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REPORT SOURCE

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DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

0 2 During an administrative review of completed Periodic Test (PT) procedures discrepan-

0 3 cies in the documenting of the performance of PT-24.5B, 18.4, 17.2 and 17.3 were noted.

0 4 Failure to \_\_\_\_\_ the PT's is contrary to T.S. 4.18, 4.1, 4.5.A.2 and 4.5.A.3

0 5 respectively and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(3). The affected components did meet the

0 6 required acceptance criteria when the next scheduled PT was performed. Therefore, the

0 7 health and safety of the public were not affected.

[illegible]

1 0 The cause of the events was due to an oversight on the part of operations personnel.

1 1 Appropriate personnel have been reinstructed and an improved PT management system is

1 2 under development.

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 18101090 652 N/A NRC USE ONLY

NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO: 50-281  
REPORT NO: 80-047/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 12-05-80

### MISSED PERIODIC TESTS

#### 1. EVENT DESCRIPTION

During an administrative review of completed Periodic Test (PT) procedures, certain discrepancies in the documenting of completed PT's were noted. The following is a description of the discrepancies: (1) PT-24.5B (RCP fire detection system) cannot be documented as being completed during the month of August, 1980 (2) PT-18.4 (Boron Injection Tank Level Check) was not scheduled for two of the four weeks in August, 1980 (3) PT-17.2 (Inside Recirc Spray Pumps) cannot be documented as being completed prior to the August, 1980 start up. (4) PT-17.3 (Outside Recirc Spray System) cannot be documented as being completed prior to the August, 1980 start up.

Failure to perform PT-24.5B is contrary to Technical Specification 4.18.A.3. Failure to perform PT-18.4 is contrary to Technical Specification 4.1, Table 4.1-1. Failure to perform PT-17.2 and 17.3 is contrary to Technical Specification 4.5.A.2 and 4.5.A.3 respectively.

The above events are being reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(3).

#### 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT

##### PT-24.5B

Satisfactory PT's were completed on 7-5-80 and 9-7-80 with the PT schedule for 8-5-80 apparently missed. The satisfactory completion of the PT on 9-7-80, shows that this fire detection circuit was operable between 7-5-80 and 9-7-80. In addition, other alarms are available to the operator that would be indicative of a RCP fire, e.g. RCP bearing temperature.

##### PT-18.4

Satisfactory PT's were completed on 8-7-80 and 8-26-80. The satisfactory completion of the PT on 8-26-80, shows that the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) level was within specification between 8-7-80 and 8-26-80. In addition, the Boric Acid Storage Tank, which is continuously recircled via the BIT did not have any unexplained changes in level during this two week period.

##### PT-17.2 & 17.3

Technical Specifications 4.5 has provisions for the waiving of these PT's during extended reactor shutdowns provide that they are performed prior to reactor start up. Both PT's were satisfactorily performed during the month of July, 1980. Preparations for unit start up following the replacement of the steam generators had been made for a July start up. However, the actual start up was delayed until the middle of August. These PT's had been performed to support the original start up date in July. These PT's were performed in September with satisfactory results. In addition, extensive component and system level testing of the Recirc Spray System was performed during the integrated Start Up Testing Program for Unit No. 2. For example, both the inside and outside Recirc Spray systems were tested during a major ESF test.

The above components did meet the required acceptance criteria when periodic testing was performed during the following month. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE

The cause of the events was due to an oversight on the part of operation personnel.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to verify that periodic testing had been performed on the affected components since the start up of Unit No. 2 on August, 1980.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION

All available documentation was reviewed in an attempt to locate any evidence of the completion of the missing PT's.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

An improved Periodic Test Management System is under development. This system should reduce the possibility of overdue PT's going unidentified past their grace period. This system, using an in house computer, should be operational early in 1981. In addition, a separate individual has been assigned to oversee the conduct of the Operational PT program. *an*

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS

None