactory during the performance of PT-8.1 and would have performed its intended function. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The failure of "A" Reactor Trip Breaker was caused by a sporadic failure of the under voltage tripping device. The failure of a small retaining clip had allowed a bushing to be dislodged, thereby creating an excessive amount of play in the mechanical linkage of the under voltage device.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker was replaced and tested satisfactory.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The under voltage device was replaced. The malfunctioning under voltage device was operated approximately 100 times in an attempt to duplicate the event. The under voltage device failed to function only once.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Electrical Maintenance procedures will be revised to address the inspection of the retaining devices.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

Since the other under voltage devices were inspected and failed to show any similar problems, this appears to be an isolated case.